II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court's final orders and its interpretation of the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions.4 See Shaver v. Operating Eng'rs Local 428Pension Tr. Fund , 332 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003) (motion to dismiss).
III.
This case revolves around several statutory and regulatory provisions and agency guidance governing the payment of wages to tipped employees: the FLSA, the dual jobs regulation, and the Guidance. Although the FLSA guarantees all workers a federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour, see 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(c), employers may pay tipped employees a reduced tip credit wage below the hourly minimum wage, see id. § 203(m).5 A tipped employee is "any employee engaged in an occupation in which he customarily and regularly receives more than $30 a month in tips." Id. § 203(t). Employers may therefore take up to a $5.12 tip credit against the full hourly minimum wage and pay tipped employees as little as $2.13 per hour in cash wages so long as the employee's tips bring him or her up to minimum wage.6 See Fast , 638 F.3d at 874-75. If, however, a server's tips fall short of covering the minimum wage, the employer must increase the employee's cash wage to make up the difference. See Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc. , 596 F.3d 577, 580 (9th Cir. 2010).
Seeking to clarify the meaning of a "tipped employee" under the statute-including what constitutes an "occupation" that "customarily and regularly" receives tips-the DOL promulgated several regulations in 1967. One of these regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 531.56, explains that "[a]n employee employed full time or part time in an occupation in which he does not receive more than $30 a month in tips customarily and regularly is not a 'tipped employee' within the meaning of [the FLSA]" and that a calendar month need not be used to determine whether an employee meets the $30-a-month benchmark. Id. § 531.56(a), (b). The DOL also included a provision in this regulation directly addressing situations in which an employee is employed in *619dual jobs, one tipped and one not. This dual jobs regulation states in full:
Dual jobs. In some situations an employee is employed in a dual job, as for example, where a maintenance man in a hotel also serves as a waiter. In such a situation the employee, if he customarily and regularly receives at least $30 a month in tips for his work as a waiter, is a tipped employee only with respect to his employment as a waiter. He is employed in two occupations, and no tip credit can be taken for his hours of employment in his occupation of maintenance man. Such a situation is distinguishable from that of a waitress who spends part of her time cleaning and setting tables, toasting bread, making coffee and occasionally washing dishes or glasses. It is likewise distinguishable from the counterman who also prepares his own short orders or who, as part of a group of countermen, takes a turn as a short order cook for the group. Such related duties in an occupation that is a tipped occupation need not by themselves be directed toward producing tips.
29 C.F.R. § 531.56(e) (emphases added).
The dual jobs regulation initially generated some confusion among employers, who were unsure whether their tipped employees qualified as dual job employees. The DOL consequently issued several opinion letters in an attempt to delineate the boundaries of the dual jobs regulation. The DOL ultimately released a guidance addressing the dual jobs regulation in its Wage and Hour Division's Field Operations Handbook ("FOH") in 1988, which the DOL revised in 2012. See FOH § 30d00(e) (1988) (the "Guidance"). Judge Ikuta calls the Guidance a new rule promulgated by the DOL, but it is clearly an interpretation in line with that of the DOL's prior opinion letters. The most recent version of the Guidance states:
(1) When an individual is employed in a tipped occupation and a non-tipped occupation, for example, as a server and janitor (dual jobs), the tip credit is available only for the hours spent in the tipped occupation, provided such employee customarily and regularly receives more than $30.00 a month in tips. See 29 CFR 531.56(e).
(2) 29 CFR 531.56(e) permits the employer to take a tip credit for time spent in duties related to the tipped occupation of an employee, even though such duties are not by themselves directed toward producing tips, provided such related duties are incidental to the regular duties of the tipped employees and are generally assigned to the tipped employee. For example, duties related to the tipped occupation may include a server who does preparatory or closing activities, rolls silverware and fills salt and pepper shakers while the restaurant is open, cleans and sets tables, makes coffee, and occasionally washes dishes or glasses.
(3) However, where the facts indicate that tipped employees spend a substantial amount of time (i.e. , in excess of 20 percent of the hours worked in the tipped occupation in the workweek) performing such related duties, no tip credit may be taken for the time spent in those duties. All related duties count toward the 20 percent tolerance.
(4) Likewise, an employer may not take a tip credit for the time that a tipped employee spends on work that is not related to the tipped occupation. For example, maintenance work (e.g. , cleaning bathrooms and washing windows) are not related to the tipped occupation of a server; such jobs are non-tipped *620occupations. In this case, the employee is effectively employed in dual jobs.
FOH § 30d00(f) (2016) (emphases added).7
The Guidance thus clearly contemplates that a server who performs unrelated tasks, such as cleaning restrooms, is a dual job employee entitled to the full minimum hourly wage for her unrelated work. The Guidance also clearly lays out that a server is a dual job employee if her related tasks occupy more than 20% of her hours in a workweek.
The dissent takes issue with the 2012 update to the Guidance8 and asserts that this was the first time the agency "provided that employers could not take a tip credit for any time employees spent on tasks that did not directly relate to serving customers." Dissent at 640. This presumes, of course, that prior to 2012, the DOL would have permitted employers to take a tip credit even for hours a server spent on tasks unrelated to their tipped occupation. As we discuss infra , the dual jobs regulation squarely forecloses that line of argument by distinguishing between a tipped employee who spends some time completing related, but untipped work, and a dual job employee who works as a maintenance man part of the time and a server the rest. 29 C.F.R. § 531.56(e). Accordingly, if both the Guidance and the dual jobs regulation are entitled to deference, then Marsh has alleged facts sufficient to make out an FLSA minimum wage violation claim. We turn to those questions.9
*621A.
Defendants first contend that the dual jobs regulation is not entitled to deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). We disagree.
1.
As an initial matter, it is beyond question that the DOL promulgated the dual jobs regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 531.56, in the exercise of its congressionally delegated authority. See United States v. Mead Corp. , 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001). Congress amended the FLSA in 1966 by defining "tipped employee" for the first time, see 29 U.S.C. § 203(t), and adding a formula for calculating the wage of a tipped employee, see id. § 203(m). See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 101, 80 Stat. 830, 830. The 1966 Amendments authorized the Secretary of Labor "to promulgate necessary rules, regulations, or orders with regard to the amendments made by this Act." Id. at § 603, 80 Stat. at 844. Shortly thereafter, the DOL issued a notice of proposed rulemaking aimed at "expand[ing] 29 CFR Part 531 to make provisions responsive" to the "Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966," specifically the newly amended sections 203(m) and 203(t) regarding tipped employees. 32 Fed. Reg. 222, 222 (Jan. 10, 1967). This process eventually produced the dual jobs regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 531.56(e). See 32 Fed. Reg. 13,575 (Sept. 27, 1967).
Defendants nonetheless urge us to conclude that Chevron deference is inapplicable in this instance because the dual jobs regulation was promulgated without adequate notice and an opportunity to comment. This argument, however, is decades too late. See Perez-Guzman v. Lynch , 835 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 737, 199 L.Ed.2d 604 (2018) ("Procedural challenges to agency rules under the Administrative Procedure Act are subject to the general six-year limitations period in the U.S. Code."); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). The dissent may object to the way the DOL promulgated the dual jobs regulation, but as a matter of law, such procedural challenges to the regulation here are indisputably untimely and beyond our scope of review. Dissent at 638-40. We therefore conclude that Mead 's requirements have been met. 533 U.S. at 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 2164.
2.
Applying the Chevron framework, we next ask whether "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. We conclude that it has not.
Section 203(t) defines a tipped employee as "any employee engaged in an occupation in which he customarily and regularly receives more than $30 a month in tips." 29 U.S.C. § 203(t). The FLSA, however, does not separately define "occupation." Id. Nor does the statute shed light on the meaning of "customarily and regularly." Id. Counsel for Defendants urge us to conclude that the use of the word "occupation" in section 203(t) was not "intended to do a lot of work" and that the statute is therefore "not ambiguous." United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 15-15791 Alec Marsh v. J. Alexander's LLC , YouTube (Mar. 20, 2018) at 47:10-47:15; 49:45-49:51. We decline to treat Congress's choice of words so dismissively; to the contrary, we must presume that Congress's choice of words is deliberate. See *622Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar , 570 U.S. 338, 353, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013). Accordingly, we agree with the Eighth Circuit that where, as here, Congress has crafted an ambiguous statute and tasked the DOL with implementing the ambiguous provisions, we must "defer to the agency's regulation so long as it is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Fast , 638 F.3d at 876 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Contrary to Defendants' assertions, the FLSA's legislative history does not "evince an unambiguous congressional intention" to treat all employees as tipped employees, regardless of their tasks or time spent on untipped tasks. Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 470 U.S. 116, 129, 105 S.Ct. 1102, 84 L.Ed.2d 90 (1985). At most, Congress suggested in a Senate report-published seven years after the DOL promulgated its dual jobs regulation-that "[i]n establishments where the employee performs a variety of different jobs, the employee's status as one who 'customarily and regularly receives tips' will be determined on the basis of the employee's activities over the entire workweek." S. Rep. No. 93-690, at 43 (1974). Under Defendants' view, this sentence indicates that section 203(t) unambiguously allows employers to take a tip credit for every hour an employee spends working, as long as the employee's total tips exceed $30 per month-even if the employee engages in tipped work only 10% of the time. See United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 15-15791 Alec Marsh v. J. Alexander's LLC , YouTube (Mar. 20, 2018) at 34:43-35:45.
But this sentence does not bear the weight Defendants put on it. Critically, the legislation accompanying the 1974 report did not make any changes to section 203(t). Further, the report expressly recognized "the ethical question involved in crediting tips toward the minimum wage" and emphasized that tipped employees "should have stronger protection to ensure the fair operation" of the tip credit provision. S. Rep. No. 93-690 at 42-43. Neither the plain language of the statute nor its legislative history suggest-much less clearly demonstrate-that section 203(t) is unambiguous.
3.
Having concluded that the FLSA "is silent or ambiguous" with respect to the treatment of employees who make more than $30 a month in tips but who may be engaged in multiple occupations, we consider "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. We conclude that it is.
The 1966 amendments to the FLSA were intended to "improve living standards by eliminating substandard working conditions in employment" and to bring the law up to date with the "advancing economy," which had outpaced the FLSA's worker protections. H.R. Rep. No. 89-1366, at 10 (1966). Later amendments to the FLSA stressed the importance of guaranteeing "a fair day's pay for a fair day's work." H.R. Rep. No. 93-913, at 8 (1974). The dual jobs regulation, which was promulgated to give effect to new statutory provisions addressing tipped employees, was neither an arbitrary reversal of a prior agency position nor "manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron , 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Confronted with a gap in the FLSA's coverage of dual job employees, the DOL reasonably exercised its authority to fill that gap by ensuring that employees working in tipped and untipped occupations would not be shortchanged by their employers.
Defendants concede that under the FLSA, if some of an employee's tasks were outside the scope of a tipped occupation, the employee would be engaging in non-tipped *623employment for which the employer would not be entitled to take a tip credit. See United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 15-15791 Alec Marsh v. J. Alexander's LLC , YouTube (Mar. 20, 2018) at 35:05-35:45. That is precisely the kind of situation the dual jobs regulation addresses.
The dual jobs regulation establishes that an employee is entitled to the full minimum wage for any time spent in a non-tipped occupation. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.56(e). Thus, an employee who serves as both a maintenance man and a waiter in a hotel "is a tipped employee only with respect to his employment as a waiter." Id. This provision prevents employers from paying maintenance workers as little as $2.13 an hour, simply because they also happen to work as servers. Having concluded that the dual jobs regulation "is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail."10 Chevron , 467 U.S. at 866, 104 S.Ct. 2778.
B.
Our inquiry, however, does not end with the dual jobs regulation. For Marsh to state a claim under the FLSA, we must also conclude that the Guidance-which establishes the 20% related duties benchmark and separates occupations by duties-is entitled to judicial deference under either Auer v. Robbins , 519 U.S. 452, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997), or Skidmore v. Swift & Co. , 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). See Indep. Training & Apprenticeship Program v. Cal. Dep't of Indus. Relations , 730 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2013). Because the dual jobs regulation is ambiguous and the Guidance's interpretation is both reasonable and consistent with the regulation, we agree with the Eighth Circuit that the Guidance is entitled to Auer deference.11 See Fast , 638 F.3d at 880-81.
1.
"[W]here an agency interprets its own regulation, even if through an informal process, its interpretation of an ambiguous regulation is controlling under Auer unless 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' " Bassiri v. Xerox Corp. , 463 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Auer , 519 U.S. at 461, 117 S.Ct. 905 ). "Under this standard, we defer to the agency's interpretation of its [ambiguous] regulation unless an 'alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the [agency's] intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation.' " Id. at 931 (emphasis and second alteration in original) (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala , 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) ). Interpretations that "do[ ] not reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment of the matter in question" or unfairly surprise regulated parties are not entitled to Auer deference.
*624Christopher v. SmithKline , 567 U.S. 142, 155-56, 132 S.Ct. 2156, 183 L.Ed.2d 153 (2012) (quoting Auer , 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905 ).
[S] We agree with Marsh that the dual jobs regulation is ambiguous.12 The dual jobs regulation, like the FLSA, does not offer a precise definition for "occupation." Instead, the regulation relies on a series of examples to illustrate the difference between a tipped employee and a dual job employee engaged in both a tipped and an untipped occupation. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.56(e). The regulation explains that a person working as both a maintenance man and a server is obviously "employed in two occupations," such that "no tip credit can be taken for his hours of employment in his occupation of maintenance man." Id. But it does not explain how to classify the person's occupation-whether through official title, expected duties, or some other method. See Fast , 638 F.3d at 877.
The second half of the dual jobs regulation suggests that the DOL likely intended to tie a person's occupation to his or her duties. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.56(e) (explaining that the maintenance man/server's situation is "distinguishable from that of a waitress who spends part of her time cleaning and setting tables, toasting bread, making coffee and occasionally washing dishes or glasses"). But like a door leading to more doors, this clarification only produces more questions. As the Eighth Circuit recognized, although the regulation establishes that a server who spends "part of her time" cleaning tables and "occasionally" washing dishes is not a dual job employee, see id. , the regulation does not define either ambiguous, temporal term.13
*625See Fast , 638 F.3d at 877. If a server spends 10% of her time washing dishes, does that qualify as "occasional"? What about 30%? The regulation's silence on this point is compelling evidence of its ambiguity. We therefore disagree with Judge Graber's reading of the regulation. See Partial Concur. at 633-34. Had the DOL intended to unambiguously foreclose servers from being dual job employees regardless of the amount of time they spend on related, but untipped duties, the regulation would not include the temporal limitations it does. Instead, the dual jobs regulation would have read: "Such a situation is distinguishable from that of a waitress who spends her time serving customers or completing related, but untipped tasks, such as cleaning and setting tables, toasting bread, and making coffee." By restricting related duties with limitations such as "occasionally," "part of [the] time," and "tak[ing] a turn," the dual jobs regulation necessarily distinguishes between single-job employees who only occasionally complete related tasks, and dual-job employees who regularly do.14 What the regulation leaves undefined is the point at which this transformation occurs.
The same is true of the regulation's reference to "related duties," 29 C.F.R. § 531.56(e), which suggests two distinctions: one between related and unrelated duties; and the other between duties related to a tipped occupation and duties that are part and parcel of a tipped occupation. The regulation states that cleaning tables, washing dishes, making coffee, and toasting bread are all duties related to a server's occupation, but offers no guidance as to other duties, such as cleaning the restroom or chopping fruits and vegetables in the kitchen. See id. The regulation also leaves open the possibility that when a tipped employee engages in tasks related to her tipped occupation-but which are not actually synonymous with her tipped occupation-more than occasionally or part of the time, those related tasks form a separate, untipped job for which the employer is not entitled to take a tip credit. These interpretive gaps, including the regulation's failure to "define 'related duties,' " Fast , 638 F.3d at 877, all serve as additional evidence of the regulation's ambiguity.
2.
Having concluded that the dual jobs regulation is ambiguous, we next consider whether the Guidance is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." Auer , 519 U.S. at 461, 117 S.Ct. 905 (internal quotation marks omitted). The DOL's interpretation is consistent with nearly four decades of interpretive guidance and with the statute and the regulation itself. Together, these factors strongly *626counsel in favor of applying Auer deference to the Guidance.
The dual jobs regulation relies on two undefined factors to determine whether an employee is a dual-job employee: (1) the relatedness of an employee's duties to a tipped occupation and (2) the amount of time an employee spends on completing related but untipped duties. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.56(e) (clarifying that an employee who spends "part of her time" on duties "related" to her tipped occupation that are not themselves "directed toward producing tips" is not a dual jobs employee). In the decades following the regulation's promulgation, the DOL continuously endeavored to provide employers with further guidance on the regulation in the form of opinion letters. These efforts eventually culminated in the creation of the Guidance in the DOL's Field Operations Handbook ("FOH") in 1988.15 See Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Dkt. No. 45, at 16 (hereinafter "DOL Amicus Brief") ("The FOH interpretation was based on, and is consistent with, the prior opinion letters.").
The Guidance attempts to address the regulation's ambiguity by establishing three definitions, each of which builds on an interpretation of the regulation. First, the Guidance limits "related duties" to those that are "incidental to the regular duties of the tipped employees and are generally assigned to the tipped employees." FOH § 30d00(f)(2) (2016). Second, the Guidance establishes that a tipped employee who spends a "substantial amount of time," defined as "in excess of 20 percent of the hours worked in the tipped occupation in the workweek," on such related duties may not be paid the reduced tip credit wage. Id. § 30d00(f)(3). "All related duties count toward the 20 percent tolerance," meaning that a server need not spend all of that time on one related task, such as washing dishes, to qualify as a dual job employee. Id. Third, the Guidance makes explicit the regulation's suggestion that occupations are defined by their tasks. See id. § 30d00(f)(4) ("For example, maintenance work (e.g. , cleaning bathrooms and washing windows) are not related to the tipped occupation of a server; such jobs are non-tipped occupations."). Accordingly, the Guidance recognizes that a server is no longer engaged in a tipped occupation once she starts cleaning bathrooms and washing windows, because those tasks fall within the purview of a separate, non-tipped occupation.16 See id.
*627Citing Probert v. Family Centered Servs. of Alaska, Inc. , 651 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2011), Defendants contend that the Guidance is not entitled to deference because the FOH includes a disclaimer that it "is not used as a device for establishing interpretive policy." Id. at 1012. Defendants' argument fails because the DOL has adopted the Guidance's interpretation in its amicus brief. See DOL Amicus Brief at 16; Fast , 638 F.3d at 877. It is well-settled law that courts may afford an agency's interpretation Auer deference if the interpretation is advanced through an amicus brief. See Auer , 519 U.S. at 461, 117 S.Ct. 905 ; Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC , 583 F.3d 1197, 1214 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Further, an agency's litigation position in an amicus brief is entitled to deference if there is no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter." (internal quotation marks omitted) ).
We similarly reject as unpersuasive Defendants' brief argument that the Guidance is not entitled to Auer deference because employers in this country did not have "notice that they must pay an employee ... based on an agency's internal advice given to its field investigators." Christopher v.SmithKline Beecham Corp. , 567 U.S. 142, 132 S.Ct. 2156, 183 L.Ed.2d 153 (2012), held that Auer deference is not warranted when an agency's interpretation would "impose potentially massive liability" without first providing regulated parties "fair warning of the [prohibited] conduct." Id. at 155-56, 132 S.Ct. 2156. There, the Court recognized that preventing "unfair surprise[s]" outweighed the "general merits of Auer deference," particularly where the agency's interpretation postdated the regulated parties' conduct. Id. at 156, 159, 132 S.Ct. 2156 ; see also Indep. Training & Apprenticeship Program v. Cal. Dep't of Indus. Relations , 730 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2013) ("[T]he Court has deemed Auer deference unsuitable when such deference would result in 'unfair surprise' to one of the litigants.").
Here, in contrast, the Guidance has been in place since 1988 and was published to the Internet pursuant to the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996. See Wage & Hour Div., Dep't of Labor, Field Operations Handbook (Aug. 31, 2017), available at https://www.dol.gov/whd/FOH/index.htm. The DOL also adopted the Guidance's interpretation and the 20% benchmark in its amicus brief to the Eighth Circuit in Fast , which was filed on September 15, 2010-two years before Marsh began his employment with J. Alexander's. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Fast v. Applebee's Int'l, Inc. , 638 F.3d 872 (8th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 10-1725/26), 2010 WL 3761133. Defendants were therefore on notice at least as of September 15, 2010-if not before17 -that their conduct was not in compliance with the dual jobs regulation.
*628As a result, unlike the plaintiffs in SmithKline , Marsh's theory of liability rests on an interpretation that predates Defendants' conduct. This is not a case where the instant suit represents the first and only time the DOL has advanced the interpretation at hand. See, e.g. , Emp'r Sols. Staffing Grp. II, LLC v. Office of Chief Admin. Hearing Officer , 833 F.3d 480, 488-90 (5th Cir. 2016) (concluding Auer deference was unwarranted because the proffered interpretation emerged from a single decision by the ALJ in the instant case). Nor is this a case where the agency failed to issue "interpretative guidance indicating [its] current position," Perez v. Loren Cook Co. , 803 F.3d 935, 943 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc), considering the DOL adopted the Guidance in its 2010 amicus brief. Further, as we discuss later, the DOL has regularly promulgated regulations that use the 20% benchmark to distinguish between substantial and incidental amounts of time. We therefore conclude that the Guidance did not unfairly surprise Defendants as of September 15, 2010.18
Defendants next contend that the Guidance is not entitled to deference because its 20% limitation on related duties is inconsistent with the dual jobs regulation itself.19 We disagree. As the Eighth Circuit recognized in Fast , "[b]y using the terms 'part of the time' and 'occasionally,' the regulation clearly places a temporal limit on the amount of related duties an employee can perform and still be considered to be engaged in the tip-producing occupation." 638 F.3d at 879 (internal alterations omitted); see also Knox v. Jones Grp. , 201 F.Supp.3d 951, 961 (S.D. Ind. 2016) (applying Auer deference because "[t]hrough its use of the terms 'part of the time' and 'occasionally,' the dual-jobs regulation embodies temporal limitations regarding the performance of related, non-tipped *629duties" (internal alteration omitted) ); Flood v. Carlson Rests. Inc. , 94 F.Supp.3d 572, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (explaining that "district courts across the country have likewise endorsed the twenty percent rule").
The dual jobs regulation states that a server who occasionally washes dishes is not a dual job employee. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.56(e). The Guidance states that a server who spends 20% of her time or less washing dishes is not a dual job employee. See FOH § 30d00(f)(3). There is nothing inconsistent between these two statements because the regulation does not limit the meaning of "occasionally" beyond its ordinary meaning of "now and then; here and there; sometimes." Fast , 638 F.3d at 879-80 (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Unabridged Dictionary 1560 (1986) ). True, the DOL could arguably have set the limit higher, but it did not and we are not at liberty to disturb the agency's "fair and considered judgment on the matter in question." Auer , 519 U.S. at 462, 117 S.Ct. 905.
Furthermore, the DOL's 20% threshold is consistent with its treatment of other temporal limitations. This, too, counsels in favor of applying Auer deference. See Fast , 638 F.3d at 881 (deferring to the Guidance in part because the 20% threshold draws from numerous other FLSA provisions); cf. Friedman v. Sebelius , 686 F.3d 813, 825 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (granting the agency's interpretation Auer deference even though "the regulations elsewhere distinguish between 'acts' and 'omissions,' " and the agency interpreted a regulation's use of only "acts" to include both acts and omissions). The DOL adopted the 20% rule in order to ensure conformity with "various other FLSA provisions, interpretations, and enforcement positions setting a 20 percent tolerance for work that is incidental to but distinct from the type of work to which an exemption applies."20 DOL Amicus Brief at 19 n.6. Because the DOL has consistently utilized the 20% threshold to distinguish between substantial and incidental or occasional work in a variety of contexts, it is especially appropriate to defer to the Guidance.
We find similarly unpersuasive Defendants' contention that the Guidance's focus on duties is "patently inconsistent" with the dual jobs regulation's "occupation-based analysis." Defendants' argument rests on an artificial distinction between occupations and duties. One cannot define the former without some reference to the latter.21 See Occupation , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining "occupation" to mean "an activity or pursuit in which a person engages" (emphasis added) ). The tip credit regulation states that *630"[a]n employee who receives tips ... is a 'tipped employee' ... when, in the occupation in which he is engaged , the amounts he receives as tips [exceed the requisite amount]." 29 C.F.R. § 531.56(a) (emphasis added). The dual jobs regulation-a sub-provision of the tip credit regulation-elaborates that a tipped employee who occasionally performs "related" but untipped "duties" is not employed in "two occupations," but that a server who works as a maintenance man is. Id. § 531.56(e).
The dual jobs regulation therefore contemplates a difference between tipped and untipped occupations, as defined by an employee's duties. The Guidance makes that distinction explicit by sorting the duties accordingly: (1) an employee who engages in duties "directed toward producing tips" or spends 20% of her workweek or less on duties related to "the regular duties of the tipped employees" works in a tipped occupation and may receive the reduced tip credit cash wage; (2) on the other hand, an employee who engages in untipped "work that is not related to the tipped occupation" or spends more than 20% of her workweek on related duties that are not themselves directed toward producing tips must be treated as working in an untipped occupation and paid the full hourly minimum wage. FOH § 30d00(f) (emphasis added). The Guidance, far from creating a de facto new rule, closely hews to the framework suggested by the dual jobs regulation.
We also reject Defendants' argument that Auer deference is inappropriate here because the DOL's position has changed throughout the years. Before adopting the Guidance in 1988, the DOL issued a number of opinion letters to employers elaborating on the dual jobs regulation. Those opinion letters consistently emphasized the temporal nature of the dual jobs regulation. For instance, although the DOL explained in a 1980 opinion letter22 that servers who spent part of their time cleaning the salad bar and vacuuming the dining room carpet after closing time could be considered tipped employees, the agency was careful to note that it "might have a different opinion if the facts indicated that specific employees were routinely assigned , for example, maintenance-type work such as floor vacuuming." U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter WH-502 (Mar. 28, 1980), available at 1980 WL 141336 (emphasis added). In a 1985 letter, the DOL reiterated that a server who spent "part of his or her time " on tasks such as toasting bread or making coffee could be treated as engaging in a single tipped occupation. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter FLSA-854 (Dec. 20, 1985), available at 1985 WL 1259240 (emphasis added). In that letter, the DOL advised the employer that it could not take a tip credit for any hours a server spent performing preparatory activities that consumed "a substantial portion of the waiter or waitress' workday." Id. The DOL focused in particular on the fact that the preparatory *631tasks typically consumed 30% to 40% of a given employee's workday-a sign that the tasks were not "incidental to the [waiter] or waitress regular duties." Id. We therefore agree with the Eighth Circuit that the Guidance "incorporates answers provided in prior opinion letters" and that the DOL's position has remained consistent over the years.23 Fast , 638 F.3d at 878 ; see also DOL Amicus Brief at 24-25 ("The FOH interpretation was based on, and is consistent with, the prior opinion letters.").
As a last-ditch attempt to dismantle the Guidance, Defendants protest that the 20% limitation is not entitled to Auer deference because it is "unworkable." But, the DOL could have reasonably concluded otherwise. Employers are ultimately responsible for assigning duties and responsibilities. The allegations that would trigger a FLSA wage violation claim require more than de minimis claims based on seconds or minutes spent rolling silverware or sweeping a customer's shattered glass. See Schaefer v. Walker Bros. Enters., Inc. , 829 F.3d 551, 555 (7th Cir. 2016) ("[T]he possibility that a few minutes a day were devoted to keeping the restaurant tidy does not require the restaurants to pay the normal minimum wage rather than the tip-credit rate for those minutes."). Marsh has alleged far more than the occasional request to tend to related but untipped tasks: he has alleged a continuous practice of assigning him tasks such as cutting lemons and limes, cleaning soft drink dispensers, wiping tables, and taking out the trash. Moreover, Marsh was able to provide information on when he was expected to complete each task: "every opening shift," "after most closing shifts," or "after each shift." The scheduled nature of these tasks makes them all the more easy to track.
As several district courts have concluded, it is not impracticable for an employer to keep track of time spent on related tasks by requiring employees to clock in any time spent rolling silverware or cleaning the restaurant before and after the restaurant closes or when business is slow. See, e.g. , Irvine v. Destination Wild Dunes Mgmt., Inc. , 106 F.Supp.3d 729, 734 (D.S.C. 2015) ("In any case, since employers, in order to manage employees, must assign them duties and assess completion of those duties, it is not a real burden on an employer to require that they be aware of how employees are spending their time before reducing their wages by 71%."); Barnhart v. Chesapeake Bay Seafood House Assocs., LLC , Civil No. JFM-16-01277, 2017 WL 1196580, at *6 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2017). Unlike the Plaintiffs in Pellon v. Bus. Representation Int'l, Inc. , 528 F.Supp.2d 1306 (S.D. Fla. 2007), Marsh does not concede that it is "impractical or impossible" to track his tasks. Id. at 1313-14. To the contrary, he asserts, consistent with several district court decisions, that "[s]egregating duties is simple," because employers already have the ability to input codes for employees to clock in and out at different pay rates, see Driver v. AppleIllinois, LLC , 890 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 2012), and because employers *632are already required to maintain records of each hour an employee receives tips and each hour she does not, see 29 C.F.R. § 516.28(a).24
In short, the DOL's opinion letters, Guidance, and amicus brief positions have long established that discerning whether a person is employed in both a tipped and untipped occupation under the dual jobs regulation requires some consideration of both the time an employee spends on a given task and the type of task involved. Because the interpretation that the DOL advances in its Guidance and amicus brief is "entirely consistent with its past views," Auer deference is warranted. Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy , 562 U.S. 195, 210, 131 S.Ct. 871, 178 L.Ed.2d 716 (2011).
IV.
We also decline to affirm the district court's flawed application of United States v. Klinghoffer Bros. Realty Corp. , 285 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960). Klinghoffer held that requiring workers to work overtime without pay does not violate the FLSA's minimum wage requirements as long as the average hourly pay for the week is equivalent to the minimum wage. See id. at 490 (concluding that the requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) are met "[i]f the total wage paid to each guard in this case during any given week ... divided by the total time he worked that week" produces an average hourly wage equal to minimum wage); see also Adair v. City of Kirkland , 185 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999) (same).
Marsh, however, has not brought a claim based on failure to pay overtime. To the contrary, he has alleged that he was paid the tip credit cash wage-an amount significantly below minimum wage-for each hour he spent engaged in a non-tipped occupation. His claim is functionally no different than that alleged by an employee who works as a server for one employer and a janitor for another, but sues only the second employer for paying him the tip credit wage every week. Klinghoffer is thus inapplicable.
V.
Contrary to the dissent's suggestions, the DOL did not embark on a fifty-year undercover mission spanning multiple administrations to erode the FLSA's tip credit provision.25 Dissent at 641. There are no rogue agencies or tales of intrigue to be found in this case. The reality is much less exciting: confronted with an undefined reference to "tipped employees" in the FLSA, the DOL promulgated the dual jobs regulation to clarify that dual job employees do not count as tipped employees in certain circumstances. Employers had six years to challenge this regulation. See 28 U.S.C. 2401(a). They did not. Instead, they sought clarification on the dual *633jobs regulation, which the DOL provided first through its opinion letters and then through the Guidance.
Congress did not intend to give employers a blank check when it enacted the FLSA's tip credit provision. Recognizing this and foreseeing the possibility that employers could misuse this provision to withhold wages from dual job employees like Marsh, who are titled "servers" or "bartenders," but who function in actuality as bussers, janitors, and chefs at least part of the time, the DOL promulgated the dual jobs regulation and issued an interpretative guidance. Together, these two provisions clarify the boundaries of acceptable tip credit use and ensure that a server's tips serve as a gift to the server, as opposed to a cost-saving benefit to the employer. Although the agency had a number of options available to resolve this issue, it is neither appropriate nor reasonable for us to override the DOL's dual jobs regulation and its Guidance where, as here, the latter is consistent with the former and both are consistent with the purpose of the FLSA.
We therefore conclude that Marsh has stated two claims for relief under the FLSA: first, that he is entitled to the full hourly minimum wage for the substantial time he spent completing related but untipped tasks, defined as more than 20% of his workweek; and second, that he is entitled to the same for time he spent on unrelated tasks.26
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Graber ; Dissent by Judge Ikuta