Neither Argentina nor AWG disputes that Kaufmann-Kohler had some degree of interest in Suez and Vivendi, but it falls to Argentina to show that the degree was significant. See id . Under Commonwealth Coatings , Argentina must first show that "the arbitrator ha[d] a substantial interest" in UBS. 393 U.S. at 151, 89 S.Ct. 337 (White, J., concurring). Argentina notes without contest that Kaufmann-Kohler's position on the board of directors gave her an interest in UBS.3 This satisfies the first Commonwealth Coatings step.
AWG responds that, although her supervisory position with UBS might have given *336her a substantial interest in the firm, Kaufmann-Kohler's position was so far removed from investment decisions that it could not have given her a substantial interest in the parties. But AWG skips a step. The second part of the Commonwealth Coatings framework asks whether UBS, not Kaufmann-Kohler, "ha[d] done more than trivial business with" Suez or Vivendi. Id . at 152, 89 S.Ct. 337 ("[W]here the arbitrator has a substantial interest in a firm which has done more than trivial business with a party, that fact must be disclosed."). It is because Argentina does not convince us that the importance of the parties to UBS is "more than trivial," id ., that we hold Kaufmann-Kohler had no disclosure duties.
Both Argentina and AWG agree there is more to an interest than just its commercial value. A majority of the Court in Commonwealth Coatings suggested that frequent deals with a party may make an arbitrator's interest significant although only small sums are exchanged. See id . at 146, 89 S.Ct. 337 (plurality opinion); id . at 150, 89 S.Ct. 337 (White, J., concurring). And we found in Al-Harbi that an arbitrator's relationship with a firm at which he no longer worked and that had formerly represented a party to the arbitration in an unrelated matter was too thin to be meaningful. 85 F.3d at 682-83. Neither case, however, examines the interest a passive investor has in the companies it holds.
Argentina seems to agree that the relationship UBS had with Suez and Vivendi was limited to purchasing and selling shares in the parties. UBS had no management responsibilities nor any guarantee of directly sharing in their profits. At the same time, Argentina does not explain why this kind of relationship is comparable to recurrent client relationships, which arbitrators might have wanted to retain. While Suez and Vivendi might have been interested in retaining UBS as an investor because the company owned more than 2% of their shares, Argentina does not explain how the importance of the parties' interest in UBS affects the interest UBS had in the parties. Commonwealth Coatings requires us to gauge the interest of Kaufmann-Kohler's firm in the parties, not their interest in her firm. We see no hint from Argentina that UBS cared about staying in the good graces of Suez and Vivendi.
Argentina proposes that the relationship UBS had with the parties was significant simply because it was ongoing while the arbitration was pending. Yet even assuming that a fresh relationship with a party is more important than one that has gone stale, Argentina does not satisfy its heavy burden to explain why this makes the interest of a passive investor, which is far more detached than the company-client relationships it cited as examples, a substantial one. We have been given no reason to think that the Act proscribes the relationships UBS had with Suez and Vivendi simply because they coincided with the arbitration.
That leaves Argentina to rely on the sheer number of dollars UBS had wrapped up in the parties as evidence of significance. We agree that the more than $2 billion UBS had invested in Suez and Vivendi added up, to state the obvious, to a significant sum. However, Argentina forgets to put that number in context. UBS is in the business of managing money by purchasing and selling shares in corporations. The $2 billion that UBS invested in Suez and Vivendi made up less than 0.06% of the $3.6 trillion UBS had in invested assets. That percentage is too small to suggest much significance, and Argentina does not provide additional context to persuade us otherwise.
We have no problem agreeing with Argentina that UBS was interested in the *337success of companies in which it had invested $2 billion, no matter what percentage of its portfolio that amount made up. However, Argentina fails to put forth any specific facts beyond the dollars invested to show why that interest was more than trivial to such a mammoth investment firm. Speculation that UBS's investment of 0.06% of its assets, most of which was credited to its clients and not its own bottom line, created a substantial interest in Suez and Vivendi is simply not enough to satisfy the Act's high standard of proof.
Argentina does not give us reason to find that the passive investments UBS made in Suez and Vivendi created evident partiality in Kaufmann-Kohler. If the interest presented here could disqualify an arbitrator who did not disclose it, parties would hesitate to select arbitrators associated with financial companies that invest broadly. The risk would be too high that "evident partiality" challenges, like Argentina's, could uproot results of decade-long arbitrations without any evidence of bias beyond a diversified portfolio. See Epic Sys. , 138 S.Ct. at 1623 (warning courts to "be alert to new devices and formulas that would" undermine the Act's endorsement of arbitration). Requiring arbitrators to either avoid working for companies with sophisticated financial strategies or investigate the far reaches of their investment plans would upset the balance between experience and neutrality struck in Commonwealth Coatings . And nothing in our decision here prevents parties who seek additional protection from agreeing that the arbitrators of their disputes must make known trivial passive-investor relationships that would not trigger the Act's rule.
Because UBS's interests in Suez and Vivendi were trivial, and therefore Kaufmann-Kohler's interests in these parties were insignificant, they could not have created evident partiality, and there is no basis for vacating the panel's award under § 10(a)(2). See Al-Harbi , 85 F.3d at 683.
IV
Argentina next argues the panel exceeded its authority by rejecting the country's necessity defense without explanation and by basing the award on events that Argentina prevented by canceling the contract. The Act authorizes vacatur of an award if "the arbitrators exceeded their powers" under the arbitration agreement. § 10(a)(4). The bar is high: courts may disturb an award only if the challenger can show that it was inconsistent with the panel's own understanding of the award that was authorized by the agreement. See Stolt-Nielsen , 559 U.S. at 671-72, 130 S.Ct. 1758. Argentina tries, but fails, to show that the panel's decision had no basis in the governing arbitration agreement.
Argentina contends that the panel failed to fully consider its necessity defense. Necessity is a well-known principle of international law that, as presented by Article 25 of the International Law Commission Articles on Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts, would excuse Argentina from liability if its breach of the fair-treatment provisions was the "only means for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril" that Argentina had not itself caused.4 During the arbitration proceeding, Argentina alleged that the unforeseen economic crisis had limited its ability to accommodate AASA's requests while *338preserving safe water services for the country's residents and resuscitating its economy. The panel rejected Argentina's assertions with brief conclusions, left unsupported by particular evidence, about the panel's understanding of the government's role in the crisis and the actions it might have taken to comply with the fair-treatment provisions. Argentina interprets the cursory dismissal as suggesting that the panel based its decision on its own policy preferences instead of the criteria to which the parties had agreed. Otherwise, Argentina reasons, the panel would have addressed with care each of Argentina's arguments that it breached the fair-treatment provisions out of necessity.
We have never required of an arbitration award the sort of extended explanation Argentina urges. In fact, we have determined that a panel's decision may be upheld even if it offered no explanation at all because the alternative, requiring a particular level of detail for every response to each party's theories, would "unjustifiably undermine the speed and thrift sought" from arbitration proceedings. Sargent v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. , 882 F.2d 529, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. , 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) ).
An unexplained decision might show that a panel exceeded its powers if there is good reason to suspect that the decision relied on factors prohibited by the arbitration agreement. See id . But Argentina did not point to anything in the record suggesting that the panel rejected the defense to suit its own preferences instead of the criteria set out in the agreement. Without such a showing, we have no reason to suspect that the panel strayed from the arbitration agreement. And without more, we will not disturb the panel's decision.
Argentina also argues the panel exceeded its powers when it calculated the damages Argentina owed AASA by estimating the profits each member of the consortium would have received had Argentina complied with the fair-treatment provisions. The final award included estimated profits from 2002, the time at which Argentina began treating AASA unfairly, until 2023, the default expiration date of the contract. The panel reasoned that in a world in which Argentina treated AASA fairly and equitably, Argentina would have granted the consortium some relief from the country's emergency economic policies and preserved, not canceled, the contract.
According to AWG, it was reasonable for the panel to assume that the contract would have lasted past 2002 had there been no breach, and so it was appropriate for the panel's award to include estimated profits from the years 2006 through 2023. Argentina takes issue with the panel's assumption that the contract would have continued past 2006, the time at which Argentina actually terminated the contract. But the government fails to show how the arbitration agreement prohibits making that assumption. Argentina also fails to prove that the panel exceeded its powers by basing AWG's compensation on payments that were not discounted to account for the risk of lawful termination. Even had the panel erroneously overestimated the probability that Argentina would have granted relief to AASA and ignored the risk of contract termination, we would still uphold the panel's decision as the result of its good-faith understanding of the type of compensation permitted by the arbitration agreement. See Oxford Health Plans , 569 U.S. at 572-73, 133 S.Ct. 2064 ; United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc. , 484 U.S. 29, 36, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) ("The courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even though the parties may allege that the *339award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract.").
V
Argentina also asks us to vacate the award under the New York Convention for the same reasons it asked us to vacate the award under the Act. For the same reasons we could not vacate the award under the Act, we cannot vacate it under the New York Convention. See 9 U.S.C. § 208 ; Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of Account , 618 F.3d 277, 290 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that the Act provides broader, not narrower, grounds for vacatur than the New York Convention).
VI
We conclude that Argentina has not satisfied the Act's or the New York Convention's elements required to vacate the award. We affirm the district court's judgment.
So ordered.