This case has a long history. The issue currently before us is whether certain school districts, a special district board, and/or a county commission have standing to challenge Colorado's Taxpayer Bill of Rights ("TABOR"). Colo. Const. art. X, § 20. TABOR allows the people of Colorado to raise or prevent tax increases by popular vote, thereby limiting the power of Colorado's legislative bodies to levy taxes. On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), the district court held that plaintiffs had Article III standing but that they lacked political subdivision standing and prudential standing. Accordingly, the court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs appeal.
This case is rife with difficult issues, and we applaud the district court for its attempts to "don waders" and generate some cognizable structure out of the sludge. Nevertheless, we conclude that it could not properly reach its conclusions at this stage of litigation. Because we hold that the political subdivision plaintiffs are not barred by standing requirements, we reverse.
I.
Plaintiffs contend that TABOR denies them a "republican form of government" as guaranteed by Congress in the Colorado Enabling Act, ch. 139, 18 Stat. 474 (1875) ("Enabling Act"), because it takes power from the legislature and puts it into the hands of the people of Colorado in violation of the Guarantee Clause, see U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4, and the Enabling Act as enforced by the Supremacy Clause, see U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. In one of our prior opinions, we held that certain individual legislator plaintiffs had standing to make this claim and that the claim was not a nonjusticiable political question. See Kerr v. Hickenlooper , 744 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2014) (" Kerr I "). On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the matter to us for further consideration in light of its opinion in *1193Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Com'n , --- U.S. ----, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 192 L.Ed.2d 704 (2015). See Hickenlooper v. Kerr , --- U.S. ----, 135 S. Ct. 2927, 192 L.Ed.2d 956 (2015).
On remand, we held that the individual legislator plaintiffs lacked standing because they were asserting an institutional injury. Kerr v. Hickenlooper , 824 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2016) (" Kerr II "). We instructed the district court to determine whether any other plaintiffs had standing. Back at the district court, plaintiffs amended their complaint to add certain additional entities: eight school boards, the Board of County Commissioners of Boulder County, and a special district board. As noted, the district court thereafter dismissed the complaint.
TABOR prevents the state legislature and local entities from enacting new taxes or raising taxes except by popular vote. Particularly significant to plaintiffs in this case, TABOR prohibits state and local governments from appropriating revenue in excess of the prior year's spending, and it requires the state and local governments to refund taxpayers for revenues appropriated in excess of the prior year's spending. Colo. Const. art. X, § 20 (7)(a) & (d). TABOR also causes plaintiffs to incur costs from presenting matters to voters. Plaintiffs allege that these requirements inhibit them from performing their mandated responsibilities under Colorado law. See, e.g. , Colo. Const. art. XIV.1
As a condition of admitting Colorado to the Union, Congress required that the state's constitution "shall be republican in form." 18 Stat. 474. This language mimics the language from the Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law controls when federal and state law are in conflict with one another. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. Plaintiffs contend that TABOR denies them the republican form of government required of the state of Colorado by the Enabling Act and is thus unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.
II.
We review the district court's "dismissal for lack of standing de novo, applying the same standard used by the district court." Petrella v. Brownback , 697 F.3d 1285, 1292 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A]s in all standing inquiries, the critical question is whether at least one petitioner has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction." Horne v. Flores , 557 U.S. 433, 445, 129 S.Ct. 2579, 174 L.Ed.2d 406 (2009) (emphasis in original); see also Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found. , 454 U.S. 151, 160, 102 S.Ct. 205, 70 L.Ed.2d 309 (1981) ; Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. , 429 U.S. 252, 264 n.9, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). Thus, if at least one plaintiff can demonstrate standing, we need not consider standing for the other plaintiffs. The district court determined that the political subdivision plaintiffs established Article III standing and defendants do not contest this conclusion on appeal. Even so, the district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it concluded that two independent doctrines barred these plaintiffs: political subdivision standing and prudential standing. The issue before us is whether these other limitations indeed preclude the political subdivision plaintiffs from establishing standing.
*1194III.
We begin by determining whether there are "prudential standing" limitations preventing plaintiffs from challenging TABOR. Plaintiffs argue that in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. , 572 U.S. 118, 134 S.Ct. 1377, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014), the district court erred in examining these prudential concerns on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 We agree. In Lexmark , the Supreme Court described the label "prudential standing" as "misleading" and "inapt."3 See id. at 125, 127 n.3, 134 S.Ct. 1377. "Although the jurisprudence surrounding standing and jurisdiction has at times been muddled, we have clearly held that prudential standing is not a jurisdictional limitation ...." Niemi v. Lasshofer , 770 F.3d 1331, 1345 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Wilderness Soc. v. Kane Cnty ., 632 F.3d 1162, 1168 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). Accordingly, the district court should not have evaluated defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of prudential standing. See VR Acquisitions, LLC v. Wasatch Cnty ., 853 F.3d 1142, 1146 n.4 (10th Cir. 2017).
IV.
Properly situating the prudential standing inquiry does not complete our analysis. The district court also found that, independently of prudential standing concerns, the political subdivision plaintiffs are barred by political subdivision standing restrictions.4
It is true that political subdivisions generally lack standing to sue their *1195creating state. Housing Authority of Kaw Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v. City of Ponca City , 952 F.2d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 1991). But "the Supreme Court and courts of appeals have shied away from erecting an absolute bar." City of Hugo v. Nichols , 656 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 2011). In certain circumstances we have held that political subdivisions have standing, and two cases guide our analysis: City of Hugo, and Branson v. Romer , 161 F.3d 619 (10th Cir. 1998). The district court and plaintiffs differ in their interpretations of the scope of these holdings.5 Because we conclude that under either proffered formulation the district court erred in dismissing these claims on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, we need not determine the precise reach of these precedents.
Plaintiffs assert the essence of City of Hugo and Branson is that "a political subdivision has standing to bring a constitutional claim against its creating state when the substance of its claim relies on the Supremacy Clause and a putatively controlling federal law." Branson , 161 F.3d at 628. They identify the dispositive question as whether the right sought to be vindicated was "written to protect individual rights, as opposed to collective or structural rights." Id. Arguing that the political subdivision plaintiffs here, like those in Branson , seek to vindicate federal rights that are statutory, structural and collective rather than constitutional, individual and contractual, they urge the conclusion that as in Branson the political subdivision plaintiffs here have standing. The government does not contest that employing this interpretation of our precedents casts the present political subdivision plaintiffs under the precedential force of Branson rather than City of Hugo . Therefore, if this interpretation of our case law is to be applied, these plaintiffs are not barred by political subdivision standing considerations.
Alternatively, the district court, the government, and the dissent all read City of Hugo as requiring that "the federal statute being enforced must be 'directed at protecting political subdivisions.' "6
*1196Kerr v. Hickenlooper , 259 F. Supp. 3d 1178, 1188 (D. Colo. 2017) (" Kerr ") (citing City of Hugo , 656 F.3d at 1257 ). Scrutinizing plaintiffs' assertion that "the political-subdivision plaintiffs are seeking to enforce rights granted to them in the Enabling Act," id. at 1188, the district court countered that the Enabling Act's requirement that the Colorado constitution be "republican in form" was not designed for such plaintiffs. Instead, the district court concluded that nearby language in the Enabling Act revealed the requirement of "republican in form" as being granted to "the people of Colorado." Id. at 1191 (emphasis added). It surmised that the political subdivision plaintiffs had been granted no statutory rights to vindicate this interest, and that they were accordingly barred by political subdivision standing.
But we cannot decisively determine if the political subdivision plaintiffs here are excepted from the usual bar to political subdivision standing because doing so would require impermissibly delving into the merits of the case. Establishing who was intended to benefit from the Enabling Act's "republican in form" requirement necessarily begs the question of what a "Republican Form of Government" is, which is the issue ultimately to be resolved if any court ever succeeds in reaching the merits of this case. See Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court for State of Massachusetts , 373 F.3d 219, 226 (1st Cir. 2004) (proceeding to merits to review scope and meaning of "Republican Form of Government"). Even the district court modulated its conclusion that "republican in form" does not extend rights to the political subdivision plaintiffs by stating that it so finds "based on the present record." Kerr , 259 F. Supp. 3d at 1190-91. But the present record is insufficient to support this determination.
Throughout their various pleadings, plaintiffs maintain that a "Republican Form of Government" extends protections directly to these political subdivision plaintiffs that TABOR unconstitutionally intrudes upon. They offer several hooks hinting at their arguments on the merits of the case, including the observations that the Enabling Act recognized the existence of *1197both counties and public schools prior to Colorado's statehood, and that the constitution Colorado adopted pursuant to the Enabling Act embodied an interdependent structure between the state and its existing political subdivisions. See Aplt. Reply Br. at 21 n.13.7 Notably, plaintiffs allege that a "fully effective legislature is an essential component of a Republican Form of Government," and that the TABOR Amendment's substantial interference with the Colorado General Assembly's taxing power "renders [it] unable to fulfill its legislative obligations .... [and] similarly undermines the Republican Form of Government for all subordinate levels of government in the state." Aplt. App. at 1447 (Complaint at ¶108). They further argue that a "Republican Form of Government" necessarily extends to each lower level of government because acceptance of the contrary would beget complete evasion of this requirement through the delegation of powers to subordinate levels of government that were not equally "republican in form." Id. at 1424 (Complaint at ¶11). Plaintiffs have informed us that their case on the merits "will offer extensive historical evidence of and legal proof for the proper meaning of the Guarantee Clause and 'Republican Form of Government.' " Aplt. Reply Br. at 25 n.15.
In response, both the government and the district court valiantly struggle to conclusively establish that the political subdivision plaintiffs are not the beneficiaries of a "Republican Form of Government." They extend various conjectural standards in doing so, including that the constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government is a guarantee to the state that does not extend to individuals, Aple. Br. at 20,8 *1198and that this guarantee is to the people of the state, Kerr , 259 F.Supp. 3d at 1191. Citing a variety of reasons, the district court declared it "does not believe" that the requirement of a Constitution "republican in form" stretches to the political-subdivision plaintiffs. But each proposed rationale is insufficient to extricate the standing inquiry from the case on the merits, which is not presently before us on this appeal from the grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). See Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker , 450 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc) ("For purposes of the standing inquiry, the question is not whether the alleged injury rises to the level of a constitutional violation. That is the issue on the merits. For standing purposes, we ask only if there was an injury in fact, caused by the challenged action and redressable in court."), cert. denied , 549 U.S. 1245, 127 S.Ct. 1254, 167 L.Ed.2d 145 (2007) ; Day v. Bond , 500 F.3d 1127, 1137 (10th Cir. 2007) (" 'For purposes of standing,' we noted [in Walker ], 'the question cannot be whether the Constitution, properly interpreted, extends protection to the plaintiff's asserted right or interest,' because that would be a determination of the merits of the plaintiffs' claim under the guise of an evaluation of their standing.").
The district court forged on, concluding that "the political subdivision plaintiffs cannot be seeking to enforce a right to a Constitution 'republican in form' because they have no such right" and it "is not their injury to assert." Kerr , 259 F. Supp. 3d at 1191, 1192. This conclusion is problematic for two reasons: first, to some extent it contradicts the court's earlier finding that the political subdivision plaintiffs have personally suffered a concrete injury directly at the hand of TABOR; second, and more importantly, this is now dabbling in the merits of this case. Granted, we have previously explained that "the term 'legally protected interest' must do some work in the standing analysis ... [and] has independent force and meaning, without any need to open the door to merits considerations at the jurisdictional stage." Walker , 450 F.3d at 1093. We have not explained what that independent force and meaning are but, in any event, the present case falls nowhere near the illustrative list of situations we provided in which an asserted "legally protected interest" is not recognized.9
The district court cited Day to try to unwind the merits from the jurisdictional issue, stating that the standing issue of whether political subdivision plaintiffs "are enforcing rights granted to them by the Enabling Act" is "a completely different inquiry to whether a Republican form of government has been undermined by TABOR." Kerr , 259 F. Supp. 3d at 1192. But the distinction between these two inquiries dissolves when traced back to the root question: both inquires require first determining the meaning and purpose of the phrase "republican in form." The standing question and merit question here are not two separate and independent issues, analogous to Day , but are instead comparable to Walker : the merits of the plaintiffs' claims mirror the standing inquiry as it is *1199framed by the district court. See Day , 500 F.3d at 1138. "[T]he circumstances of this case present a rare instance in which the standing issue is intertwined and inseparable from the merits of the underlying claim." Largess , 373 F.3d at 224 ; see also Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. And Energy Workers Int'l Union v. Cont'l Carbon Co. , 428 F.3d 1285, 1292 (10th Cir. 2005) ("The underlying issue in determining whether the jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits is whether resolution of the jurisdictional question requires resolution of an aspect of the substantive claim.") (internal brackets and citation omitted); Sizova v. Nat. Inst. of Standards & Tech. , 282 F.3d 1320, 1324 (10th Cir. 2002) ("[S]ubject matter jurisdiction and the merits are considered to be intertwined when subject matter jurisdiction is dependent upon the same statute which provides the substantive claim in the case.") (internal brackets, quotation mark, and citation omitted);10 cf. Kennan, supra note 4 (arguing that questions of whether political subdivisions should be barred from bringing suit because it would impede state sovereignty can only be determined by addressing the merits of the subdivision's claims that state action violates the Supremacy Clause).
The various conclusions the district court and parties draw regarding "republican in form" are not of most interest to our analysis. Rather, it is the attempt itself which betrays the fundamental hitch-that these standing arguments turn on the merits of plaintiffs' claims, namely the meaning, scope, and intended beneficiaries of the Enabling Act's requirement that Colorado's constitution be "republican in form." See Aplt. Reply Br. at 24. We are not commenting on the validity or weight of any of these arguments but merely highlighting the degree of uncertainty present at this stage. See Schramm v. Oakes , 352 F.2d 143, 149 (10th Cir. 1965) (holding standing inquiry to be intertwined with the merits because "[b]ased then on what we have, we are unable to say with any degree of legal certainty that the appellants could not make out a valid cause of action"). The merits of these issues were not presented to the district court and are not before us. We thus cannot say with confidence what is entailed by the Enabling Act's requirement for a government "republican in form," and neither can we say with confidence what is not.
This uncertainty is particularly apparent when we examine the paucity of jurisprudence concerning the scope and meaning of guarantees to a "Republican Form of Government." As tellingly described by the First Circuit,
scholars have interpreted this [republican form of government] portion of the Guarantee Clause in numerous, often conflicting, ways. And John Adams himself, twenty years after ratification of the Constitution, confessed that he "never *1200understood" what the Guarantee Clause meant and that he "believ[ed] no man ever did or ever will."
Largess , 373 F.3d at 226-27 (citations omitted); see also Aplt. Reply Br. at 16 n.7 (citing Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175-77, 22 L.Ed. 627 (1874) ). There can be no doubt that disentangling these answers will be an immense task; however, this is not a task to be undertaken on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion such as this.
We sympathize with the reality that "standing doctrine sometimes has a frustratingly metaphysical quality." Walker , 450 F.3d at 1097. But "a federal court's obligation to hear and decide cases within its jurisdiction is virtually unflagging." Lexmark Int'l, Inc. , 572 U.S. at 126, 134 S.Ct. 1377 ; see also Odom v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P. , 893 F.3d 739, 743 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing Lexmark to construe prudential restraints narrowly). Irrespective of whether or not a republican form of government is eventually found to be guaranteed to these particular plaintiffs, the district court cannot properly reach this issue as a jurisdictional matter. Because these political subdivision plaintiffs have Article III standing and cannot be irrefutably barred by alternative standing doctrines, the district court should not have dismissed the complaint for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
We REVERSE and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings.