Plaintiff Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc. filed suit against Defendants Synchrony Group, LLC and its related entities (collectively, "Synchrony") for violations of the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act ("DTSA"),1 the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("PUTSA"),2 breach of contract, breach of duty of loyalty, and breach of fiduciary duty. Synchrony now moves to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the following reasons, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND3
Jazz is a California-based pharmaceutical company which manufactures various sleep medications, including Xyrem-an FDA-approved prescription drug used to treat narcolepsy. As part of efforts to expand the number of patients benefitting from Xyrem and its other sleep-related drugs, Jazz engaged in business discussions with Synchrony, a Pennsylvania-based pharmaceutical marketing firm, to develop and execute marketing support and evaluation services.
On March 1, 2012, Jazz and Synchrony entered into a Master Services Agreement *439("MSA"), which was later amended to extend its term to March 1, 2018. The MSA, as amended, detailed the scope of the parties' relationship and included provisions to protect Jazz's confidential information. The protected information included various forms of data and technology, as well as business, financial, marketing, and manufacturing processes related to Jazz's products. The MSA also required Synchrony to refrain from using or disclosing Jazz's outlined confidential information at any time or for any purpose either during, or after, the term of the MSA, without Jazz's prior written consent. If a party prematurely terminated the MSA or if Jazz requested, Synchrony had to return or destroy all confidential information.
Over the course of the next several years, Synchrony accessed valuable information concerning all aspects of Jazz's medical marketing and development plans for Xyrem and other sleep-related drugs. Jazz provided Synchrony with marketing strategies and tactics for promoting its products, non-public drug sales data and data regarding physician-prescribing habits, market research commissioned by Jazz surveying patients' and doctors' habits and preferences, Jazz's analyses of its own products compared to other narcolepsy products, and risk evaluation and mitigation strategy research and information. To restrict the accessibility of such information, Jazz imposed strict limitations on its dissemination through employee confidentiality agreements, non-disclosure agreements with third parties, employee handbook policies, and coded access cards to lock and monitor Jazz's physical facilities.
By November 21, 2017, approximately three months prior to the end of the MSA term, Synchrony's CEO informed Jazz of its potential interest in working with Harmony, a newly formed pharmaceutical company which had recently acquired a narcolepsy drug, pitolisant, not yet approved in the United States. Synchrony planned to move "the best of its personnel" to a different division to focus on other clients, such as Harmony. Approximately one week later, Synchrony notified Jazz that it had signed a services agreement to act as the agency of record for Harmony. The next day, Synchrony sent a letter to Jazz, declaring its desire to terminate all sleep-related projects with Jazz, despite the existence of twenty open projects relating to Xyrem and other sleep-related drugs.
Even though Jazz attempted throughout December of 2017 and January of 2018 to negotiate a business solution to continue its collaboration with Synchrony, Synchrony failed to respond to such requests. The CEO of Synchrony did, however, admit that he had given Harmony the names of several Jazz employees in commercial, medical affairs, and regulatory roles that Harmony should consider trying to hire to build its narcolepsy treatment business. Synchrony then returned some, but not all, of Jazz's confidential information.
Jazz filed suit, asserting claims against Synchrony for violations of the DTSA (Count I), PUTSA (Count II), breach of contract (Count III), breach of duty of loyalty (Count IV), and breach of fiduciary duty (Count V). Jazz also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, demanding that Synchrony immediately return all information relating to its work for Jazz, refrain from using or disclosing Jazz's confidential information and trade secrets, and desist from providing services to Harmony.
Synchrony agreed to comply with a voluntary stipulated preliminary injunction, which the Court approved. Under the injunction, Synchrony agreed to return all listed confidential information to Jazz, refrain from using or disclosing Jazz's confidential *440information and trade secrets, and produce Synchrony's CEO for deposition concerning Synchrony's use of Jazz's confidential information.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) permits a party to move for dismissal of any claim over which the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.4 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) therefore challenges the power of a federal court to hear a claim or case.5 When faced with a 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff must bear the burden of persuasion to convince the court that it has jurisdiction.6
Proper grounds for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss includes the issue of mootness, since the mootness doctrine implicates jurisdictional matters.7 A plaintiff's claim is rendered moot "when 'the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.' "8 The central question of all mootness issues, then, "is whether changes in circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of the litigation have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief."9
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is appropriate where a plaintiff's "plain statement" lacks enough substance to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief.10 In determining whether a motion to dismiss should be granted, the court must consider only those facts alleged in the complaint, accepting the allegations as true and drawing all logical inferences in favor of the non-moving party.11 Courts are not, however, bound to accept as true legal conclusions framed as factual allegations.12 Something more than a mere possibility of a claim must be alleged; a plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."13 The complaint must set forth "direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some *441viable legal theory."14 Deciding a motion to dismiss, courts may consider "only allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim."15
III. DISCUSSION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Mootness16
Relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), Synchrony moves to dismiss Jazz's claim seeking injunctive relief based on mootness grounds, contending that as it has complied with the Court-approved stipulated preliminary injunction, there is no longer any live controversy as to injunctive relief.17 Jazz argues that Synchrony has not fully complied with the stipulated preliminary injunction, and that Jazz seeks other relief than that addressed in the stipulated injunction.18
Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts' judicial authority to "cases" or "controversies" that are actual and ongoing.19 The actual and ongoing matters "must be extant at all stages of [the court's] review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed."20 If "an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a 'personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit,' at any point during the litigation," the action is no longer "live" and is rendered moot.21 However, it must be "impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief" for a claim to be moot.22 A claim is therefore still considered "live" when a real and substantial controversy exists between parties, however small, which can be resolved by specific relief granted by the court.23
*442Jazz's claim for injunctive relief is not rendered moot since Jazz has not been afforded complete injunctive relief.24 The preliminary injunction did not require Synchrony to end its relationship with Harmony, and there is still a dispute as to whether Synchrony has fully complied with the Court-approved stipulated preliminary injunction,25 including assertions that Synchrony failed to produce various confidential documents within the deadline specified in the injunction, and failed to refrain from further disclosing confidential information.26 In addition, Jazz's request for permanent injunctive relief in its Complaint has not yet been addressed by this Court.27 Because the Court retains the ability to determine whether further specific injunctive relief is required, Jazz's claim for injunctive relief is "live," and not moot.28
B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
Section 14 of the MSA states: "This Agreement will be governed in accordance with the laws of the State of California, excluding any choice of law rules which may direct the application of the laws of another jurisdiction."29 As both parties agree that California law applies to the breach of contract claim, and that Pennsylvania law applies to the misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of duty claims, the Court will adhere to this framework in its assessment of these claims for purposes of Synchrony's motion to dismiss.30
1. Breach of Contract
Synchrony argues that Jazz has not alleged that Synchrony breached *443any provisions of the MSA.31 To state a claim for breach of contract under California law, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) defendant's breach; and (4) damage to the plaintiff.32 To determine whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for breach of contract, a court must compare the allegations of the complaint with the terms of the contract.33
Synchrony does not dispute that Jazz has properly alleged the existence of a contract and Jazz's performance.34 Synchrony instead argues that Jazz has not alleged that Synchrony breached the MSA. However, Jazz has alleged that Synchrony breached requirements that it not use or disclose Jazz's specified confidential information at any time or for any purpose, without Jazz's prior written consent.35 Moreover, Synchrony also allegedly failed to "promptly" return or "lawfully destroy" all of Jazz's confidential information "upon the earlier of the termination of this [MSA]."36 Finally, Jazz alleges that Synchrony's decision to simultaneously work for Harmony and Jazz, without segregating its employees on the two accounts, breached the normal practices of the industry in violation of the contractual requirement of due care.37 Because Jazz has alleged a causal connection between the breach and damages,38 it has therefore stated a claim for a breach of contract in *444Count III.39
2. DTSA and PUTSA
Synchrony also argues that Jazz has failed to state a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets under the DTSA and the PUTSA because the allegations of misappropriation are speculative, vague, and conclusory. According to Synchrony, Jazz's claims solely rest on Synchrony's awareness of certain trade secrets, which only demonstrate a potential for Synchrony to unlawfully use or disclose such trade secrets in the future.
The Complaint alleges that Synchrony had access to confidential marketing materials, non-public drug sales data and data regarding physician-prescribing habits, analyses of prescriber and patient data commissioned by Jazz, marketing research, analyses of its own products compared to other narcolepsy products, and risk evaluation and mitigation strategy research.40 Although the DTSA and the PUTSA use different wording, both statutes define a "trade secret" as information that: (1) the owner has taken reasonable means to keep secret; (2) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from being kept secret; (3) is not readily ascertainable by proper means; and (4) others who cannot readily access it would obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.41 Jazz's Complaint sufficiently alleges information qualifying as trade secrets.42
However, Jazz has not alleged that the names of employees constitute trade secrets. Jazz alleges that the CEO of Synchrony admitted that he disclosed the names of several Jazz employees in commercial, medical affairs, and regulatory roles so that Harmony could try to hire them,43 but fails to allege that it has taken any reasonable means to keep its employee information a secret, or that employee identities qualify as trade secrets under either statute. Thus, only confidential information related to Jazz's products,44 and not its employees, is at issue. The Court *445next considers whether Jazz has pleaded misappropriation of trade secrets.
Under the DTSA and the PUTSA, "misappropriation" of trade secrets includes the "acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper45 means" or the "disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent."46 The DTSA and the PUTSA permit a court to enjoin permanently either (1) actual or (2) threatened misappropriation of trade secrets.47
Jazz has sufficiently pleaded that Synchrony actually misappropriated its trade secrets. In its Complaint, Jazz states that upon information and belief, Synchrony obtained Harmony's business by "using, touting, and sharing with Harmony [Jazz's] years of knowledge of marking strategies and tactics for Jazz's sleep medicine franchise-specialized knowledge that is proprietary to Jazz and that was developed at Jazz's sole expense over the course of many years."48 Jazz alleges that Synchrony was aware that Jazz's trade secrets were not to be used or disclosed to others, that it did not obtain Jazz's consent to use the specified trade secrets except on Jazz's behalf, and identifies Synchrony's instances of deliberate conduct in violation of the DTSA and the PUTSA.49 These allegations move beyond speculation; Jazz has alleged "enough facts to state a claim to relief" as to actual misappropriation of its trade secrets in Counts I and II.50
Alternatively, Jazz's allegations that Synchrony staffed the Harmony account *446with veterans of the Jazz account and refused to ensure it would protect Jazz's trade secrets, state a claim for threatened misappropriation of trade secrets.51 The Third Circuit has held that where an employee's work for a new employer substantially overlaps with work for a former employer, based on the same role, industry, and geographic region, a district court may conclude that those employees would likely use confidential information to the former employer's detriment.52 An employee's additional failure to ensure an employer that it would refrain from using or disclosing the employer's trade secrets, despite their written agreement, may also constitute threatened misappropriation.53
Although Synchrony's personnel were not direct employees of Jazz, as they were employed by Harmony to work with Jazz via contractual agreement, Synchrony's alleged access to Jazz's confidential information and their transfer to the account with Jazz's direct competitor, Harmony, without any assurance that trade secrets would be protected,54 plausibly suggests the threatened misappropriation of Jazz's trade secrets.55 Jazz has therefore alleged "enough facts to state a claim to relief"56 as to threatened misappropriation in Counts I and II.
3. Breaches of Duty of Loyalty and of Fiduciary Duty
Synchrony next argues that it owed no extra-contractual duty to Jazz, as there was no "special relationship" imposing a fiduciary duty upon Synchrony.57 Jazz argues that the MSA reposed high levels of trust in Synchrony, sufficient to create a fiduciary relationship. Even if there could be such a relationship here, it is barred by the gist of the action doctrine, as the claims solely arise from the parties' contractual relationship.
The gist of the action doctrine generally bars tort claims that arise exclusively *447from a contract between the parties, where the duties allegedly breached were grounded in the contract itself, where the liability stems from a contract, or where the tort claim acts as a duplicate of a breach of contract claim.58 To evaluate whether the gist of the action doctrine applies, a court must identify the duty breached by examining the substance of the allegations comprising a claim, and determining whether the duty stems from tort law or contract law.59 Fiduciary duties and duties of loyalty will not be barred when they extend "beyond the particular obligations contained in the [contract] itself," and they arise as a "matter of social policy."60
Here, Jazz has failed to allege any duties that exist outside of the parties' contractual obligations under the MSA.61 Jazz's only arguments are its attempts to categorize Synchrony's engagement in a business relationship with both Harmony and Jazz as existing outside of the MSA.62 Jazz alleges, however, that Synchrony's decision to work for Harmony at the same time, and without segregating its employees on the two accounts, was a "breach of, at least, ¶ 7 of the 2012 MSA ."63 Jazz does not identify any other obligation on the part of Synchrony outside of the contemplated MSA,64 and therefore the gist of the action doctrine bars the breaches of fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty. Counts IV and V will therefore be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Synchrony's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is denied. Synchrony's motion to dismiss Jazz's Complaint is granted as to Counts IV and V, and denied as to Counts I, II, and III.
An order follows.