This matter is pending for consideration of Defendant Andre Deshawn Lundy's second motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [Record No. 118] On June 6, 2016, this Court transferred Lundy's tendered motion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2244 and Rule 9 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. [Record Nos. 112, 113] On November 17, 2016, the Court of Appeals granted Lundy permission to file a successive petition, and remanded the motion to this Court with instructions to hold the case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in Beckles v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2510, 195 L.Ed.2d 838 (2016) (granting petition for a writ of certiorari) (Mem.). [Record No. 116] Lundy filed a supplemental brief addressing his claim for relief under Johnson v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) [Record No. 120], and this matter was stayed pending resolution in Beckles. [Record No. 121] On March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Beckles , holding that the advisory sentencing guidelines are not subject to a due process vagueness challenge and, therefore, § 4B1.2(a)'s residual clause is not void for vagueness. Beckles v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 886, 896-97, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017). Because that decision foreclosed Lundy's argument that he is not entitled to relief under Johnson , his motion will be dismissed.
On March 28, 2008, Lundy pleaded guilty to a one-count indictment for possession with the intent to distribute a *970quantity of pills containing oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled substance, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). [Record Nos. 53, 54] Following an October 6, 2008, hearing, Lundy was sentenced to 200 months' imprisonment, followed by six years of supervised release. [Record Nos. 79, 83] Lundy received an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 based on previous state convictions for bank robbery and delivery of controlled substances. Lundy argues that his bank robbery conviction can only be considered a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)'s residual clause. [Record No. 112-1 at 4] Because Johnson held a similar, statutory, residual clause void for vagueness, a decision that was made retroactive to cases on collateral review by Welch v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 194 L.Ed.2d 387 (2016), Lundy seeks an extension of that rationale to disallow the enhancement he received under the Sentencing Guidelines. [Id. ; Record No. 120 at 3]
The Supreme Court took up this issue directly in Beckles v. United States , and found that Johnson's void for vagueness ruling has no bearing on the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Thus, Beckles foreclosed Lundy's sole claim for relief.* Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
1. Lundy's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Record No. 118] is DISMISSED .
2. This matter is STRICKEN from the docket.
This 7th day of March, 2017.