Presently, the Court has before it Defendant OSI Collection Services, Inc.'s *959("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss or, alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment (# 4). Plaintiff filed a response (# 8) as well as an affidavit (# 9) in opposition. Defendant filed a reply (# 10).2
Also before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Leave of Court to File Second Amended Complaint (# 15). Defendant filed a response in opposition (# 16), to which Plaintiff replied (# 17).
I. Background.
Plaintiff, a self-proclaimed consumer advocate, filed his original complaint on March 2, 2004, and then filed his Amended Complaint on March 29, 2004, before Defendant had filed a responsive pleading. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges causes of action based on the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 - 1692o and on state law. Plaintiff predicates his claims upon Defendant's efforts to collect a debt from him in March 2003. On May 12, 2003, Defendant and related companies filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. On October 15, 2003, the bankruptcy court entered its Order Confirming Debtors' Amended and Restated Joint Plan of Reorganization, as Modified, and confirmed Debtor's Third Amended and Restated Joint Plan of Reorganization, as Modified. In its Notice of Confirmation of Debtors' Third Amended Plan of Reorganization Notice and Related Matters, the bankruptcy court specifically provided that the provisions of the Plan bound any holder of a claim and that debtors (which included the instant Defendant) were discharged by operation of Section 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code from any and all debts and claims that arose against them before the date of entry of the Confirmation Order.
On March 19, 2004, Defendant was served Plaintiff's complaint. On March 22, 2004, Counsel for Defendant mailed Plaintiff a letter reminding him of the Confirmation of the Chapter 11 Reorganization Plan and requested him to voluntarily dismiss his complaint. On March 24, 2004. Plaintiff acknowledged receipt of the letter and advised that he would not dismiss his complaint. After talking with Plaintiff, Defendant's counsel sent another letter setting forth Defendant's position that Plaintiff was in violation of the injunction of 11 U.S.C. § 524 and again requested that Plaintiff dismiss his complaint against the Defendant. On March 29, 2004, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in which he expressly states that he waives any recovery of damages against the Defendant. However, in the second paragraph of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff expressly states that "This Amended Complaint is not to be interpreted, construed, or accepted as any agreement or conclusion, by Plaintiff, to dismiss OSI from this action."
II. Analysis.
A dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is a ruling on a question of law. See Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court "must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true." Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Review is limited to the contents of the complaint. See *960Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 231 F.3d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 2000). All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. The court is not required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. See Clegg, 18 F.3d at 754-55. A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief. See Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988. If a matter outside the pleadings is considered, the court should treat the motion as one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
Summary judgment may be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any. show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine factual issue for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). All justifiable inferences must be viewed in the light must favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. However, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his or her pleadings, but he or she must produce specific facts, by affidavit or other evidentiary materials provided by Rule 56(c), showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment shall not be granted if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
A. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (# 4).
In its motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the bankruptcy discharge. The effect of confirmation pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1141 is to bind a creditor to the provisions of the confirmed plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a). Moreover, the confirmation of a plan discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation. See id. § 1141 (d)(1). A creditor is defined as one who has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor. See id. § 101 (10)(A). A claim is defined, among other things, as a right of payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. See id. § 101(5)(A). A debt means liability on a claim. See id. § 101(12). Once a debtor is discharged, this discharge operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act to collect or recover a discharged debt. See id. § 524(a)(2).
In order for a creditor to retain its claim against the bankrupt, it must generally file a proof of claim during the bankruptcy proceedings. See Perez v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 213 B.R. 622, 623 (D. Mass. 1997). Also, all creditors in a Chapter 11 proceeding who hold contingent, unliquidated, or disputed claims are required to file a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court by the deadline or "bar *961date" set by the court. See 11 U.S.C. § 1111 ; Bankr. R. 3003(c)(2). If a creditor fails to file a proof of claim, § 524(a) shields the debtor from that creditor. See Perez, 213 B.R. at 623 ; see also In re White Motor Credit, 761 F.2d 270, 275 (6th Cir. 1985) ("All pre-petition claims and post-petition claims against White which have not been filed with the Bankruptcy Court are barred by the statute and the orders of the lower courts."). However, courts have held that claimants may proceed with claims against a debtor for the purpose of collecting from the debtor's liability insurer. See Perez, 213 B.R. at 623 (citing several cases); see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(e). These courts reason that § 524(a) discharges only the debtor's personal liability, not the liability of any other party such as the debtor's insurer. See Perez, 213 B.R. at 623.
Here, the factual predicates of Plaintiff's claims arose in March 2003. These claims clearly occurred before the bankruptcy court entered the Confirmation Order. Moreover, Plaintiff never filed a required proof of claim, nor has he sought to reopen the bankruptcy case in order to modify the permanent injunction to allow a claim against Defendant's insurer. Accordingly, Plaintiff is barred from going forward against Defendant.
Even if Plaintiff were allowed to proceed nominally against Defendant for the sole purpose of potentially reaching Defendant's insurer his claims fail. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff expressly waives any recovery from Defendant. In his Affidavit, Plaintiff states that if he is the prevailing party, he will limit recovery against Defendant to insurance proceeds and, further, that he will not seek enforcement of a judgment as against Defendant. While such language would typically allow Plaintiff to proceed, he cannot reach Defendant's insurer. Under its policy of insurance, Defendant is responsible, under a retention provision, for the initial sum of $ 100,000 for each wrongful act resulting in a claim, other than a class action claim. Plaintiff brings his suit under the FDCPA and chapters 598 and 649 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. Plaintiff seeks from Defendant statutory damages of $1,000 under the FDCPA and punitive damages of $25,000 under the Nevada Revised Statutes. The maximum recovery Plaintiff could recover from Defendant is $26,000 which would not allow him to recover from Defendant's insurer. Accordingly, there is no proper reason for him to continue against Defendant.3
B. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave of Court to File Second Amended Complaint (# 15).
In his motion, Plaintiff seeks leave to file a Second Amended Complaint in order to add Mr. Shannon as a defendant. Even though Mr. Shannon neither made or participated in the telephone calls nor signed or sent the collection notices alleged to violate the FDCPA, Plaintiff contends that Mr. Shannon is still a debt collector for FDCPA purposes because he is a compliance officer for Defendant. Plaintiff maintains that Mr. Shannon has an extremely high level of involvement in Defendant's debt collection practices and activities and is highly involved in creating, approving and ratifying the debt collection *962practices, policies and procedures utilized by Defendant, its employees and its representatives.
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a plaintiff to amend the complaint once, as a matter of right, prior to the filing of a responsive pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Once the complaint has been amended, a plaintiff must then seek leave of court or written consent of the adverse party before further amendment may be made. See id. The Court shall grant leave to amend "when justice so requires." Id. The Court must be guided by Rule 15's underlying purpose: to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities. See Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 628 (9th Cir. 1991). The Court is instructed to apply with extreme liberality Rule 15's policy of favoring amendments to pleadings. See id. In determining whether to grant a motion to amend, the Court should consider the following factors: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith; (3) futility of amendment; and (4) prejudice to the opposing party. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999). However, the Court's "discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint." Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) ).
The Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to Rule 15 relief. First, the Court finds undue delay in Plaintiff seeking to file a Second Amended Complaint. In requesting Rule 15 relief, Plaintiff attached the deposition of Mr. Shannon from one of Plaintiff's many lawsuits. This deposition occurred in April 2003. Thus, Plaintiff knew of Shannon's activities almost one year before he filed his original Compliant in early March 2004. Thus, there is no excuse for Plaintiff not naming Shannon in either his original or Amended Complaint, Second, the Court finds the Plaintiff's actions are based on bad faith. Realizing that his complaint will be dismissed due to the § 524(a) discharge and that he has failed to serve the other individual Defendants in the time frame set out in Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,4 Plaintiff has now sought to salvage his complaint by finding any employee of Defendant to name as a defendant. Coupled with the fact that Plaintiff knew of Shannon's activities well before he filed the instant action, these acts establish bad faith.5
*963C. Attorneys' Fees.
In its motion to dismiss, Defendant seeks attorneys' fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). This section provides, in part: "On a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs." The Court finds that Plaintiff's case was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment. After Plaintiff filed his complaint, Defendant's counsel advised him of Defendant's bankruptcy and requested voluntary dismissal. Plaintiff refused and insisted in advancing his claims notwithstanding the discharge. Most likely, Plaintiff brought this complaint in the hope of demanding a payment in exchange for the dismissal of this litigation. Plaintiff's past court experiences support this finding as Plaintiff is no stranger to litigation under the FDCPA. A review of the Court's records reveals that Plaintiff has instigated at least 45 actions in this Court alone.6 In these cases, Plaintiff brought claims pursuant to the FDCPA, the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 - 1681u, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 - 1691(f), among others.7 In addition to these legal *964actions, Plaintiff has also reached monetary settlement in more than 20 claims without needing to file suit.8 In a previous deposition, Plaintiff testified that he made a living by suing companies pursuant to the FDCPA, FCRA, and ECOA.9 Plaintiff *965also testified that his basic practice is to allege a violation of one or more of the federal acts and make an initial demand of $7,500.00 to settle the case.10 Plaintiff used this practice even when the debt was only a $32 bill from MCI.11 In fact, Plaintiff testified that in 2001 he received settlements of approximately $25,000 in five case by sending just his demand letter.12 Rather than being the most harassed debtor in Clark County, Plaintiff's many lawsuits indicates his tactic of harassment.13 *967Thus, the Court will award Defendant reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
D. Conclusion.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment (# 4) is GRANTED . Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is DISMISSED as to all Defendants.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply to Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Plaintiff's Motion to File Surreply (# 12) and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave of Court to File Second Amended Complaint (# 15) are DENIED .
It is further ordered that Defendant's demand for attorney's fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) is GRANTED . Defendant shall have fifteen days from the entry of this order to file its schedule of attorney's fees and costs.