II. Discussion
We review a district court's Younger abstention determination de novo. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund , 754 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 2014). We conduct the Younger analysis "in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time the federal action was filed." Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v. County of Solano , 657 F.3d 876, 881 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011).
In Younger , the Supreme Court held that federal courts should abstain from granting equitable relief as to the validity of state criminal statutes when parallel criminal proceedings are ongoing in state court. 401 U.S. at 41, 91 S.Ct. 746. To do otherwise, the Court concluded, would be "a violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances." Id. The Court subsequently extended Younger abstention to a limited category of state civil cases. See, e.g. , Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. , 420 U.S. 592, 604, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975) (applying Younger abstention to a federal suit that interfered with an ongoing state nuisance proceeding); Juidice v. Vail , 430 U.S. 327, 335, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977) (applying Younger abstention to a federal suit that interfered with state contempt procedures); Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n , 457 U.S. 423, 432-37, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982) (applying Younger abstention to a federal suit that interfered with state bar disciplinary proceedings). Both the Supreme Court and our court have repeatedly emphasized, however, that Younger abstention is "an extraordinary and narrow exception to the general rule that federal courts have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given." Potrero Hills , 657 F.3d at 882 (internal quotation marks omitted).
With that directive in mind, we have developed a five-prong test to determine when Younger abstention should apply to a civil case. Specifically, "Younger abstention is appropriate only when the state proceedings: (1) are ongoing, (2) are quasi-criminal enforcement actions or involve a state's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts, (3) implicate an important state interest, and (4) allow litigants to raise federal challenges." ReadyLink , 754 F.3d at 759. If these four threshold elements are established, we then consider a fifth prong: (5) "whether the federal action would have the practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings and whether an exception to *925Younger applies." Id. Each of these requirements must be "strictly met." AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden , 495 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007).
Only the second and fifth prongs of this test are at issue in this case. We discuss each in turn.
A. Prong Two: The State Proceeding Is Not Quasi-Criminal and Does Not Involve the State's Interest in Enforcing Court Orders
Rynearson argues that the district court erred in applying Younger abstention because state protection order proceedings are not quasi-criminal enforcement actions and do not involve the state's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts. We agree.
In Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs , the Supreme Court summarized much of its precedent on the nature of quasi-criminal civil enforcement actions:
Such enforcement actions are characteristically initiated to sanction the federal plaintiff, i.e. , the party challenging the state action, for some wrongful act. See, e.g. , Middlesex , 457 U.S. at 433-34, 102 S.Ct. 2515 (state-initiated disciplinary proceedings against lawyer for violation of state ethics rules). In cases of this genre, a state actor is routinely a party to the state proceeding and often initiates the action. See, e.g. , Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. , 477 U.S. 619, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986) (state-initiated administrative proceedings to enforce state civil rights laws); Moore v. Sims , 442 U.S. 415, 419-20, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979) (state-initiated proceeding to gain custody of children allegedly abused by their parents); Trainor v. Hernandez , 431 U.S. 434, 444, 97 S.Ct. 1911, 52 L.Ed.2d 486 (1977) (civil proceeding "brought by the State in its sovereign capacity" to recover welfare payments defendants had allegedly obtained by fraud) .... Investigations are commonly involved, often culminating in the filing of a formal complaint or charges. See, e.g. , Dayton , 477 U.S. at 624, 106 S.Ct. 2718 (noting preliminary investigation and complaint); Middlesex , 457 U.S. at 433, 102 S.Ct. 2515 (same).
571 U.S. 69, 79-80, 134 S.Ct. 584, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013) (parallel citations omitted).
The district court concluded that protection order proceedings meet this standard because they are "akin to criminal prosecutions." But protection order proceedings in Washington are different from the enforcement actions discussed in Sprint . Under Washington law, a court may issue a protection order if it "finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner has been a victim of stalking conduct by the respondent." Wash. Rev. Code § 7.92.100(1)(a). This "petitioner" is a private party, not the state or local government. In Rynearson's case it was Moriwaki. The law does not require state authorities to conduct any investigation or file charges or a complaint in connection with an application for a protection order, and state actors are not party to the protection proceedings. Indeed, the stalking protection order statute specifically provides that a petitioner is not required to report the stalking conduct to the police to obtain a protection order. See Wash. Rev. Code § 7.92.100(b) ("The petitioner shall not be denied a stalking protection order ... because the petitioner did not report the stalking conduct to law enforcement."). In Rynearson's case, the state prosecutor's decision not to file criminal charges against Rynearson for his conduct did not bear on the municipal court's decision to grant Moriwaki a permanent protection order.
*926Furthermore, the purpose of Washington state stalking protection orders is not to "sanction" a party "for some wrongful act." Sprint , 571 U.S. at 79, 134 S.Ct. 584. Although a petitioner cannot receive a protection order unless the respondent has engaged in a wrongful act, the primary purpose of the order is to protect the petitioner, not punish the respondent. This is clear from the introduction to Washington's stalking protection statute:
Victims who do not report the crime still desire safety and protection from future interactions with the offender. Some cases in which the stalking is reported are not prosecuted. In these situations, the victim should be able to seek a civil remedy requiring that the offender stay away from the victim.
To be sure, the stalking protection order statute makes reference to state criminal statutes. "Stalking conduct" is defined to include any act of stalking as defined under Washington Revised Code section 9A.46.110 or any act of cyberstalking as defined under Washington Revised Code section 9.61.260. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.92.020(3).1 Conduct in violation of those specified criminal statutes may be a basis on which a state court may grant a protection order, but that is not the only basis on which a protection order may be granted. More broadly, the mere fact that the protection order law refers to criminal statutes does not mean that protection order proceedings are quasi-criminal. As the Supreme Court noted in Sprint , "[a]bstention is not in order simply because a pending state-court proceeding involves the same subject matter." 571 U.S. at 72, 134 S.Ct. 584.
Washington stalking protection proceedings do not reflect any of the characteristics described in Sprint . Those proceedings are not quasi-criminal enforcement actions for Younger purposes.
Nor do the protection proceedings "involve a state's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts." ReadyLink , 754 F.3d at 759. The Supreme Court and our court have held that this standard is geared to ensuring that federal courts do not interfere in the procedures by which states administer their judicial system and ensure compliance with their judgments. This standard derives primarily from the Supreme Court's decisions in Juidice and Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. , 481 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). In Juidice , the Court held that Younger abstention applied to a federal suit that sought to enjoin the use of state statutory contempt procedures because "[t]he contempt power lies at the core of the administration of a State's judicial system." 430 U.S. at 335, 97 S.Ct. 1211. Similarly, in Pennzoil the Court held that Younger abstention applied to a federal suit challenging the constitutionality of state procedures that allowed judgment creditors to secure liens on all of a judgment debtor's real property. As the Court *927explained, "[t]his Court repeatedly has recognized that the States have important interests in administering certain aspects of their judicial systems." Pennzoil , 481 U.S. at 12-13, 107 S.Ct. 1519. Further, "[b]oth Juidice and this case involve challenges to the processes by which the State compels compliance with the judgments of its courts. Not only would federal injunctions in such cases interfere with the execution of state judgments, but they would do so on grounds that challenge the very process by which those judgments were obtained." Id . at 13-14, 107 S.Ct. 1519 (footnote omitted).
We recently considered this standard in Cook v. Harding , 879 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed (U.S. April 30, 2018) (No. 17-1487). In Cook , the plaintiff filed a federal suit challenging the constitutionality of a state statute, California Family Code section 7962, that "authorizes the judicial determination of legal parentage in accordance with the terms of a gestational surrogacy agreement." 879 F.3d at 1038. The plaintiff was party to a pending action in state court to enforce a surrogacy agreement when she filed her federal complaint. Id. We held that the state action did not involve the state's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts because
Cook does not question the process by which California courts compel compliance with parentage determinations under state law. Rather, she alleges that Section 7962 is unconstitutional. Cook accordingly challenges the legislative prescriptions of Section 7962. As the Court held even before Sprint , Younger does not "require[ ] abstention in deference to a state judicial proceeding reviewing legislative ... action."
Id . at 1041 (alterations in Cook ) (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans , 491 U.S. 350, 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989) ).
Here, Rynearson's challenge is solely to the constitutionality of a criminal statute. Although conduct in violation of that statute can be (and was, in Rynearson's case) a partial basis for issuing a protection order, the criminal statute's constitutionality does not bear on the validity of the state's protection orders or the procedures by which the state courts issue or enforce them. We therefore conclude that Rynearson's suit did not involve Washington's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.
B. Prong Five: The Federal Suit Would Not Have the Practical Effect of Enjoining the State Protection Proceedings
Even if we were to decide that the state protection proceedings met the first four prongs described above, Younger abstention still would not be appropriate here because Rynearson's federal constitutional challenge to the cyberstalking statute would not "have the practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings." ReadyLink , 754 F.3d at 759.
Defendants argue that declaring the cyberstalking statute unconstitutional would have given Rynearson the means to stop the municipal court from continuing to apply the cyberstalking statute to Rynearson's conduct. That is not true. It would have been true that success in Rynearson's federal suit would have prevented state prosecutors from prosecuting Rynearson specifically for the crime of cyberstalking (which they ultimately decided not to do, anyway). But there is no basis to conclude that Rynearson's federal suit would have prevented the municipal court from granting Moriwaki a permanent protection order or prevented the state prosecutors from prosecuting Rynearson if he had violated the protection order.
*928Even if the cyberstalking statute were declared unconstitutional in federal court, the protection order was not based solely on the crime of cyberstalking. The stalking protection order statute clearly provides that the crime of stalking and other forms of "stalking conduct" can be the basis for a protection order; cyberstalking is not required. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 7.92.020, 7.92.100. In Rynearson's case, the municipal court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Rynearson had committed both stalking and unlawful harassment in addition to cyberstalking. Therefore, the declaratory judgment and injunction that Rynearson sought in the federal proceedings would not have prevented the municipal court from issuing a stalking protection order against Rynearson.
Nor would Rynearson's federal suit have blocked the state's ability to prosecute Rynearson had he violated the protection order. The stalking protection orders issued by the municipal court and the cyberstalking statute covered different conduct. The cyberstalking statute criminalizes repeated or anonymous electronic communications made "with intent to harass, intimidate, torment, or embarrass." Wash. Rev. Code § 9.61.260(1). The protection orders issued by the municipal court, on the other hand, prohibited Rynearson from, among other things, attending events with Moriwaki, contacting Moriwaki, and creating websites that used Moriwaki's name. Rynearson could have engaged in conduct prohibited by the orders but not criminalized under the challenged cyberstalking statute. Even if the state were enjoined from enforcing the criminal cyberstalking law, Rynearson could have been charged with violating the protection order.
Moreover, even if the federal action did cast doubt on the validity of the terms of the stalking protection order, Rynearson still would not be able to use any federal determination about the cyberstalking statute's constitutionality as a defense in a contempt proceeding. A party cannot use a challenge to the validity of a court order as a defense in a proceeding for violation of that order under Washington law. See City of Seattle v. May , 171 Wash.2d 847, 256 P.3d 1161, 1163-64 (2011) (en banc).
Rynearson did not challenge the terms of the protection orders issued against him in his federal suit. Nor did he challenge the constitutionality of Washington's protection order statute or the statute under which he would be prosecuted if he were to violate the order. See Wash. Rev. Code § 26.50.110. Rynearson's federal suit would not have had the practical effect of enjoining the state protection order proceedings.
III. Conclusion
Younger abstention is a limited exception to the obligation of federal courts to hear cases within the scope of their jurisdiction. We conclude that the Washington state stalking protection order proceedings against Rynearson did not fit into the narrow category of state cases in which federal abstention was appropriate. We reverse the district court's dismissal of Rynearson's complaint and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.