In recent years, the use of force by police officers making traffic stops has flared into a national debate of renewed importance. At the same time, the doctrine of qualified immunity in the excessive force context has continued to evolve. This appeal presents a question at the intersection of the Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity law. In the course of a felony arrest, may a police officer point a loaded gun at an unarmed suspect's head, where that suspect had already been searched, was calm and compliant, was watched over by a second armed deputy, and was seated on the bumper of a police cruiser 10- 15 feet away from a gun found in the suspect's car? Because the facts are at this stage disputed, we take the facts in the light most favorable to the suspect. We hold that pointing a loaded gun at the suspect's head in these circumstances constitutes excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, but that the officers here are entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established at the time of the traffic stop.
Background
In December, 2011, Pete Copeland, a deputy in the King County Sheriff's Office ("KCSO"), was on patrol in the City of Burien, Washington. After watching Lawrence Thompson commit "multiple traffic violations," Copeland pulled him over. Thompson apologized to Copeland but failed to provide a driver's license, although he did offer up some mail addressed in his name.
When Copeland ran Thompson's identifying information, he discovered that Thompson had a suspended license for an unpaid ticket, that Thompson was a convicted felon, and that his most recent felony conviction was for possessing a firearm. Copeland decided to arrest Thompson for driving with a suspended license, and to impound Thompson's car, as required by a City of Burien ordinance.1
*585Copeland had Thompson exit the vehicle and patted him down for weapons. Finding none, Copeland radioed for backup, and had Thompson sit on the bumper of Copeland's patrol car. Copeland then conducted an inventory search of Thompson's vehicle. During his search, Copeland saw a loaded revolver sitting in an open garbage bag on the rear passenger-side floorboard. After seeing the gun, Copeland decided to arrest Thompson for violating the Uniform Firearms Act, a felony. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.040.
Thompson continued to sit on the bumper of Copeland's police cruiser, watched over by another deputy who had arrived for backup on the scene. Thompson was about 10-15 feet from the gun in the backseat of his car, and was not handcuffed. Copeland signaled to the deputy watching over Thompson, then drew his gun.
What happened next is disputed by the parties. Copeland claims he unholstered his firearm and assumed a low-ready position, with his gun clearly displayed but not pointed directly at Thompson. By contrast, Thompson claims that Copeland pointed his gun at Thompson's head, demanded Thompson surrender, and threatened to kill him if he did not.
Copeland directed Thompson to get on the ground, face-down, so that he could be handcuffed. Thompson complied and was cuffed without incident. Copeland arrested Thompson for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
The State of Washington charged Thompson with "unlawful possession of a firearm." A Washington state court dismissed the charges after determining that the evidence against Thompson had been gathered in violation of the Washington State Constitution.2
Thompson sued Copeland and King County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, Thompson alleged that Copeland used excessive force in pointing his gun at Thompson and threatening to kill him.3
In recommending dismissal of this claim, the Magistrate Judge noted that the question is "whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." The Magistrate Judge found that the degree of force used on Thompson was reasonable given that Copeland was conducting a "felony arrest of a suspect who was not secured, who was in relatively close proximity to a weapon, who was taller and heavier than him, and who had a prior felony conviction for unlawfully possessing a firearm." The Magistrate Judge concluded that "Copeland's minimal use-of-force in effectuating [Thompson's] arrest was objectively reasonable" and did not violate Thompson's Fourth Amendment rights. The Magistrate Judge also recommended granting Copeland's motion for *586summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, and dismissed Thompson's claims with prejudice, a decision we review de novo. Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't , 756 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2014).
Analysis
Our analysis involves two distinct steps. Id. Police officers are not entitled to qualified immunity if (1) the facts "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury" show that "the [officers'] conduct violated a constitutional right" and (2) "the right was clearly established" at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). We may address these two prongs in either order. Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). These inquiries are questions of law. Morales v. Fry , 873 F.3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2017) ; Serrano v. Francis , 345 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003).
Because this case was decided on summary judgment, we examine the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and hence assume that Copeland did indeed point his gun at Thompson's head and threaten to kill him-rather than hold it in the alternative low-ready position as Copeland claims. See Sandoval , 756 F.3d at 1160. If genuine issues of material fact prevent a determination of qualified immunity, the case must proceed to trial. Id.
I. Violation of Constitutional Right
Where, as here, Thompson "alleges excessive force during an investigation or arrest, the federal right at issue is the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures." Tolan v. Cotton , --- U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1865, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam); Tennessee v. Garner , 471 U.S. 1, 7, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985).
We approach an excessive force claim in three stages. Espinosa v. City & Cty. of S.F. , 598 F.3d 528, 537 (9th Cir. 2010). First, we "assess the severity of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment rights by evaluating the type and amount of force inflicted." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Then, we evaluate the government's interests by assessing the severity of the crime; whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the officers' or public's safety; and whether the suspect was resisting arrest or attempting to escape. Id. Finally, we "balance the gravity of the intrusion on the individual against the government's need for that intrusion." Id. ; Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989).
Applying these standards here, we conclude that Copeland's use of force in arresting Thompson was not objectively reasonable. Accepting Thompson at his word, as we are required to do at the summary judgment stage, Copeland pointed the gun at Thompson's head and threatened to kill him if he did not surrender. This type and amount of force can hardly be characterized as "minor," as the government contends. We have previously held, in the context of a residential confrontation, that "pointing a loaded gun at a suspect, employing the threat of deadly force, is use of a high level of force." Espinosa , 598 F.3d at 537. With respect to the government's interests, Thompson was suspected of driving with a suspended license and violating the Uniform Firearms Act-potential crimes of low and moderate severity, respectively. The safety threat either to the officers or the public was *587relatively low. The government's claim that Thompson "could have charged past Deputy Copeland and grabbed the revolver [in the back of the car] in a matter of seconds" is weak. Thompson would have had to travel 10-15 feet to his car to grab the gun or make any use of it. Thompson had no weapon and had already been searched. He was sitting on the bumper of a squad car, watched over by an armed deputy. He was not "actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. He was "compliant with the directions of law enforcement at all times." See Green v. City & Cty. of S.F. , 751 F.3d 1039, 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2014). Nor did the officers have "reason to believe that he would resist or flee." See Baldwin v. Placer Cty. , 418 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2005). Reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the force used against Thompson was excessive when balanced against the government's need for such force.
In the end, "pointing guns at persons who are compliant and present no danger is a constitutional violation." Baird v. Renbarger , 576 F.3d 340, 346 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Motley v. Parks , 432 F.3d 1072, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) ). A jury could find that "brandishing a cocked gun in front of [Thompson's] face" and threatening to kill him was unreasonable under these particular circumstances. Robinson v. Solano Cty. , 278 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (citation omitted). We do not discount the concern for officer safety when facing a potentially volatile situation. But where the officers have an unarmed felony suspect under control, where they easily could have handcuffed the suspect while he was sitting on the squad car, and where the suspect is not in close proximity to an accessible weapon, a gun to the head constitutes excessive force.
II. No Clearly Established Right
Although the use of excessive force violated Thompson's constitutional rights, Copeland is entitled to qualified immunity because Thompson's right not to have a gun pointed at him under the circumstances here was not clearly established at the time the events took place. In arriving at this conclusion, we take careful note of recent Supreme Court precedent illuminating the reach and parameters of qualified immunity in the excessive force context.
The Supreme Court long ago laid down the principle that qualified immunity protects government officials "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). For a right to be "clearly established," existing "precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate ," such that "every" reasonable official, not just "a" reasonable official, would have understood that he was violating a clearly established right. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (emphasis added). Thus, the "dispositive question" is "whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established." See, e.g. , Mullenix v. Luna , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting al-Kidd , 563 U.S. at 742, 131 S.Ct. 2074 ).
Just last year, in a case addressing excessive force, the Supreme Court underscored that qualified immunity, when properly applied, protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." White v. Pauly , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 548, 551, 196 L.Ed.2d 463 (2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court "reiterate[d]
*588the longstanding principle that 'clearly established law' should not be defined at a high level of generality." Id. at 552 (citation omitted). And the Court cautioned that, as an "an immunity from suit, qualified immunity is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Id. at 551 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Looking to the particular setup here, we cannot say that every reasonable officer in Copeland's position would have known that he was violating the constitution by pointing a gun at Thompson. Thompson's nighttime, felony arrest arising from an automobile stop, in which a gun was found, coupled with a fluid, dangerous situation, distinguishes this case from our earlier precedent. More specifically, Copeland was conducting a felony arrest at night of a suspect who was not handcuffed, stood six feet tall and weighed two hundred and sixty-five pounds, was taller and heavier than Copeland, and had a prior felony conviction for unlawfully possessing a firearm. Although Thompson was cooperative, the situation was still critical in terms of potential danger to the officers, especially given that a loaded gun was only 10- 15 feet away. Copeland did not violate a "clearly established" right as that concept has been elucidated by the Supreme Court in the excessive force context. See Pauly , 137 S.Ct. at 552.
In arguing that Copeland violated his clearly established rights, Thompson points to our earlier decisions in Robinson v. Solano Cty. , 278 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), and Hopkins v. Bonvicino , 573 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2009). But neither of those cases involved a felony traffic stop with a firearm in proximity, nor did they feature facts sufficiently similar to the pattern we address here to put the constitutional question beyond debate as required to defeat qualified immunity. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. at 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074.
In Robinson , we held that police used excessive force in pointing their guns at a 64-year old unarmed retired police officer who had his hands up. 278 F.3d at 1010, 1015. The police were responding to a radio dispatch regarding a man "carrying a shotgun," who had just shot two dogs, and who was in the street "yelling at this time." Id. at 1010. After six police vehicles arrived on the scene in broad daylight, Robinson voluntarily approached from his yard in an unbuttoned shirt and jeans. Id. The officers saw that he was clearly unarmed-a shotgun was nowhere in sight. Id. at 1010, 1014. The police presence was overwhelming. And although the officers released Robinson within thirty minutes when it was ascertained he had not violated the law, the potential crime was at most a misdemeanor, in contrast to Thompson's felony arrest. Id. at 1010-11, 1014.
In Hopkins , officers used excessive force when they broke into the home of an unarmed man who had been in a minor traffic accident and was suspected of drunk driving, arrested him, and pointed their guns at him. 573 F.3d at 759, 776. Citing to Robinson , we held that "pointing a gun to the head of an apparently unarmed suspect during an investigation can be a violation of the Fourth Amendment, especially where the individual poses no particular danger." Id. at 776 (citing Robinson , 278 F.3d at 1015 ). We confirmed that force can be excessive where the "crime under investigation [is] at most a misdemeanor[,] the suspect [is] apparently unarmed and approaching the officers in a peaceful way," there "[are] no dangerous or exigent circumstances apparent at the time of the detention, and the officers outnumber[ ] the plaintiff." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Again, the potential crime in Hopkins was not a *589felony and there were no apparent dangerous or exigent circumstances.
The arrest in Hopkins occurred in his bedroom, within the sanctuary of his own home, where "searches and seizures ... without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." 573 F.3d at 773 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Payton v. New York , 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) ). Robinson approached from "the area immediately surrounding and associated with [his] home," which "enjoys protection as part of the home itself." Florida v. Jardines , 569 U.S. 1, 6-7, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013). Though the distance from his house-which was in a rural area-to the street was 135 feet, Robinson was in the "area around the home to which the activity of home life extends." Oliver v. United States , 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.12, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984).4
The Supreme Court "has traditionally drawn a distinction between automobiles and homes or offices in relation to the Fourth Amendment." S. Dakota v. Opperman , 428 U.S. 364, 367, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). Indeed, the Court has recognized that traffic stops are "especially fraught with danger to police officers." Arizona v. Johnson , 555 U.S. 323, 330, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As the government points out, traffic stops and arrest situations "amount[ed] to a combined total of 27.1% of assaults against officers ..., and a combined total [of] 35.6% of situations leading to an officer's felonious death, from 2006-2015."
Perhaps because of the considerable danger inherent in the traffic stop context, the Supreme Court has stressed that the "risk of harm to both the police and the occupants [of a stopped vehicle] is minimized ... if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation." Johnson , 555 U.S. at 330, 129 S.Ct. 781 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And the Court has "expressly recognized that suspects may injure police officers and others by virtue of their access to weapons, even though they may not themselves be armed." Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032, 1048, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). We have recently echoed the Court's view, recognizing the "need for unquestioned obedience to lawful commands during a car stop." Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim , 747 F.3d 789, 804 (9th Cir. 2014).
These precedents, many of which were decided after Robinson and Hopkins , complicate the state of the law at the time of Thompson's seizure. They also suggest that a seizure conducted during a traffic stop may be a less severe "intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests" than the same seizure conducted within the refuge of the home. Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Amendment's protection is at its zenith within the home, and the area immediately surrounding and associated with the home. Payton , 445 U.S. at 589-90, 100 S.Ct. 1371 ; Jardines , 569 U.S. at 6-7, 133 S.Ct. 1409. At the same time, the special and empirical dangers traffic stops pose to police buttress the "countervailing governmental interests *590at stake" in employing some force to control a potentially volatile automotive arrest situation. Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. This distinction accords with common sense.
At the time of the gun-pointing here, Copeland was engaged in both a traffic stop and a nighttime felony arrest, and the situation was "tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving." Id. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Copeland was aware that Thompson had been convicted of a recent felony for possessing a firearm. There were only two deputies on the scene-as opposed to Robinson where six police vehicles fortified the officers with overwhelming force. 278 F.3d at 1010. Thompson was heavier and taller than Copeland. And critically, Thompson was within seconds of a firearm-unlike the plaintiffs in Robinson and Hopkins where no guns were anywhere in the vicinity at the time of the gun-pointing. The circumstances Copeland faced "would have alarmed any officer." Ruvalcaba v. City of L.A. , 64 F.3d 1323, 1328 (9th Cir. 1995). After careful scrutiny of the record, we are not persuaded that Copeland was "plainly incompetent" or that he "knowingly violate[d] the law" when he acted as he did. See Pauly , 137 S.Ct. at 551 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The only traffic stop case Thompson points to involved markedly different facts. See Green , 751 F.3d at 1039. Police officers stopped an African-American woman after a system they used to run license plates malfunctioned, leaving them with the completely mistaken belief that the woman had stolen the car she was driving. Id. at 1042. The officers failed to verify whether the car was stolen, even though they had ample opportunity to do so. Id. at 1043. At least four officers pointed guns at the woman without reasonable suspicion or probable cause that she had committed any crime. Id. at 1043, 1044. There was no weapon anywhere nearby, and the woman suffered from knee problems, stood five feet and six inches tall, and weighed 250 pounds. Id. at 1043. That scenario, which merited denial of qualified immunity, contrasts starkly with this case.
While Thompson fails to carry his burden that, in view of the safety concerns faced in this traffic stop, every reasonable police officer would have known that Copeland's conduct was unconstitutional under these circumstances, we acknowledge that the facts of this case are at the outer limit of qualified immunity's protection in the excessive force context. There can be little question that holding the gun in the low-ready alternative would have been a superior option for Copeland to use in the circumstances here, rather than pointing it at Thompson's head. In the face of the then-current law, there was not a clearly established constitutional violation. Going forward, however, the law is clearly established in this scenario.
Conclusion
Because the law was not clearly established within the parameters dictated by the Supreme Court, Copeland is entitled to qualified immunity and the grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED .