*752Skechers USA, Inc. appeals the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction prohibiting it from selling shoes that allegedly infringe and dilute adidas America, Inc.'s Stan Smith trade dress and Three-Stripe trademark. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction as to adidas's claim that Skechers's Onix shoe infringes on adidas's unregistered trade dress of its Stan Smith shoe. We conclude, however, that the district court erred in issuing a preliminary injunction as to adidas's claim that Skechers's Cross Court shoe infringes and dilutes its Three-Stripe mark. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
adidas is a leading manufacturer of athletic apparel and footwear. Skechers is a footwear company that competes with adidas in the active footwear and apparel market. Skechers has grown to become the second largest footwear company in the United States, ahead of adidas and behind only Nike.
The Stan Smith has become one of adidas's most successful shoes in terms of sales and influence since its release in the 1970s. Deemed "[t]he favorite shoe of [fashion industry] insiders like designer Raf Simons and Marc Jacobs" by The Wall Street Journal and the "ultimate fashion shoe" by i-D magazine, the Stan Smith has received extensive media coverage and been featured in such print and online publications as Time , Elle , InStyle , and Vogue . The Stan Smith also has frequently appeared on lists of the most important or influential sneakers of all time and has earned industry accolades such as Footwear News 's 2014 "Shoe of the Year." That same year, adidas announced that the Stan Smith had become its top-selling shoe of all time, selling more than 40 million pairs worldwide.
adidas is also known for its Three-Stripe mark, which has been featured on its products for many years as part of its branding strategy and for which it owns federal trademark registrations. adidas claims to earn several hundred million dollars in annual domestic sales of products bearing the Three-Stripe mark. adidas advertises the Three-Stripe mark in print publications, on television, and in digital media and promotes it through celebrity endorsements, sporting events sponsorships, and athletic partnerships.
The parties have a history of trademark litigation that has previously resulted in Skechers acknowledging that "adidas is the exclusive owner" of the Three-Stripe mark and agreeing not to use it or any other protected mark "confusingly similar thereto." Despite the agreement, adidas has sued Skechers several times in the last twenty years for infringement of its Three-Stripe trademark.1
adidas filed the present lawsuit against Skechers on September 14, 2015, alleging, among other things, that Skechers's Onix shoe infringes on and dilutes the unregistered trade dress of adidas's Stan Smith shoe (both pictured below).
*753adidas further alleges that Skechers's Relaxed Fit Cross Court TR (pictured below) infringes and dilutes adidas's Three-Stripe trademark, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (c).
adidas filed a motion for preliminary injunction to prohibit Skechers from manufacturing, distributing, advertising, selling, or offering for sale the Onix and Cross Court. The district court granted adidas's motion and issued the preliminary injunction, finding that adidas established all the Winter factors. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) ("A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.").
Skechers timely appealed.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion. See Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co. , 571 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 2009). "A district court abuses its discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction if its decision is based on either an erroneous legal standard or clearly erroneous factual findings ...." Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N.A. , 523 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2008). "The legal issues underlying the injunction are reviewed de novo because a district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of law." GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co. , 202 F.3d 1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, the district court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. See Lahoti v. VeriCheck, Inc. , 586 F.3d 1190, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 2009).
*754III.
ANALYSIS
Skechers contests only two of the factors under Winter , specifically, the district court's findings that adidas showed a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm. Because the analysis for Skechers's Onix and Cross Court shoes differ, we take them each in turn.
A. Skechers's Onix and adidas's Stan Smith
i. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Skechers challenges the district court's finding that adidas demonstrated a likelihood of success on its claim that Skechers's Onix shoe infringes on and dilutes adidas's unregistered Stan Smith trade dress.
"Trade dress protection applies to 'a combination of any elements in which a product is presented to a buyer,' including the shape and design of a product." Art Attacks Ink, LLC v. MGA Entm't Inc. , 581 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 8:1 (4th ed. 2008) ).2 To prove infringement of an unregistered trade dress, "a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the trade dress is nonfunctional, (2) the trade dress has acquired secondary meaning, and (3) there is a substantial likelihood of confusion between the plaintiff's and defendant's products." Id. Skechers contests only the latter two elements.
A trade dress has acquired secondary meaning when consumers associate the design features with a particular producer. Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc. , 654 F.3d 958, 967 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). "Secondary meaning and likelihood of buyer confusion are separate but related determinations ...." Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc. , 632 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1980). Some of the relevant factors for determining secondary meaning include the exclusivity, manner, and length of use of the trade dress, the amount and manner of advertising, the amount of sales, and proof of intentional copying by the defendant. Art Attacks , 581 F.3d at 1145.
The district court's finding that the Stan Smith has likely acquired secondary meaning is supported by ample evidence in the record. The evidence showed that adidas has used the Stan Smith trade dress exclusively since the early 1970s, expended considerable capital and human resources to promote the shoe, and reaped significant but difficult-to-quantify value from placing the Stan Smith with celebrities, musicians, athletes, and other "influencers" to drive consumer hype and recognition of the trade dress-which, in 2014, became adidas's top selling shoe of all time with the 40 millionth pair sold. See Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp. , 768 F.2d 1001, 1016 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding evidence of sales, promotional efforts, and duration of exclusive use indicative of secondary meaning). Also indicative of secondary meaning is the considerable amount of unsolicited media coverage praising the Stan Smith's influence and iconic status as one of the most famous sneakers of all time. See Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho , 646 F.2d 347, 350-51 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The district court's finding that a *755secondary meaning has attached is supported by evidence of the extensive media coverage ....").
Skechers's own conduct also supports the district court's finding. "[P]roof of copying strongly supports an inference of secondary meaning." Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp. , 888 F.2d 609, 615 (9th Cir. 1989). Skechers placed metadata tags on its website that directed consumers who searched for "adidas Stan Smith" to the page for the Onix shoe. "Using another's trademark in one's metatags is much like posting a sign with another's trademark in front of one's store." Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp. , 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999). We agree with the district court that "the only reason 'adidas Stan Smith' is a useful search term is that consumers associate the term with a distinctive and recognizable shoe made by adidas." Therefore, the district court did not clearly err by finding that the Stan Smith had acquired secondary meaning.
We turn next to the likelihood of confusion between the shoes. This factor turns on whether a reasonably prudent consumer would be confused about the source of the goods bearing the marks. Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG Studio , 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998). "Likelihood of confusion in the trade dress context is evaluated by reference to the same factors used in the ordinary trademark context[:] strength of the trade dress, similarity between plaintiff's and defendant's trade dress, evidence of actual confusion, marketing channels used, type of goods and likely degree of purchaser care, and the defendant's intent in selecting its trade dress." Vision Sports , 888 F.2d at 616 (internal citation omitted) (citing AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats , 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) ). These are commonly referred to as the " Sleekcraft factors." We review the district court's findings on these factors under the clearly erroneous standard. Id.
The first Sleekcraft factor is of considerable importance to the likelihood of confusion analysis, given that "the greater the similarity between the two marks at issue, the greater the likelihood of confusion." GoTo.com , 202 F.3d at 1206. The similarities between the Stan Smith and Onix are unmistakable. Both shoes share the same white leather upper, a raised green mustache-shaped heel path, angled stripes with perforations, the identical defined stitching pattern around the perforations, and a flat white rubber outsole. Minor differences, including the use of Skechers's logo, do not negate the overall impression of similarity between these two shoes. See Clicks Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc. , 251 F.3d 1252, 1259 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he issue is not whether defendant's package or trade dress is identical to plaintiff's in each and every particular. Rather, it is the similarity of the total , overall impression that is to be tested ...." (alterations in original) (quoting 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 8:2 (4th ed. 2000) ) ).
Other Sleekcraft factors also favor adidas. "Related goods are generally more likely than unrelated goods to confuse the public as to the producers of the goods." Brookfield Commc'ns , 174 F.3d at 1055 (citing Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss , 6 F.3d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir. 1993) ). "Related goods are those products which would be reasonably thought by the buying public to come from the same source if sold under the same mark." Sleekcraft , 599 F.2d at 348 n.10 (internal quotation marks omitted). There can be little doubt that the shoes in question here are similar goods, and that, if the shoes were sold under the *756same mark, the public would reasonably think they came from the same source. This makes the likelihood of confusion greater here than in other cases. And, as we discussed when analyzing the Stan Smith's secondary meaning above, adidas has presented ample evidence that the Stan Smith has enjoyed tremendous commercial success and market recognition. Finally, the evidence supports an inference that Skechers intended to confuse consumers; it not only created a nearly identical shoe to the Stan Smith, but then used metadata tags to direct consumers who searched for "adidas stan smith" to the Onix web page.3
"[O]nly a subset of the Sleekcraft factors are needed to reach a conclusion as to whether there is a likelihood of confusion." GoTo.com , 202 F.3d at 1206. Given the evidence, the district court here did not clearly err in concluding that adidas was likely to succeed on its claim that Skechers's Onix shoe infringes on adidas's Stan Smith trade dress.
ii. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm
Skechers also argues that the district court's finding of a likelihood of irreparable harm to the Stan Smith was erroneous.
In Herb Reed Enterprises, LLC v. Florida Entertainment Management, Inc. , we reaffirmed that "[e]vidence of loss of control over business reputation and damage to goodwill [can] constitute irreparable harm," so long as there is concrete evidence in the record of those things. 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir. 2013). Consistent with Herb Reed , the district court here based its finding of irreparable harm from the Onix shoe on evidence that adidas was likely to suffer irreparable harm to its brand reputation and goodwill if the preliminary injunction did not issue. adidas's Director of Sport Style Brand Marketing testified to the significant efforts his team invested in promoting the Stan Smith through specific and controlled avenues such as social media campaigns and product placement, and he stated that the Stan Smith earned significant media from various sources that was not initiated or solicited by adidas. adidas also presented evidence regarding its efforts to carefully control the supply of Stan Smith shoes and its concerns about damage to the Stan Smith's reputation if the marketplace were flooded with similar shoes. Finally, adidas produced customer surveys showing that approximately twenty percent of surveyed consumers believed Skechers's Onix was made by, approved by, or affiliated with adidas.4
The extensive and targeted advertising and unsolicited media, along with tight control of the supply of Stan Smiths, demonstrate that adidas has built a specific reputation around the Stan Smith with *757"intangible benefits." See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Am. Broad. Cos. , 747 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). And, the customer surveys demonstrate that those intangible benefits will be harmed if the Onix stays on the market because consumers will be confused about the source of the shoes. We find that the district court's finding of irreparable harm is not clearly erroneous. See Herb Reed , 736 F.3d at 1250 ; Rent-A-Ctr., Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc. , 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that harm to advertising efforts and goodwill constitute "intangible injuries" that warrant injunctive protection).
B. Skechers's Cross Court and adidas's Three-Stripe Mark
i. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
adidas alleges that Skechers's Cross Court shoe infringes and dilutes its Three-Stripe trademark. The district court found that adidas showed a likelihood of success on the merits as to both the infringement and dilution claims.
a. Trademark Infringement
To establish trademark infringement, a plaintiff must show, among other things, ownership of its trademark and a likelihood of confusion between its and the defendant's marks. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). Although Skechers concedes adidas's ownership of the Three-Stripe mark, Skechers challenges the district court's finding that adidas was likely to succeed in establishing the confusion element of its trademark infringement claim.
Given our deferential review, we cannot say the district court clearly erred in its analysis of the Sleekcraft factors. Both the Cross Court and adidas's designs have three stripes, and while there are distinctions between the marks-including a difference in the thickness of the stripes, the inclusion of a strip between the three stripes on the Cross Court, and the fact that the stripes do not continue to the sole of the shoe-the district court was permitted to discount these differences in conducting its factual determination regarding similarity. See Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc. , 618 F.3d 1025, 1032 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that "similarities are weighed more heavily than differences" in this analysis (internal quotation marks omitted) ). This is especially true when the marks are attached to closely related products, as they are here. See Goss , 6 F.3d at 1392 (noting that a "diminished standard of similarity is therefore applied when comparing the marks of closely related goods"); see also supra Part III.A.i (discussing relatedness).
Nor did the district court clearly err in finding that the strength of the registered mark factor weighs in adidas's favor. "The stronger a mark-meaning the more likely it is to be remembered and associated in the public mind with the mark's owner-the greater the protection it is accorded by the trademark laws." Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc. , 638 F.3d 1137, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Brookfield Commc'ns , 174 F.3d at 1058 ). "Two relevant measurements are conceptual strength and commercial strength." Id. "[A] mark's conceptual strength is proportional to the mark's distinctiveness." M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy Entm't , 421 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). "[A]n arbitrary or fanciful mark is the most distinctive." Id. (citing GoTo.com , 202 F.3d at 1207 ). On the other hand, "[c]ommercial strength is based on 'actual marketplace recognition.' " Network Automation , 638 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Brookfield Commc'ns , 174 F.3d at 1058 ). Evidence of substantial advertising expenditures can transform a *758suggestive mark into a strong mark. Id. The Three-Stripe mark possesses both conceptual and commercial strength. Conceptually, it features an arbitrary and distinctive design. Commercially, the mark enjoys a long history of marketplace recognition, as well as adidas's significant investment of resources to advertise the mark.
The district court also did not clearly err in finding that Skechers's intent in selecting its mark weighs in adidas's favor. In light of the parties' litigation history, Skechers undoubtedly knew of adidas's Three-Stripe mark when it conceived of its Cross Court shoe. "When one party knowingly adopts a mark similar to another's, reviewing courts presume that the defendant will accomplish its purpose, and that the public will be deceived." Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc. , 944 F.2d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Sleekcraft , 599 F.2d at 354 ). This knowledge supports the district court's finding that Skechers intended to deceive the public as to the source of its shoe by using a similar mark.
Taken together, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in evaluating the Sleekcraft factors cited above in adidas's favor.5 Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in finding adidas showed a likelihood of success on its trademark infringement claim.
b. Trademark Dilution
"Dilution is 'the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of-(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.' " Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Compt. Corp. , 378 F.3d 1002, 1011 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 ). To establish dilution, "a plaintiff must show that (1) the mark is famous and distinctive; (2) the defendant is making use of the mark in commerce; (3) the defendant's use began after the mark became famous; and (4) the defendant's use of the mark is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment." Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc. , 518 F.3d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) ). "[T]he court may consider all relevant factors" to determine whether dilution is likely, including:
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark.
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark.
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark.
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association with the famous mark.
*759(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous mark.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). No one factor is necessarily determinative. See id. ; see also Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc. , 736 F.3d 198, 207, 211 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that "the importance of each factor will vary with the facts" and that "the test is not an inflexible one").
There is substantial overlap between many of these factors and the Sleekcraft factors. In challenging the district court's determination that these factors weigh in favor of a likelihood of dilution, Skechers relies on many of the same objections it made to the district court's findings regarding a likelihood of success on the trademark infringement claim. We reject these arguments here for the same reasons we rejected them in the infringement context. Skechers's only new argument is that adidas failed to produce evidence of the degree of recognition of the Three-Stripe mark, but this is simply incorrect. There was substantial evidence from which the district court could find that the Three-Stripe mark enjoyed a high degree of recognition. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in finding a likelihood of success on the merits on adidas's trademark dilution claim.
ii. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm
Skechers next argues that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction because under Winter , adidas has not shown that it will be irreparably harmed from sale of the Cross Court. We agree.
Both below and on appeal, adidas advanced only a narrow argument of irreparable harm as to the Cross Court: that Skechers harmed adidas's ability to control its brand image because consumers who see others wearing Cross Court shoes associate the allegedly lesser-quality Cross Courts with adidas and its Three-Stripe mark.6 Yet we find no evidence in the record that could support a finding of irreparable harm based on this loss of control theory.
First, adidas's theory of harm relies on the notion that adidas is viewed by consumers as a premium brand while Skechers is viewed as a lower-quality, discount brand. But even if adidas presented evidence sufficient to show its efforts to cultivate a supposedly premium brand image for itself, adidas did not set forth evidence probative of Skechers's allegedly less favorable reputation. The only evidence in the record regarding Skechers's reputation was testimony from adidas employees.7
*760First, adidas claimed that "Skechers generally sells its footwear at prices lower than adidas's"-how much lower, and for what of any number of possible reasons other than the quality of its products, we do not know. This generalized statement regarding Skechers's price point does not indicate that consumers view Skechers as a value brand. Second, one adidas employee noted that within adidas, Skechers is viewed as inferior to adidas. Again, Skechers's reputation among the ranks of adidas employees does not indicate how the general consumer views it. Thus, the district court's finding that Skechers is viewed as a "value brand" is an "unsupported and conclusory statement[ ]" that is not "grounded in any evidence or showing offered by [adidas]." See Herb Reed , 736 F.3d at 1250 (internal quotation marks omitted).8
Second, adidas's theory of harm is in tension with the theory of customer confusion that adidas has advanced to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. adidas did not argue in the district court, and has not argued on appeal, that a Cross Court purchaser would mistakenly believe he had bought adidas shoes at the time of sale. Indeed, this argument would be implausible because the Cross Court contains numerous Skechers logos and identifying features. Instead, adidas argues only that after the sale, someone else looking at a Cross Court shoe from afar or in passing might not notice the Skechers logos and thus might mistake it for an adidas.
The tension between adidas's consumer confusion and irreparable harm theories, then, boils down to this: How would consumers who confused Cross Courts for adidas shoes be able to surmise, from afar, that those shoes were low quality? If the "misled" consumers could not assess the quality of the shoe from afar, why would they think any differently about adidas's products? How could adidas's "premium" brand possibly be hurt by any confusion?
Indeed, such a claim is counterintuitive. If a consumer viewed a shoe from such a distance that she could not notice its Skechers logos, it is unlikely she would be able to reasonably assess the quality of the shoes. And the consumer could not conflate adidas's brand with Skechers's supposedly "discount" reputation if she did not know the price of the shoe and was too far away to tell whether the shoe might be a Skechers to begin with. In short, even if Skechers does make inferior products (or *761even if consumers tend to think so), there is no evidence that adidas's theory of post-sale confusion would cause consumers to associate such lesser-quality products with adidas. And, even if we agree with the district court that some consumers are likely to be confused as to the maker of the Cross Court shoe, we cannot simply assume that such confusion will cause adidas irreparable harm where, as here, adidas has failed to provide concrete evidence that it will. See Herb Reed , 736 F.3d at 1250-51.
As discussed above, adidas presented specific evidence that its reputation and goodwill were likely to be irreparably harmed by Skechers's Onix shoe based on adidas's extensive marketing efforts for the Stan Smith and its careful control of the supply of Stan Smiths available for purchase. Thus, even post-sale confusion of consumers from afar threatens to harm the value adidas derives from the scarcity and exclusivity of the Stan Smith brand. But there was no comparable argument or evidence for the Cross Court.
Because adidas failed to produce evidence that it will suffer irreparable harm due to the Cross Court, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by issuing a preliminary injunction for the Cross Court. See Herb Reed , 736 F.3d at 1250.
* * *
We affirm the district court's preliminary injunction order as to the Onix shoe as likely infringing on, and causing irreparable harm to, adidas's Stan Smith trade dress. However, because we find that there was no evidence in the record that met the standard outlined in Herb Reed for likelihood of irreparable harm to adidas's Three-Stripe mark, we reverse the preliminary injunction as to the Cross Court shoe. The parties should bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.