Jorge Alejandro Rojas ("Rojas") appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"). The case concerns a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request Rojas submitted to the FAA after the FAA notified him that he was ineligible for an Air Traffic Control Specialist position based on his performance on a screening test called the Biographical Assessment ("BA"). The district court held that (1) the FAA fulfilled its FOIA obligations by conducting a reasonable search for the requested information and (2) the FAA properly withheld nine pages of summary documents pursuant to Exemption 5 as inter-agency memoranda subject to the attorney work-product doctrine. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse and remand.
I. Background
A. The Biographical Assessment
In November 2012, the FAA hired Applied Psychological Techniques, Inc. ("APTMetrics"), a human resources consulting firm, to review and recommend improvements to the FAA's hiring process for Air Traffic Control Specialists.
In 2013, APTMetrics developed the BA test to replace the FAA's existing Air Traffic Selection and Training Test. The BA is an initial screening test that determines whether an applicant possesses certain characteristics empirically shown to predict success in an Air Traffic Control Specialist position. These characteristics include flexibility, risk-tolerance, self-confidence, dependability, resilience, stress tolerance, cooperation, teamwork, and rules *912application. The FAA implemented the BA for the first time during the 2014 hiring cycle for Air Traffic Control Specialist applicants. In Summer and Fall 2014, the FAA revised the BA, and APTMetrics performed validation work related to the revised BA (the "2015 BA"). The 2015 BA was subsequently incorporated in the 2015 Air Traffic Control Specialist hiring process.1
In November 2014, the FAA Office of the Chief Counsel asked John Scott ("Scott"), then Chief Operating Officer of APTMetrics, to create "summaries and explanations" of its validation work on the 2015 BA in anticipation of litigation on the FAA's hiring practices. Scott provided the Office of the Chief Counsel with an initial summary in December 2014 and a supplement in January 2015.
B. Rojas's Application and FOIA Request
In early 2015, Rojas applied for an Air Traffic Control Specialist position with the FAA. During the application process, he completed the 2015 BA. On May 21, 2015, the FAA notified Rojas that he was ineligible for a position based on his responses to the BA. Rojas's rejection notification briefly described the BA and stated that the test was "independently validated by outside experts."
On May 24, 2015, Rojas emailed the FAA a FOIA request seeking "information regarding the empirical validation of the biographical assessment noted in [his] rejection notification [from the FAA]. This includes any report created by, given to, or regarding APTMetrics' evaluation and creation and scoring of the assessment." On June 18, 2015, the FAA, through the Office of the Chief Counsel, denied Rojas's FOIA request for documents on the empirical validation of the 2015 BA. The FAA reasoned that these records were, in part, protected as attorney work-product and therefore subject to Exemption 5 of FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). On June 24, 2015, Rojas filed an administrative appeal contesting the FAA's denial of his FOIA request. On October 7, 2015, the FAA remanded Rojas's case to the Office of the Chief Counsel because the agency incorrectly searched for documents on the empirical validation of the 2014 BA, instead of the 2015 BA.
Pursuant to the remand, attorneys at the Office of the Chief Counsel reviewed records on the empirical validation of the 2015 BA. They located the following three documents: (1) a summary of the Air Traffic Control Specialist hiring process, dated December 2, 2014; (2) a summary of the 2015 BA, dated January 29, 2015; and (3) a summary of the validation process and results of the 2015 BA, dated September 2, 2015. All of these records were created by APTMetrics and are identified in the FAA's Vaughn Index.2 The FAA denied *913Rojas's FOIA request for the second time on December 10, 2015, once again invoking Exemption 5 and the attorney work-product doctrine.
On July 31, 2015, Rojas filed a complaint in district court, alleging that the FAA withheld information on the empirical validation of the 2015 BA in violation of FOIA. On September 21, 2016, the district court ordered the FAA to disclose the three documents identified in its Vaughn Index for in camera review. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the FAA on November 10, 2016, holding that the three responsive records were properly withheld under Exemption 5 as attorney work-product. The court also concluded that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that the FAA adequately searched for relevant documents. Rojas timely appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).
II. Standard of Review
In FOIA cases, we review de novo a district court's order granting summary judgment. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 836 F.3d at 990. Summary judgment is warranted when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Olsen v. Idaho St. Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004).
III. Discussion
FOIA requires government agencies to "make ... promptly available to any person," upon request, whatever "records" are possessed by the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). FOIA "was enacted to facilitate public access to [g]overnment documents" and "pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny." Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173, 112 S.Ct. 541, 116 L.Ed.2d 526 (1991) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). An agency may avoid disclosure only if it proves that the requested documents fall within one of nine enumerated exemptions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9); see also Lane v. Dep't of Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008). At issue on appeal is, whether: (1) the FAA adequately searched for records in response to Rojas's FOIA request; (2) the FAA properly withheld three documents under Exemption 5 of FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5); and (3) the FAA properly construed the scope of Rojas's FOIA request.
A. Search for Responsive Documents3
Under FOIA, an agency responding to a request must "demonstrate that it has conducted a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents." Hamdan v. Dep't of Justice, 797 F.3d 759, 770 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and *914internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he issue to be resolved is not whether there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was adequate." Zemansky v. EPA, 767 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "The adequacy of the agency's search is judged by a standard of reasonableness, construing the facts in the light most favorable to the requestor." Citizens Comm'n on Human Rights v. Food & Drug Admin., 45 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). We conclude that the FAA failed to conduct a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.
Rojas's FOIA request sought "information regarding the empirical validation" of the BA that was described in his rejection notice, including "any report created by, given to, or regarding APTMetrics' evaluation and creation and scoring" of the BA. In response, the Office of the Chief Counsel located summaries of: (1) the Air Traffic Control Specialist hiring process; (2) the 2015 BA; and (3) the validation process and results of the 2015 BA. All of these records were created by APTMetrics.
"[T]he government may demonstrate that it undertook an adequate search by producing reasonably detailed, nonconclusory affidavits submitted in good faith." Lane, 523 F.3d at 1139 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Affidavits must be "relatively detailed in their description of the files searched and the search procedures." Zemansky, 767 F.2d at 573 (internal quotation marks omitted). The agency must show that it searched for the requested records "using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested." Oglesby v. Dep't of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
The FAA's declarations did not sufficiently describe the agency's search procedures. The declaration of Yvette Armstead, the FAA's Assistant Chief Counsel, states that the agency "conducted a search for documents responsive to [Rojas]'s FOIA request" on two occasions-both initially and on remand from Rojas's administrative appeal. Armstead further explains that the search was "reasonably calculated to obtain responsive records" because attorneys at the Office of the Chief Counsel who provided legal advice on revisions to the Air Traffic Control Specialist hiring process "were asked to review their records." Attorneys located "[t]hree responsive documents" comprised of nine pages in total that "discuss[ ] the validation of the 2015 BA."
Armstead's declaration is conclusory. It omits relevant details, such as names of the attorneys who searched the relevant documents and the amount of time the Office of the Chief Counsel devoted to the search. See Citizens Comm'n on Human Rights, 45 F.3d at 1328 (concluding that agency's search was adequate where its declaration stated that the agency spent over 140 hours reviewing documents in response to the plaintiff's FOIA request). The documents the FAA located included summaries of the Air Traffic Control Specialist hiring process, the 2015 BA, and the validation process and results of the 2015 BA. But summaries by necessity summarize something else; there is no indication that there was any search conducted for underlying documents. Thus, though Armstead's declaration establishes that appropriate employees were contacted and briefly describes the files that were discovered, it does not demonstrate that the FAA's search could reasonably be expected to produce the information requested-here, "information regarding the empirical validation of the biographical assessment noted in Rojas's rejection notification."
*915Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Rojas, the FAA has not shown "that it undertook an adequate search," Lane, 523 F.3d at 1139.
B. FOIA Exemption 5
Per Exemption 5, FOIA's disclosure requirements do not apply to "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). The exemption allows the government to withhold records that are "normally privileged in the civil discovery context[,]" such as documents covered by the attorney work-product privilege. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975); see Maricopa Audubon Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997). It prevents FOIA from being used to circumvent litigation privileges. United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 801-02, 104 S.Ct. 1488, 79 L.Ed.2d 814 (1984).
The threshold question under Exemption 5 is whether the records qualify as "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5); Dep't of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 12, 121 S.Ct. 1060, 149 L.Ed.2d 87 (2001). By its plain terms, Exemption 5 applies only to records that the government creates and retains. However, a number of our sister circuits have adopted a functional interpretation of Exemption 5 that treats documents produced by an agency's third-party consultant as "intra-agency" memorandums. This functional interpretation, called the consultant corollary, recognizes that a third-party consultant may perform certain functions on behalf of a government agency. The consultant corollary treats communications from third-party consultants as "intra-agency" memorandums under Exemption 5, as if those communications came from the agency itself.
The district court seems to have relied on the consultant corollary in determining that the FAA properly invoked Exemption 5 in this case. It reasoned that "courts have upheld the application of FOIA Exemption 5 to materials composed and supplied by outside contractors." At the same time, the court concluded that the records "constitute inter-agency memoranda created by a government agency." The description of the documents as "inter-agency memoranda" is incorrect. APTMetrics is not a government agency. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1) (defining agency), 552(f) (same). Therefore, the exchange of records between it and the FAA cannot be an inter-agency exchange. See Black's Law Dictionary (10th Ed. 2014) (defining the preposition "inter" as "among"). Under the consultant corollary, to which the district court's reasoning alludes, the documents would be classified as "intra-agency."
We have yet to adopt the consultant corollary in this Circuit, though we have previously acknowledged it.4 Here, the role of APTMetrics as a consultant to *916the FAA is undisputed. Therefore, we must now decide whether to adopt the consultant corollary to Exemption 5. Because the consultant corollary is contrary to Exemption 5's text and FOIA's purpose to require broad disclosure, we decline to do so.
The consultant corollary contravenes Exemption 5's plain language. Statutory interpretation "begins with the plain language of the statute." Eleri v. Sessions, 852 F.3d 879, 882 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "When an examination of the plain language of the statute, its structure, and purpose clearly reveals congressional intent, our judicial inquiry is complete." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Exemption 5 protects only "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (emphasis added). An "agency," with some exceptions not relevant here, is defined as "each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency." 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). More specifically, an agency "includes any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(f). A third-party consultant, then, is not an agency as that word is used in FOIA, generally, or Exemption 5, particularly. Indeed, "neither the terms of the exemption nor the statutory definitions say anything about communications with outsiders." Klamath, 532 U.S. at 9, 121 S.Ct. 1060.
In contrast, two other FOIA exemptions explicitly protect communications with outsiders. Exemption 4 applies to "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (emphasis added). Exemption 8 applies to information "contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (emphasis added). That these exemptions contemplate information from third parties, while Exemption 5 is limited to "inter-agency or intra-agency" communications, makes clear that Exemption 5 applies only to records that originate and remain inside the government. See Weber, 465 U.S. at 804, 104 S.Ct. 1488 ("We therefore simply interpret Exemption 5 to mean what it says."). Thus, the consultant corollary expands Exemption 5's protections beyond the plain text of FOIA.
The dissent attempts to resolve the consultant corollary's tension with the statutory text by conflating the term "intra-agency memorandums," as used in Exemption 5, with "agency records," as used elsewhere in FOIA. The dissent also construes "intra-agency" to mean records held within an agency, even though they may have originated with a third-party consultant. But that renders superfluous the term "inter-agency" as used alongside "intra-agency" in Exemption 5. And, if Congress intended Exemption 5 to extend to all "agency records," it would have used that term, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1), (2), rather than the narrower "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters," § 552(b)(5).
In addition to contravening the statutory text, the consultant corollary also undermines the purpose of FOIA. The dissent insists that civil discovery rules dictate the scope of Exemption 5. But FOIA "sets forth a policy of broad disclosure of Government documents in order `to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society.'" FBI v.
*917Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621, 102 S.Ct. 2054, 72 L.Ed.2d 376 (1982) (quoting Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978)). "[D]isclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act." Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976). Accordingly, the exemptions are construed narrowly. See id. at 361, 96 S.Ct. 1592; Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 151, 109 S.Ct. 2841, 106 L.Ed.2d 112 (1989); Abramson, 456 U.S. at 630, 102 S.Ct. 2054. Congress has instructed as much with the statutory language that the exemptions do "not authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section." 5 U.S.C. § 552(d) (emphasis added). The consultant corollary allows the government to withhold more documents than contemplated by Exemption 5, contrary to FOIA's policy favoring disclosure and its mandate to interpret exemptions narrowly.
The cases adopting the consultant corollary do little to confront its inconsistency with both the text and purpose of FOIA. The opinion in which it originates, the 1971 D.C. Circuit case Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971), does not even address the statutory text. Soucie concerned a FOIA request for the Garwin Report, an "independent assessment" on supersonic transport aircraft produced by a panel of outside experts for the Office of Science and Technology. Id. at 1070. The issue on appeal was whether the Office of Science and Technology was an "agency" subject to FOIA's disclosure requirements. Id. at 1075. The D.C. Circuit held that the Office of Science and Technology was an agency and remanded the case for the district court to consider whether the Garwin Report fell within any of FOIA's exemptions. Id. at 1075-76. First, though, the court posited that Exemption 5 may apply. Id. at 1076-77. In a footnote, the court summarily reasoned that Exemption 5's purpose supported applying it to records prepared by third-party consultants:
The rationale of the exemption for internal communications indicates that the exemption should be available in connection with the Garwin Report even if it was prepared for an agency by outside experts. The Government may have a special need for the opinions and recommendations of temporary consultants, and those individuals should be able to give their judgments freely without fear of publicity. A document like the Garwin Report should therefore be treated as an intra-agency memorandum of the agency which solicited it.
Id. at 1078 n.44. The court cited no authority for these propositions. Nor did it acknowledge, never mind reconcile, FOIA's text and purpose.
In Wu v. National Endowment for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir. 1972), the Fifth Circuit cited Soucie's unsourced footnote to hold that Exemption 5 protected evaluations prepared by outside experts for the National Endowment for the Humanities. Wu reasoned that protecting third-party communications furthered Exemption 5's policy of "encouraging full and candid intra-agency discussion, and shielding from disclosure the mental processes of executive and administrative officers." Id. at 1034 (quoting Int'l Paper Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 438 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1971)). But, like Soucie, the opinion did not reconcile its holding with FOIA's broader policy favoring disclosure or Exemption 5's textual limits.
Together, Soucie and Wu form the basis for the consultant corollary. Later opinions adopting the consultant corollary cite to the two cases. See Hoover v. Dep't of the Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1138 (5th Cir. 1980); Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc. v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 83 (2d Cir. 1979); Ryan v.
*918Dep't of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Martin Marietta Aluminum, Inc. v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 444 F.Supp. 945, 949 (C.D. Cal. 1977). Or, they cite to cases that in turn cite Soucie and Wu. See Gov't Land Bank v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 671 F.2d 663, 665 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing Hoover, 611 F.2d at 1137-38). That other courts readily signed onto the consultant corollary does not compensate for its shaky foundation. And relying on the doctrine's proliferation to adopt it now would be the result of judicial inertia, rather than reasoned consideration.
The Supreme Court acknowledged, but did not adopt, the consultant corollary in the 2001 case Department of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Association. In Klamath, the Court commented that "[a]lthough neither the terms of the exemption nor the statutory definitions say anything about communications with outsiders, some Courts of Appeals have held that in some circumstances a document prepared outside the Government may nevertheless qualify as an `intra-agency' memorandum under Exemption 5." Id. at 9, 121 S.Ct. 1060 (citations omitted). The Court also quoted the dissent in Department of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 108 S.Ct. 1606, 100 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988), in which Justice Scalia accepted the consultant corollary's purposive reading of Exemption 5:
It is textually possible and ... in accord with the purpose of the provision, to regard as an intra-agency memorandum one that has been received by an agency, to assist it in the performance of its own functions, from a person acting in a governmentally conferred capacity other than on behalf of another agency-e.g., in a capacity as employee or consultant to the agency, or as employee or officer of another governmental unit (not an agency) that is authorized or required to provide advice to the agency.
Klamath, 532 U.S. at 9-10, 121 S.Ct. 1060 (quoting Julian, 486 U.S. at 18 n.1, 108 S.Ct. 1606 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Curiously, the Klamath Court did not discuss the propriety of the consultant corollary and neither adopted nor rejected it.
Instead, the Court explained that the term "intra-agency" in Exemption 5 is not "purely conclusory" and warned that there is "no textual justification for draining the first condition of independent vitality." Id. at 12, 121 S.Ct. 1060 (majority opinion). The Court then narrowly held that, "at the least[,]" the consultant corollary does not apply to communications from interested parties who consult with the government for their own benefit. Id. at 12, 12 n.4, 108 S.Ct. 1606. In a footnote, the Court admonished two D.C. Circuit opinions, Public Citizen, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 111 F.3d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1997) and Ryan v. Department of Justice, 617 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1980), as "instances of intra-agency consultants that arguably extend beyond what we have characterized as the typical examples." Id. at 12 n.4, 108 S.Ct. 1606. However, the Court provided no further guidance as to the proper scope of Exemption 5. Klamath, then, appears to instruct that courts should be more rigorous in analyzing whether an outside party's records satisfy Exemption 5's threshold "intra-agency" requirement before analyzing whether the records are privileged. See Hunton & Williams v. Dep't of Justice, 590 F.3d 272, 283-84 (4th Cir. 2010) (describing that Klamath requires the first step of Exemption 5 to be "more carefully scrutinized").
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Klamath, the Fourth and Tenth Circuits have adopted the consultant corollary. See Hanson v. USAID, 372 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2004); Stewart v. Dep't of Interior, 554 F.3d 1236, 1245 (10th Cir. 2009). Most recently, though, the Sixth Circuit rejected *919it in Lucaj v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 852 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 2017).
Lucaj concerned a FOIA request for documents that the FBI had sent to foreign governments to secure their assistance in investigating Lucaj's role in political attacks in Montenegro. Id. at 543-44. The FBI argued that the documents were protected from disclosure under Exemption 5 pursuant to the "common interest doctrine," which "permits parties whose legal interests coincide to share privileged materials with one another in order to more effectively prosecute or defend their claims." Id. at 545 (quoting Hunton & Williams, 590 F.3d at 277-78). The Sixth Circuit, relying on Klamath's instruction that "the first condition of Exemption 5 is no less important than the second," applied a strict statutory interpretation to conclude that documents sent by a government agency to a foreign government are neither "intra-" nor "inter-agency" memoranda within the meaning of the Exemption. Id. at 547 (quoting Klamath, 532 U.S. at 9, 121 S.Ct. 1060). The court then explicitly rejected the consultant corollary as contrary to Exemption 5's plain text and the mandate to construe FOIA's exemptions narrowly. Id. at 549. In doing so, the court relied on Klamath's instruction not to ignore Exemption 5's threshold inquiry.
Lucaj reads Klamath's focus on the threshold question under Exemption 5 as essentially foreclosing the consultant corollary. We disagree that Klamath can be interpreted so conclusively. Rather, we understand Klamath as leaving open whether the consultant corollary is a proper application of Exemption 5. We conclude that it is not. As described above, the consultant corollary is contrary to Exemption 5's text and FOIA's policy of broad disclosure, and its legal foundation-the unsourced footnote in Soucie-is tenuous at best. While the dissent is critical of the Sixth Circuit decision, Lucaj provides a reasoned discussion of the interplay between the consultant corollary, the language of Exemption 5, and the purpose of FOIA. That is more than can be said of Soucie and its progeny.
Proponents of the consultant corollary may argue that rejecting it allows parties to use FOIA to circumvent civil litigation privileges. Indeed, Congress enacted the exemptions because it "realized that legitimate governmental and private interests could be harmed by release of certain types of information." Abramson, 456 U.S. at 621, 102 S.Ct. 2054. Even so, full disclosure is the guiding principal in interpreting FOIA. See Rose, 425 U.S. at 361, 96 S.Ct. 1592. We are not convinced that the potential harm to the government warrants adopting the consultant corollary's broad reading of Exemption 5. While today's holding means some privileged documents from third-party consultants will be subject to disclosure under FOIA, the dissent's suggestion that it will open the floodgates is speculative. And, absent the consultant corollary, agencies can still avoid disclosure under Exemption 5 by keeping potentially privileged material within the government. If this proves unworkable, as the dissent argues, the proper remedy lies with Congress, not the courts.
Because we reject the consultant corollary, the records at issue can no longer be considered "intra-agency" documents, and Exemption 5 does not apply. Thus, we need not address whether the records would be privileged under Exemption 5's second step.
C. Scope of the FOIA Request
Rojas challenges the district court and the FAA's interpretation of the scope of his FOIA request. Specifically, Rojas argues that the FAA has an obligation under FOIA to retrieve any responsive documents, such as the underlying data to *920the summaries, held by APTMetrics. However, FOIA places no such obligation on an agency.
FOIA empowers federal courts "to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). As discussed above, an agency is "any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1). A "record" is "any information that would be an agency record subject to the requirements of this section when maintained by an agency in any format, including an electronic format" along with "any information... that is maintained for an agency by an entity under Government contract, for the purposes of records management." 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2). FOIA does not define "agency record." See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 178, 100 S.Ct. 977, 63 L.Ed.2d 293 (1980).
The Supreme Court has held that for a document to be an "agency record" under FOIA, the agency must (1) "`either create or obtain' the requested materials," and (2) "the agency must be in control of the requested materials at the time the FOIA request is made." Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. at 144-45, 109 S.Ct. 2841 (quoting Forsham, 445 U.S. at 182, 100 S.Ct. 977). That an agency has a right to obtain a document does not render the document an agency record. Id. at 144, 109 S.Ct. 2841. "FOIA applies to records which have been in fact obtained, and not to records which merely could have been obtained." Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Forsham, 445 U.S. at 186, 100 S.Ct. 977).
To be sure, the bright line definition of agency records as those "which have been in fact obtained" allows the government to avoid disclosure by parking documents with third parties. We share the concerns Justice Brennan articulated when he dissented from the adoption of a bright line definition. Specifically, Justice Brennan expressed that
the understandable tendency of agencies to rely on nongovernmental grantees to perform myriad projects distances the electorate from important information by one more step. If the records of such organizations, when drawn directly into the regulatory process, are immune from public inspection, then government by secrecy must surely return.
Forsham, 445 U.S. at 191, 100 S.Ct. 977 (Brennan, J., dissenting). These concerns are particularly pertinent in this case, which involves a federal agency delegating its duty to establish hiring criteria to an outside consultant. But we are bound by the Supreme Court's precedent. And under that precedent, the records held by APTMetrics that have not been transmitted to the FAA are beyond the reach of FOIA. That the FAA is not obligated to search APTMetrics for responsive documents does not relieve its duty to conduct a reasonable search of its own records, as discussed above.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of the FAA. The FAA has not shown it conducted a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents in response to Rojas's FOIA request, and we join the Sixth Circuit in rejecting the consultant corollary to Exemption 5. We REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Rojas's motion for judicial notice is DENIED.