Anthony Evans appeals from the sentence imposed because of his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He also appeals the sentence imposed for violating the conditions of his supervised release in another case. Evans argues that the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement under the aggravated assault sentencing guideline, in imposing certain conditions of supervised release, and in failing to resolve Evans's factual objection to an allegation that he had violated his conditions of supervised release on another occasion. We vacate and remand in part, and affirm in part.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Surveillance camera footage shows that Evans was sitting in the passenger seat of a double-parked car on July 15, 2015, in the Bayview district of San Francisco when a man in a black sweatshirt approached and spoke to him. Evans's girlfriend, Jamellah Ali-Suluki, left the driver's seat of the car and walked out of the camera frame. The man in the black sweatshirt walked away and conferred with another man, who bent through the front passenger door of a neighboring blue car, and then began shooting at Evans.
*1158After firing a number of shots, five of which struck Evans, the man appeared to pass something to the man in the black sweatshirt, and then fled. The man in the black sweatshirt closed the front passenger door of the blue car and looked toward Evans. When Evans got out of the passenger seat of his car, the man in the black sweatshirt fled down the sidewalk. Evans fired several shots at him. Ali-Suluki then returned to the car and drove Evans to the hospital.
In July of 2015, Evans was on supervised release for an earlier felony conviction. After the shooting, the Probation Office claimed that Evans had violated the terms of his supervised release by possessing a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Separately, Evans was also charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of the same statute. Evans pled guilty to the charge and admitted the corresponding supervised release violation. The Probation Office also alleged that Evans committed aggravated assault when he fired his weapon on July 15, and that he had previously violated the conditions of his supervised release by keeping a gun at his residence in April 2015. Evans denied both of these allegations.
At sentencing, the district court did not address the April 2015 allegation. Because of Evans's criminal history and the seriousness of possessing a firearm, the court sentenced Evans to the maximum two-year sentence for the supervised release violation, to be served consecutively to the court's sentence on the substantive charge. The district court heard argument on the felon-in-possession charge about whether Evans acted in self-defense when he fired shots at the man in the black sweatshirt. The court stated that it was faced with
an interesting legal paradigm here because normally in a situation like this ... I believe under state law, [the defendant] has the burden of proof of the affirmative defense.
But we're not at a situation where-that situation. We're at a situation where this court has to stand here or sit here as an adjudicatory body to determine all in, is this a-an aggravated assault or one that is legally excused by virtue of a self-defense-a self-defense defense being made out by the facts in the case.
The court found that "the defendant did not initiate the shooting," but he did get out of the car and fire at "one of [his assailant's] coconspirators," who was fleeing. Therefore, the court found that Evans had not acted in self-defense and sentenced him to 57 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release subject to both standard and special conditions. Evans's attorney sought permission to address the supervised release conditions, but the court denied him permission to do so.
Evans timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
ANALYSIS
I. Aggravated Assault Sentencing Enhancement
In general, Sentencing Guideline § 2K2.1(a)(6) prescribes an offense level of 14 for the possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. However, pursuant to §§ 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) and 2X1.1, if a defendant charged with unlawful possession of a firearm used the firearm in the commission of another offense, the guideline for that other offense applies if the resulting offense level is higher. When the other offense is an aggravated assault in which a firearm is discharged, the offense level under § 2A2.2(a) and (b)(2)(A) is 19.
The district court found that Evans used a firearm in the commission of an aggravated assault, and accordingly applied *1159§ 2A2.2(a) and (b)(2)(A). Evans argues here, as he did below, that the district court's finding was erroneous because he acted in self-defense. The underlying offense of assault is codified in California Penal Code § 240. California law provides that self-defense "negates culpability for assaultive crimes." People v. Adrian , 135 Cal.App.3d 335, 185 Cal.Rptr. 506, 510 (1982).1 We review the district court's factual findings for clear error. United States v. Christensen , 828 F.3d 763, 815 (9th Cir. 2015).
At the time Evans exited the car with his gun drawn, he had already been shot five times, and the surveillance video suggests the man he fired at was in league with the shooter. Nevertheless, when Evans began firing the man was already fleeing, and Evans continued firing at him as the man ran down the street. Based on its review of the security footage, the district court concluded that Evans did not reasonably believe it was necessary to shoot a fleeing man in order to defend himself, and we conclude that finding was not clearly erroneous.
Evans also asserts that the district court's finding was improper because it misapplied the burden of proof. It is not easy to discern where the court placed the burden of proof, but it did misstate California law when it noted that "under state law, [the defendant] has the burden of proof of the affirmative defense." In fact, California law places the burden on the state to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt at a criminal trial. See Adrian , 185 Cal.Rptr. at 510. Evans does not argue that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard applied here. Instead, he recognizes that the government's burden was to disprove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence, as is generally required when a party seeks to adjust the offense level at sentencing. See United States v. Charlesworth , 217 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2000).
Although its remarks were somewhat ambiguous, the court may have based its conclusion on an objective view of the record without allocating burdens to either side.2 Even assuming, arguendo , that the district court failed to place the burden of proof on the government to disprove self-defense, however, the error was harmless. The surveillance video clearly showed that Evans opened fire on a fleeing man. Under the circumstances, any failure by the district court to properly assign the burden of proof did not affect its finding that Evans did not act in self-defense.
II. Conditions of Supervised Release
After serving his consecutive prison sentences for the violation of supervised release and the felon-in-possession charge, Evans will be placed on supervised release for three years, subject to numerous conditions. Evans challenges four of those conditions on various grounds. We generally review conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion, but we *1160review de novo claims that such conditions violate the Constitution. United States v. Watson , 582 F.3d 974, 981 (9th Cir. 2009).3 Evans argues that all of the challenged conditions are unconstitutionally vague. A condition of supervised release violates due process "if it either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." UnitedStates v. Hugs , 384 F.3d 762, 768 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Loy , 237 F.3d 251, 262 (3d Cir. 2001) ).
A. Special Condition 5
Evans first argues that Special Condition 5, which imposed several gang-related constraints, was procedurally erroneous, substantively unreasonable, and unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Special Condition 5 reads as follows:
The defendant shall not associate with any member of the Down Below Gang. The defendant shall have no connection whatsoever with the Down Below Gang or any other gang. If he is found to be in the company of such individuals or wearing the clothing, colors or insignia of the Down Below Gang, or any other gang, the court will presume that the association was for the purpose of participating in gang activities.
"On appeal, we first consider whether the district court committed significant procedural error, then we consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence." United States v. Carty , 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Evans asserts that the court's failure to adequately explain the choice of conditions is procedural error. See United States v. Wolf Child , 699 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he district court must provide a sufficient explanation to 'permit meaningful appellate review' and communicate 'that a reasoned decision has been made.' " (quoting Carty , 520 F.3d at 992-93 ) ).
The court did not explain its reasoning for this condition, which was procedural error unless "the reasoning is apparent from the record." Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Collins , 684 F.3d 873, 890 (9th Cir. 2012) ). The Presentence Investigation Report stated that Evans "has been identified as an affiliate of the Down Below Gang, which operates out of the Sunnydale Housing Projects." The probation officer's sentencing recommendation notes that "[o]n his prior term of supervised release, the defendant was prohibited from associating with any member of the Down Below Gang and was prohibited from being in the vicinity of the Sunnydale District in San Francisco." At sentencing, Evans's counsel explained that Evans grew up in Sunnydale, where "the two main gangs" are the "Up the Hill Gang and Down the Hill Gang" (presumably the same as the Down Below Gang), and that Evans had friends in both gangs. On this record, the district court's reasoning was apparent: it believed that Evans was connected to the Down Below Gang, and that requiring him to avoid that and other gangs would reduce his risk of reoffending.
Because Special Condition 5 is not procedurally erroneous, we next consider whether it is substantively unreasonable. "A supervised release condition is *1161substantively unreasonable if it 'is not reasonably related to the goal[s] of deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation of the offender,' or if it infringes more on the offender's liberty than is 'reasonably necessary' to accomplish these statutory goals." Wolf Child , 699 F.3d at 1090 (alteration in original) (first quoting Collins , 684 F.3d at 892 ; and then quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2) ). The government bears the burden of showing "that a particular condition of supervised release involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to serve the goals of supervised release." United States v. Weber , 451 F.3d 552, 559 (9th Cir. 2006).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the gang condition. Evans denies being a gang member and argues that none of his offenses were gang-related. However, he has been linked to the Down Below Gang and its members, and he was previously arrested for violating the conditions of his supervised release that prohibited him from entering the Sunnydale District (where the Down Below Gang operates) and associating with persons convicted of felonies. A condition barring contact with an organization may be substantively reasonable even if the defendant denies membership, see United States v. Ross , 476 F.3d 719, 721-22 (9th Cir. 2007), and it need not relate to the defendant's current or prior offenses as long as it serves the statutory goals of sentencing, see Watson , 582 F.3d at 983. The district court "could properly have concluded that [Evans] was more likely to relapse into crime if he returned to his prior associations. Probation conditions may seek to prevent reversion into a former crime-inducing lifestyle by barring contact with old haunts and associates, even though the activities may be legal." United States v. Bolinger , 940 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1991).
Because Special Condition 5 is neither procedurally erroneous nor substantively unreasonable as a whole, we next address Evans's challenges to subsections of the condition. Evans challenges the requirement that he have "no connection whatsoever with the Down Below Gang or any other gang" as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it appears to prohibit incidental or unknowing contacts with gang members or even people who are connected to gang members. See United States v. Soltero , 510 F.3d 858, 865-66 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). However, we construe this condition "consistent with well-established jurisprudence under which we presume prohibited criminal acts require an element of mens rea ." United States v. Vega , 545 F.3d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 2008) (construing similar gang condition to require mens rea ); see also Soltero , 510 F.3d at 866-67 (construing similar gang condition to exclude incidental contacts). Thus construed, the condition does not reach unknowing or incidental contacts, and it is not vague or overbroad.
While this reading of the condition saves it from unconstitutionality, it renders the condition's last sentence problematic. That sentence reads: "If [Evans] is found to be in the company of [gang members] or wearing the clothing, colors or insignia of the Down Below Gang, or any other gang, the court will presume that the association was for the purpose of participating in gang activities." This presumption explicitly removes the requirement that the government prove mens rea in a future revocation proceeding and therefore, if allowed to stand, would render the condition vague and overbroad. See Wolf Child , 699 F.3d at 1100 n.9. Accordingly, although we uphold the rest of Special Condition 5, we remand for the district court to strike this final sentence. See Soltero , 510 F.3d at 867.
*1162B. Standard Conditions
Evans next challenges three "standard" conditions of supervised release, arguing that each of them is unconstitutionally vague.4 In response to criticism from the Seventh Circuit, among other critics, the Sentencing Commission has amended the Sentencing Guidelines to address these three conditions' vagueness. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines 43-44 (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-amendments/20160428_RF.pdf.5 However, Evans's sentence still includes the standard conditions in effect on the date of his sentencing. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.11(a). We agree with Evans that the three challenged standard conditions are unconstitutionally vague.
Standard Condition 4 requires Evans to "support his or her dependents and meet other family responsibilities." Evans challenges the phrase "meet other family responsibilities," contending that its meaning is too vague to alert him to his responsibilities. See United States v. Kappes , 782 F.3d 828, 849 (7th Cir. 2015) ("[I]t is not apparent what 'other family responsibilities' means, given that it appears to mean something different than 'support[ing]' [appellant's] as-yet nonexistent dependents." (second alteration in original) ). The government disagrees, but it has offered no suggestion as to what "other family responsibilities" might mean.6 Does it mean that Evans must wash the dishes after dinner? Does it mean he must attend his children's soccer games? If a relative comes to Evans with a problem, does the condition require him to do his best to give good advice rather than ignoring him or her?7 The Sentencing Commission's *1163amendment resolves the problem by omitting the phrase. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.3(d)(1). We remand for the district court to do the same.
Standard Condition 5 requires Evans to "work regularly at a lawful occupation, unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons." Evans challenges the word "regularly," arguing that it has no clear definition and renders the condition unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Poulin , 809 F.3d 924, 932 (7th Cir. 2016) ; Kappes , 782 F.3d at 849. Indeed, the word "regularly" has no clear meaning in this context: it could mean something like "full-time" or "close to full-time"-the fact that the amended condition requires thirty hours per week, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.3(c)(7), seems to support this reading-or it could mean "the same amount each week" or "the same amount each month." This ambiguity might confront Evans if he had, for example, a job opportunity that would offer only ten hours per week; would taking that job be enough to keep him out of jail? This condition places Evans "in the untenable position of discovering the meaning of his supervised release condition only under continual threat of reimprisonment, in sequential hearings before the court." United States v. Stoterau , 524 F.3d 988, 1003 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Guagliardo , 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) ).8 We remand for the district court to modify Standard Condition 5 to remove this ambiguity.
Standard Condition 13 requires Evans, "[a]s directed by the probation officer," to "notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by [his] criminal record or personal history or characteristics...." Evans argues that, as the Seventh Circuit has held, "[t]here is no indication of what is meant by 'personal history' and 'characteristics' or what 'risks' must be disclosed to which 'third parties.' " United States v. Thompson , 777 F.3d 368, 379 (7th Cir. 2015) ; see also United States v. Hill , 818 F.3d 342, 345 (7th Cir. 2016) ("Hopelessly vague is the further condition ... that the defendant 'shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's criminal record or personal history or characteristics.' Does this mean that if he happens to be standing next to a six-year-old girl at a soda fountain he has to warn her that he has been convicted of receipt of child pornography? Does he have to explain to her what child pornography is ?").9 Evans has several convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm; must he disclose that there is a risk he may have a gun? To whom must he make this disclosure? Only to social acquaintances, or also to coworkers? If he goes to a bank in order to open a savings account and meets with a bank employee, must he *1164disclose that he might have a gun? He has no way of knowing.
The government argues that this condition does not leave Evans guessing because it "requires consultation with the probation officer." But "[a] vague supervised release condition 'cannot be cured by allowing the probation officer an unfettered power of interpretation, as this would create one of the very problems against which the vagueness doctrine is meant to protect, i.e. , the delegation of "basic policy matters to policemen for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis." ' " Soltero , 510 F.3d at 867 n.10 (alteration omitted) (quoting Loy , 237 F.3d at 266 ). The language of the condition must provide some determinate guidance to Evans's probation officer, as well as to Evans.
"A probationer must be put on clear notice of what conduct will (and will not) constitute a supervised release violation." Id . Indeed, the Sentencing Commission recognized as much when it amended the applicable guideline to remove the ambiguous phrase "personal history or characteristics" and to clarify that a probation officer may only require a defendant to notify specific persons of specific risks that the defendant poses to those persons. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.3(c)(12) ("If the probation officer determines that the defendant poses a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may require the defendant to notify the person about the risk and the defendant shall comply with that instruction."). Accordingly, we remand for the district court to modify Standard Condition 13 in accordance with this opinion.
III. Factual Dispute During Revocation Hearing
Evans's final claim of error is that the district court was required to resolve a factual issue that was presented at his revocation hearing: namely, whether his probation officer's allegation that Evans possessed a gun in April 2015 was true. Evans objected to this allegation and presented two sworn declarations contesting it. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(B) requires a sentencing court to resolve such factual disputes or determine explicitly that resolving the dispute is unnecessary. See United States v. Doe , 705 F.3d 1134, 1153 (9th Cir. 2013). In general, Rule 32.1, not Rule 32, governs revocation proceedings, see United States v. Urrutia-Contreras , 782 F.3d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 2015), and Rule 32.1 does not include an analogue to Rule 32(i)(3)(B). However, "where Rule 32.1 is silent with respect to the matters that must be considered by a district court in imposing a sentence for violating the terms of supervised release, Rule 32 may be used to 'fill in the gap' in Rule 32.1." Id. at 1113.
Evans argues that we should read into Rule 32.1 an analogous requirement that a district court in a revocation proceeding must resolve factual disputes or determine explicitly that such resolution is unnecessary. We need not decide this question because any error by the district court in failing to resolve the April 2015 allegation was harmless. The district court did not refer to the allegation in determining Evans's sentence; rather, it placed great weight on both Evans's criminal history and the instant violation, his admitted possession of a firearm in July 2015. Thus, we are satisfied that any error in failing to resolve the factual allegation had no effect on the court's decision.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's sentence for the violation of supervised release and vacate and remand the sentence on the substantive offense for the district court to correct the challenged *1165conditions of supervised release. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 39(a)(4).
AFFIRMED in part and VACATED AND REMANDED in part.