*1191THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff United States of America's oral motion to exclude evidence of co-operator1 Gerald Archuleta's 1986 involuntary manslaughter and 1988 second-degree murder convictions under rule 609(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. If the United States' representation to the *1192Court that Archuleta was released from confinement for those convictions more than 10 years ago is accurate,2 *1193rule 609(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence applies to those convictions. That those two convictions later were used to enhance a subsequent conviction does not alter that result, because, when a defendant's criminal history enhances his or her sentence for a subsequent offence, the resulting conviction and sentence are imposed for the conduct underlying the subsequent conviction and not for the conduct underlying earlier offenses. See United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 386, 128 S.Ct. 1783, 170 L.Ed.2d 719 (2008) ("When a defendant is given a higher sentence under a recidivism statute ... 100% of the punishment is for the offense of conviction. None is for the prior convictions or the defendant's 'status as a recidivist.' ").3 If it were otherwise, *1194using a defendant's criminal history to enhance the sentence for subsequent crimes would be unconstitutional. See U.S. Const. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...."). Consequently, rule 609(b) applies to Archuleta's 1986 and 1988 convictions even though those convictions were later used to enhance a sentence for a later conviction. That rule 609(b) applies to those convictions means that those convictions are not admissible, because the Defendants have not established, for either conviction, that "its probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect." Fed. R. Evid. 609(b)(1).
Even if rule 609 permits inquiry into the facts underlying a conviction, under rule 608(b), when the conviction itself is inadmissible,4 -which it does not-the Court would not permit inquiry into the facts underlying Archuleta's old convictions, because those facts do not "attack or support [Archuleta's] character for truthfulness." Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). The facts underlying Archuleta's 1986 and 1988 convictions, which are both homicide offenses, show that Archuleta is a violent person and an immoral person, but they do not show that he is an untruthful person, so asking questions about those facts is not permissible under rule 608(b). Using those facts as propensity evidence-vis-à-vis a character trait other than truthfulness-is impermissible under rule 404. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1) ("Evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait."); Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1) ("Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a *1195person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.").
Rules 404, 608, and 609 do not govern whether Archuleta's convictions or their underlying facts are admissible for a non-character purpose. Defendants Billy Garcia and Joe Lawrence Gallegos contend that the facts underlying Archuleta's convictions are admissible to show how Archuleta achieved his position in the SNM. How Archuleta achieved his position in the SNM is not a "fact of consequence in determining the action," because Archuleta is not currently on trial. Fed. R. Evid. 401(b). See Fed. R. Evid. 402 ("Irrelevant evidence is not admissible."). The Court can discern no other relevant not-for-character purpose for introducing the facts underlying Archuleta's 1986 and 1988 convictions, and the parties have not identified other purposes. Accordingly, the Court will not admit evidence of those convictions or permit questioning regarding their underlying facts.
IT IS ORDERED that the United States' oral motion is granted.