In re Acis Capital Mgmt., L.P., 584 B.R. 115 (2018)

April 13, 2018 · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas · CASE NO. 18–30264–SGJ–7; CASE NO. 18–30265–SGJ–7
584 B.R. 115

IN RE: ACIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P., Alleged Debtor.

In re: Acis Capital Management GP, L.L.C., Alleged Debtor.

CASE NO. 18-30264-SGJ-7
CASE NO. 18-30265-SGJ-7

United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

Signed April 13, 2018

*118Warren A. Ustaine, Cole Schotz P.C., Hackensack, NJ, Michael D. Warner, Cole Schotz P.C., Fort Worth, TX, for Debtor

David W. Elmquist, Reed & Elmquist, P.C., Waxahachie, TX, for Trustee.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ORDERS FOR RELIEF ISSUED AFTER TRIAL ON CONTESTED INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY PETITIONS

Stacey G. C. Jernigan, United States Bankruptcy Judge

Joshua N. Terry (the "Petitioning Creditor" or "Mr. Terry") filed involuntary bankruptcy petitions (the "Involuntary Petitions") against each of the two above-referenced related companies (the "Alleged Debtors") on January 30, 2018.1 The Involuntary Petitions were contested, and the court held a multi-day trial (the "Trial") spanning March 21, 22, 23, 27, and March 29, 2018.2 This constitutes the *119court's findings of fact, conclusions of law and ruling, pursuant to Fed. Rs. Bankr. Proc. 7052 and 9014.3 As explained below, the court has decided that Orders for Relief are legally required and appropriate as to each of the Alleged Debtors.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Introduction.

1. The Alleged Debtors-Acis Capital Management, L.P. ("Acis LP"), a Delaware limited partnership, and ACIS Capital Management GP, L.L.C. ("Acis GP/LLC"), a Delaware limited liability company-are two entities in the mega-organizational structure of a company that is known as Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland").

2. Highland is a Dallas, Texas-based company that is a Registered Investment Advisor. Highland was founded in 1993 (changing its original name from "Protective Asset Management" to Highland in 1997) by James D. Dondero ("Mr. Dondero"), originally with a 75% ownership interest, and Mark K. Akada ("Mr. Akada"), originally with a 25% ownership interest.4

3. Both Mr. Dondero and Mr. Akada provided witness testimony at the Trial on the Involuntary Petitions, and their names are mentioned numerous times herein-since they were generally the subject of significant evidence and argument presented at the Trial. Mr. Dondero is the chief executive officer for Highland and Mr. Akada is the chief investment officer. Mr. Dondero is also the president of each of the two Alleged Debtors.

4. Highland, through its organizational structure of approximately 2,000 separate business entities, manages approximately $14-$15 billion of investor capital in vehicles ranging from: collateral loan obligation funds ("CLOs"); private equity funds; and mutual funds.

5. Highland's CLO business was front-and-center at the Trial on the Involuntary Petitions. The Alleged Debtor, Acis LP, for approximately the past seven years, has been the vehicle through which Highland's CLO business has been managed.

6. The Petitioning Creditor, Mr. Terry, became an employee of Highland in the year 2005, starting as a portfolio analyst, promoting to a loan trader, then ultimately becoming the portfolio manager for (and 25% limited partner in) Highland's CLO business-specifically, Mr. Terry was the human being who was acting for the CLO manager, Acis LP.

7. Mr. Terry was highly successful in his role in the CLO business, managing billions of dollars of assets during his tenure, but Mr. Terry and Mr. Dondero had a bitter parting of ways on June 9, 2016. Specifically, Mr. Terry's employment was terminated on that date (for reasons that *120have been highly disputed) and his 25% limited partnership interest in Acis LP was deemed forfeited without any payment of consideration to him.

8. In September 2016, Highland sued Mr. Terry in the 162nd Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas ("State Court 1") for breach of fiduciary duty/self-dealing, disparagement, breach of contract, and various other causes of action and theories. Mr. Terry asserted his own claims against Highland, and also claims against the two Alleged Debtors, Mr. Dondero, and others and demanded arbitration. On September 28, 2016, State Court 1 stayed the litigation and ordered the parties to arbitrate. The parties participated in ten days of arbitration in September 2017 before JAMS. On October 20, 2017, Mr. Terry obtained an Arbitration Award (herein so called),5 jointly and severally against both of the Alleged Debtors in the amount of $7,949,749.15, plus post-award interest at the legal rate, which was based on theories of breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duties.

9. There are still claims pending between and among the Petitioning Creditor, Highland, and others (not including the Alleged Debtors) in State Court 1.

10. A Final Judgment (herein so called) confirming the Arbitration Award was entered by the 44th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas ("State Court 2") on December 18, 2017, in the same amount as that contained in the Arbitration Award-$7,949,749.15.6

11. Mr. Terry began pursuing post-judgment discovery soon after obtaining his Arbitration Award and even more so after entry of the Final Judgment. Mr. Terry undertook a UCC search on November 8, 2017, to investigate whether there were any liens on the Alleged Debtors' assets (none appeared).7 Mr. Terry also pursued a garnishment of an Acis LP bank account (at a time when there was only around $2,000 in the account). Mr. Terry's counsel deposed Highland's General Counsel Scott Ellington (who sat for the deposition as a representative of Acis, LP) on January 26, 2018, and asked numerous questions about: (a) how many creditors the Alleged Debtors had,8 and (b) whether Acis LP was able to pay its debts as they became due,9 but did not receive meaningful answers.

12. Mr. Terry requested a temporary restraining order ("TRO") from State Court 2, on January 24, 2018, after discovering certain transactions and transfers involving Acis LP's interests, that he believed were pursued without any legitimate business purpose and with the purpose of denuding Acis LP of its assets and to make it judgment proof. Most particularly, it appeared as though Highland was engaged in a scheme to transfer certain fee-generating CLO management contracts of Acis LP away from it and into a Cayman Island affiliate of Highland.10 At a January 24, 2018 hearing on the request for a TRO, Acis LP agreed and State Court 2 ordered that, between that hearing and a later hearing on a request for a temporary injunction, no CLO management contracts would be transferred away from Acis LP and that no monies would be diverted from it.11

*12113. Then, on January 29, 2018, the Controller of and CPA for Highland (David Klos) submitted a Declaration to State Court 2 concerning the net worth of the Alleged Debtors, stating that Acis GP/LLC had a net worth of $0 and that Acis LP might have a net worth, at best, of $990,141.12 Mr. Terry thought this was preposterous-given the management fees that Acis LP was entitled to and the receivables that should be owing to it. Mr. Terry believes that the collateral management agreements on which Acis LP receives management fees have a present value of $30 million (about $6 million for each of the five CLOs which Acis LP has been managing).

14. On January 29, 2018, the Alleged Debtors filed a motion for leave to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of $495,070.50 with State Court 2 (purportedly half of the net worth of the two Alleged Debtors-as stated in the David Klos Declaration), so that they could suspend enforcement of the Final Judgment while they appealed it.13 Although there is a very stringent standard for appealing an Arbitration Award, the Alleged Debtors apparently believe they have an argument that State Court 2 lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the Arbitration Award (a motion to vacate the Final Judgment based on this argument has previously been denied by State Court 2).14

15. Meanwhile, Mr. Terry was learning of more transactions and transfers involving Acis LP's assets and interests. On January 29, 2018, Mr. Terry filed supplemental pleadings with State Court 2, alleging that further shenanigans (i.e., transfers and transactions that would amount to fraudulent transfers) were underway at Acis LP and seeking a receiver.15 Also, at some point, in the weeks leading up to this, an Acis LP lawyer represented to Mr. Terry's counsel that the Alleged Debtors were "judgment proof."16

16. At approximately 11:57 p.m. on January 30, 2018 (on the evening before a scheduled temporary injunction hearing in State Court 2-at which time State Court 2 presumably might have considered the Alleged Debtors' request to post the $495,070.50 supersedeas bond to stay enforcement of the Final Judgment), Mr. Terry filed the Involuntary Petitions, as a sole petitioning creditor, against both Acis LP and Acis GP/LLC.

17. For purposes of this Trial (and this Trial only), the Alleged Debtors do not dispute that Mr. Terry has standing to be a petitioning creditor pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 303(b) -in other words, they do not dispute that Mr. Terry is a holder of a claim against the Alleged Debtors that is not contingent as to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount and that aggregates at least $15,775 in unsecured amount. However, the Alleged Debtors argue that: (a) the Alleged Debtors have 12 or more creditors and, thus, three or more petitioning creditors were required to prosecute the Involuntary Petitions pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 303(b)(1) ; (b) the Petitioning Creditor did not establish, pursuant to *122Bankruptcy Code section 303(h)(1), that the Alleged Debtors are not generally paying their debts as such debts become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount; (c) regardless of whether the Petitioning Creditor has met the statutory tests in sections 303(b)(1) and (h)(1), the Petitioning Creditor has acted in bad faith -which serves as an equitable basis for dismissal of the Involuntary Petitions; and (d) if the court disagrees with the Alleged Debtors and determines that the section 303(b) and (h) statutory tests are met, and also determines that the Petitioning Creditor has not acted in bad faith, the court should nevertheless abstain in this matter, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 305 , since this is essentially a two-party dispute and the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by dismissal.

18. The Petitioning Creditor argues that he has met the statutory tests of sections 303(b) and (h) but, even if he has not, there is a "special circumstances" exception to the section 303 statutory requirements, whenever a petitioning creditor establishes fraud, trick, scheme, artifice or the like on the part of an alleged debtor-which "special circumstances," Mr. Terry alleges, have been established here. Moreover, the Petitioning Creditor argues that the facts here do not warrant section 305 abstention because the interests of creditors and the Alleged Debtors would not be better served by dismissal.

19. As further explained below, the court finds and concludes that the Petitioning Creditor has met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the statutory tests of sections 303(b) and (h) are met here. Thus, the court does not need to reach the question of whether there is a "special circumstances" exception to the section 303 statutory requirements, whenever a petitioning creditor establishes fraud, trick, scheme, artifice or the like on the part of an alleged debtor, and-if so-whether the exception is applicable here.17

20. Moreover, the Alleged Debtors have not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Petitioning Creditor acted in bad faith, such that the Involuntary Petitions should be dismissed.

21. Finally, the Alleged Debtors also have not shown facts here that warrant section 305 abstention because they have not shown that the interests of creditors and the Alleged Debtors would be better served by dismissal.

B. The CLO Business: Understanding the Alleged Debtors' Business Operations, Structure, and What Creditors and Interest Holders They Actually Have.

22. Highland set up its first CLO in the year 1996. Highland was one of the early participants in the CLO industry.

23. The Alleged Debtors were formed in 2011 to be the new "brand" or face of the Highland CLO business, after Highland's name had suffered some negative publicity in the marketplace.

24. Acis LP has acted as the portfolio manager of Highland's CLOs since 2011. Acis LP currently has a contractual right to CLO portfolio management fees on five CLOs18 which were referred to at the Trial as CLO 2013-1; CLO 2014-3; CLO 2014-4; CLO

*1232014-5; and CLO 2016-6. CLOs typically have an 8-12 year life. Thus, there are still several years of life left on these CLOs (since the oldest one was established in the year 2013).

25. The key "players" in and features with regard to the Highland CLOs, during the time period relevant to the issues adjudicated at the Trial, have been:

(a) The CLO manager. As mentioned earlier, the CLO manager is the Alleged Debtor, Acis LP. Acis LP, has collateral management agreements (hereinafter, the "CLO Collateral Management Agreements") with the CLOs (which CLOs were set up as special purpose entities) and, pursuant thereto, receives management fees19 from the CLOs in exchange for managing the pool of assets within the CLOs and communicating with investors in the CLOs.20 As mentioned earlier, Mr. Terry was the human being that performed the management function at Acis LP until Highland fired him on June 9, 2016 and also terminated his limited partnership interest in Acis LP. Mr. Terry, and all employees who have ever provided services to the CLO manager, are Highland employees-which were provided to Acis LP through shared and sub-advisory services agreements-as further explained below. Thus, to be clear, Acis LP has always essentially subcontracted its CLO managerial function out to Highland.
(b) The pool of assets. Within each CLO that the CLO manager manages is a basket of loans that the CLO manager purchases. The basket of loans typically consists of approximately 200 loans-payable (or portions of loans payable), on which large well-known companies typically are the makers/obligors (and which loans, collectively, provide a variable rate of interest).21 The CLO manager can typically decide to buy and sell different loans to go into the pool of assets, with certain restrictions, during a four or five year reinvestment time period.
(c) The CLO investors (i.e., CLO note holders). These may be any number of persons or entities, including pension funds, life insurance companies, or others who decide to invest in the CLOs and contribute capital to fund the purchase of a CLO's loan pool, and, in return, receive fixed rate notes payable-the ratings on which can range anywhere from Triple-A to Single-B, depending upon the risk option the investor chooses. There are typically five or six traunches of notes issued by the CLO (with the top AAA-rated traunche being the least risky and *124the bottom traunche being the most risky) and-to be clear-the CLO itself (again, in each case, the CLO is a special purpose vehicle) is the obligor. As the CLO manager receives income from the pool of loans in the CLO, he distributes that income to the CLO investors, in accordance with their note indentures,22 starting with the top traunche of notes and then down to the other traunches. The top traunche of notes (AAA-rated) is considered the "controlling" class and a majority of holders in this class can terminate the CLO manager (i.e., Acis LP) for cause on 45 days' notice, although all parties seem to agree this would be a rare event.
(d) The CLO equity holder. The CLO equity holder actually is a holder of subordinated notes issued by the CLOs (i.e., the bottom traunche of notes on which the CLO special purpose entity is obligated), and has voting rights and is itself a capital provider, but it takes the most risk and receives the very last cash flow from the CLOs. It, in certain ways, controls the CLO vehicle23 -for example, by virtue of having the ability to make a redemption call after a certain "no-call" period-which would force a liquidation of the basket of loans in the CLO, with the proceeds paying down the traunches of notes, starting at the top with the Triple A's). Note that, until recently, a separate entity known as Acis Loan Funding, Ltd. ("ALF"), which was incorporated under the laws of the island nation of Guernsey,24 was the CLO equity holder. To be clear, ALF was essentially the equity owner in the CLO special purpose entities-not the equity owner of Acis LP . Acis LP was a party to a separate portfolio management agreement with ALF (hereinafter, the "ALF Portfolio Management Agreement"-not to be confused with the CLO Collateral Management Agreements that Acis LP separately has with the special purpose CLOs). No fees were paid from ALF to Acis LP pursuant to the ALF Portfolio Management Agreement (rather, fees are only paid to Acis LP on the CLO Collateral Management Agreements). The complicated structure of the CLO business-all parties seemed to agree-has been developed, among other reasons, to comply with "risk-retention requirements" imposed by the U.S. Congress's massive Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation25 enacted in year *1252010, in response to the financial crisis and recession that first began in 2008.
(e) The Equity Owners of ALF. Until recently (i.e., until October 24, 2017-four days after the Arbitration Award), Acis LP itself, as required for a CLO manager, had a 15% indirect ownership in ALF, in order to be regulatory compliant.26 The parties sometimes refer to ALF (and the web of ownership between it and Acis LP) as the "risk retention structure."27 The evidence at the Trial revealed that ALF (which has recently been renamed), now, has three equity owners: (i) a 49% equity owner that is a charitable fund (i.e., a donor advised fund or "DAF") that was seeded with contributions from Highland, is managed/advised by Highland, and whose independent trustee is a long-time friend of Highland's chief executive officer, Mr. Dondero; (ii) 2% is owned by Highland employees; and (iii) finally, ALF may be 49% owned by a third-party institutional investor based in Boston that Highland believed it was required to keep anonymous at the Trial. Not only is the court unaware of who this independent third-party is, but the evidence seems to suggest that it may have acquired its interest fairly recently or may have simply committed to invest recently.28
(f) The underwriter for the CLO notes. As with any publicly traded notes, there is an underwriter for the CLO notes which solicits investors for the CLO notes (examples given at the Trial: Mizuho Securities USA, LLC; Merrill Lynch; JP Morgan Chase).29 The CLO notes are traded on the Over-the-Counter Market.
(g) The independent indenture trustee for the CLO notes. As also with any issuance of publicly traded notes, there is an indenture trustee (example given at the Trial: U.S. Bank).30

26. Mr. Terry, the Petitioning Creditor, as earlier mentioned, began working for Highland in 2005 until his employment was terminated on June 9, 2016.

27. Acis LP and Acis GP/LLC have never had any employees. Rather, all employees *126that work for any of the Highland family of companies (including Mr. Terry) have, almost without exception, been employees of Highland itself. Highland has approximately 150 employees in the United States. Highland provides employees to entities in the organizational structure, such as Acis LP and Acis GP/LLC, through both the mechanism of: (a) a Shared Services Agreement (herein so called),31 which provides "back office" personnel-such as human resources, accounting, legal and information technology to the Highland family of companies; and (b) a Sub-Advisory Agreement (herein so called),32 which provides "front office" personnel to entities-such as the managers of investments like Mr. Terry. The evidence indicated that this is typical in the CLO industry to have such agreements. The court notes that all iterations of the Shared Services Agreements and Sub-Advisory Agreements between Acis LP and Highland were signed by Mr. Dondero both as President of Acis LP and as President of the General Partner of Highland.

28. Because Acis LP essentially subcontracts out all of its functions to Highland pursuant to the Shared Services Agreement and the Sub-Advisory Agreement, Acis LP has very few vendors or creditors. Rather Highland incurs expenses and essentially bills them to Acis LP through these two agreements.33 In other words, Highland is one of Acis LP's largest and most frequent creditor.

29. The evidence reflected that at all times Mr. Dondero has been the President of both of the Alleged Debtors, and there have been, at all times, very few, if any, other officers. It appears that the only other officer of Acis GP/LLC that ever existed was Frank Waterhouse, Treasurer.34 It also appears that the only other officer of Acis LP that ever existed was Frank Waterhouse, Treasurer, Mr. Terry as Portfolio Manager, and someone named Patrick Boyce as Secretary at one time.35

30. Mr. Dondero testified that he has decision making authority for the Alleged Debtors but usually delegates that authority to Highland's in-house lawyers, Scott Ellington (General Counsel, Chief Legal Officer, and Partner of Highland) and Isaac Leventon (Assistant General Counsel of Highland) and is rarely involved in "nitty gritty negotiations." Sometimes instructions will come to him from the compliance group headed up by Chief Compliance Officer Thomas Surgent. Additionally, he testified that he signs hundreds of documents per week, and much of what he signs is on advice of counsel and he sometimes even delegates to his assistant the authority to sign his name. As set forth above, Mr. Ellington (who did not testify at the Trial)36 and Mr. Leventon (who did testify at the Trial) are not officers, directors, or employees of the Alleged Debtors. Mr. Leventon is designated to be the representative for the Alleged Debtors (and testified as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness during pre-Trial discovery)-he explained that this representative-authority derives from the Shared Services Agreement. Mr. Leventon testified that he takes his instructions generally through his direct supervisor, Mr. *127Ellington, although Highland partners can ask him to perform legal services for any of Highland's 2,000 entities.

C. Transfers and Transactions Involving the Alleged Debtors Since the Litigation with Mr. Terry Commenced-and Especially After the Arbitration Award.

31. Below is a listing of some (but not necessarily all) of the transfers and transactions that the Alleged Debtors, Highland, and related parties undertook after the litigation with Mr. Terry commenced.

(a) Acis LP's Sale to Highland of a "Participation Interest" in its CLO Cash Flow Stream. On October 7, 2016 (approximately one month after the litigation arose among Mr. Terry, Highland, and the Alleged Debtors), Acis LP sold to Highland a participation interest in its expected future cash flow from the CLO Collateral Management Agreements-specifically, it sold a portion of the cash flow it expected to earn from November 2016 to August 2019 (not the full life of the CLOs), for $666,655 cash, plus a $12,666,446 note payable from Highland to Acis LP (hereinafter, the "Acis LP Note Receivable from Highland"). Mr. Dondero signed the purchase and sale agreement for both purchaser and seller.37 Mr. Dondero signed the Acis LP Note Receivable from Highland, which accrued interest at 3% per annum. It appears that the $666,665 cash down payment was actually paid, and a payment required on the Acis LP Note Receivable from Highland of $3,370,694 on May 31, 2017, was actually made. The Acis LP Note Receivable from Highland was payable in three installments, with a $5,286,243 payment required on May 31, 2018, and a $4,677,690 payment required on May 31, 2019. When viewed in complete isolation, this transaction does not necessarily appear problematic. Although there was evidence that Acis LP had been managing the five CLOs for about $10 million per year of fees, some of the recitals in the purchase and sale agreement suggest that there may have been a sound business reason for the transaction and the arbitration panel,38 viewing this transaction in isolation, did not think it was necessarily problematic or actionable. In any event, Highland is adamant it was a net neutral transaction.
(b) Transfer of Acis LP's interest in ALF. Recall that ALF was the entity that held equity (i.e., the subordinated notes) in the CLO special purpose vehicles, and held voting rights and was a capital provider to the overall risk retention structure supporting the CLOs. And Acis LP, in turn, held a 15% indirect interest in ALF. On October 24, 2017 (four days after the Arbitration Award ), Acis, LP entered into an agreement with ALF whereby ALF acquired back the shares that Acis LP indirectly held in ALF (966,679 shares) for the sum of $991,180.13.39 No credible business justification was offered for this transaction, other than mostly uncorroborated (and self-serving) statements from Highland witnesses *128that Acis LP was "toxic" in the market place (due to the litigation with Mr. Terry) and this was a step in the process of extricating Acis LP from the CLO business.40 The court finds the testimony about Acis LP's toxicity in the marketplace to not be credible or at all convincing. For one thing, a new CLO (Acis CLO 2017-7, Ltd.) was closed on April 10, 2017 with Acis LP as the portfolio manager. Moreover, Acis LP subcontracts all of its CLO management function to Highland-and there was no evidence to suggest that anyone in the marketplace at this juncture differentiates between Acis LP (whose president is Mr. Dondero) and Highland (whose president is Mr. Dondero). In any event, the October 24, 2017 transaction had the highly consequential effect of making Acis LP "noncompliant" or unable to continue serving as a CLO manager for regulatory purposes for any new CLOs or reset CLOs (or for a refinancing of any of the Highland CLOs that had been created after December 2014)41 because aspects of the federal Dodd Frank legislation require CLO managers to have "skin in the game" with regard to the CLOs they manage (i.e., they must retain at least 5% of CLOs they manage). Mr. Akada, who testified that he had been involved with the CLO business from the beginning and that the CLO team reported to him (including Mr. Terry before his termination), testified that he had no knowledge of this particular transaction. The document effectuating this transaction was signed by Frank Waterhouse, Treasurer for and on behalf of Acis LP, acting by its general partner, Acis GP/LLC.42
(c) ALF Next Decides to Jettison Acis, LP as its Portfolio Manager and Replace it with a new Highland Cayman Island Entity. On October 27, 2017 (seven days after the Arbitration Award), ALF-having purchased back the ownership interest that Acis LP had in it, just three days earlier-decided that it would no longer use Acis LP as its portfolio manager and entered into a new portfolio management agreement to supersede and replace the ALF Portfolio Management Agreement. Specifically, on October 27, 2017, ALF entered into a new Portfolio Management Agreement with a Cayman Island entity called Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd., replacing Acis LP in its role with ALF.43 This agreement appears to have been further solidified in a second portfolio management agreement dated November 15, 2017.44
(d) The Acis LP Note Receivable from Highland is Transferred from Acis LP to Yet Another Highland Cayman Island Entity. On November 3, 2017 (10 days after the Arbitration Award), Acis LP assigned and transferred its interests in the Acis LP Note Receivable from Highland-which at that point had a *129balance owing of over $9.5 million-to a Highland Cayman Island entity known as Highland CLO Management Ltd. which apparently was created sometime recently to be the new collateral manager of the CLOs (in other words, the new Acis LP).45 The Assignment and Transfer Agreement memorializing this transaction is signed by Mr. Dondero for Acis LP and Mr. Dondero for Highland and some undecipherable name for Highland CLO Management Ltd.46 The document recites that (i) Highland is no longer willing to continue providing support services to Acis LP, (ii) Acis LP, therefore, can no longer fulfill its duties as a collateral manager, and (iii) Highland CLO Management Ltd. agrees to step into the collateral manager role if Acis LP will assign to it the Acis LP Note Receivable from Highland. One more thing: since Acis LP was expected to potentially incur future legal and accounting/administrative fees, and might not have the ability to pay them when due, Highland CLO Management Ltd. agreed to reimburse Acis LP (or pays its vendors directly) up to $2 million of future legal expenses and up to $1 million of future accounting/administrative expenses.47
(e) Various Additional Transactions that further Transitioned CLO Management and Fees Away from Acis LP to Highland Cayman Island Entity. On December 19, 2017-just one day after the Arbitration Award was confirmed with the entry of the Final Judgment-the vehicle that can most easily be described as the Acis LP "risk retention structure" (necessitated by federal Dodd Frank law) was transferred away from Acis LP and into the ownership of Highland CLO Holdings, Ltd. (yet another Cayman Island entity, incorporated on October 27, 201748 ).
(f) In addition to transferring Acis LP's interest in the Acis LP risk retention structure on December 19, 2017, Acis LP also transferred its contractual right to receive management fees for Acis CLO 2017-7, Ltd. (which had just closed April 10, 2017), which Mr. Terry credibly testified had a combined value of $5 million, to Highland CLO Holdings, Ltd., another Cayman entity, purportedly in exchange for forgiveness of a $2.8 million receivable that was owed to Highland under the most recent iteration of the Shared Services Agreement and Sub-Advisory Agreement for CLO-7.49 In conjunction with this transfer, Highland CLO Holdings, Ltd. then entered into new Shared Services and Sub-Advisory Agreements with *130Highland.50
(g) Change of Equity Owners of the Alleged Debtors. When Acis LP was first formed, it was owned by one general partner (Acis GP/LLC, with a .1% interest) and it had three limited partners: (a) Dugaboy Investment Trust (a Dondero family trust of which either Mr. Dondero or his sister, Nancy Dondero, have been the Trustee at all relevant times) with a 59.9% interest; (b) Mr. Terry with a 25% interest; and (c) Mr. Akada with a 15% interest. When Acis GP/LLC was formed (i.e., the .1% owner of Acis LP), its sole member was the Dugaboy Investment Trust. After Mr. Terry was terminated by Highland, his 25% limited partnership interest in Acis LP was forfeited and divided among the two remaining limited partners: Mr. Akada (increasing his interest by 10% up to 25%), and Dugaboy Investment Trust (increasing its interest by 15% up to 74.9%). But, more importantly, on the day after entry of Mr. Terry's Final Judgment (i.e., on December 18, 2017), both Mr. Akada and Dugaboy Investment Trust conveyed their entire limited partnership interests in Acis LP-25% and 74.9%, respectively-to a Cayman Island entity called Neutra, Ltd., a Cayman Islands exempted company. Dugaboy Investment Trust also conveyed its 100% membership interest in Acis GP/LLC to Neutra, Ltd. Mr. Akada testified that he did this on advice of counsel. He also did not dispute that he had made millions of dollars of equity dividends from his equity investment in Acis LP in recent years51 -which he conveyed away for no consideration on December 18, 2017.
(h) The Intended Reset of Acis CLO 2014-3. With all of the above maneuverings having been accomplished, Highland was posed to do a reset on Acis CLO 2014-3 in February 2018 (until Mr. Terry filed the Involuntary Petitions). The investment bank Mizuho Securities USA, LLC was engaged November 15, 201752 and a final offering circular was issued in January 201853 -contemplating a reset of Acis CLO 20-14-3 with the recently created Highland CLO Management Ltd. Identified as the new portfolio manager, rather than Acis LP. The act of implementing a reset on the CLO was not in itself suspect. However, the reset would, of course, have the effect of depriving Acis LP from a valuable asset-an agreement that could realistically be expected to provide millions of dollars of future collateral management fees-coincidentally (or not) just after Mr. Terry obtained his large judgment.

D. Findings Regarding Credibility of Witnesses.

32. The court found the testimony of Mr. Terry to be very credible. He was very familiar with the financial condition of the Alleged Debtors, since he presided over the business of the Alleged Debtors from their inception until June 9, 2016, and has also closely followed publicly available *131information regarding the companies since his termination. Mr. Terry credibly testified that the Alleged Debtors have never had a significant number of creditors, since most of the Alleged Debtors' vendors are engaged by and send their invoices to Highland, and Highland simply obtains reimbursement from the Alleged Debtors (and other entities in the Highland family), as its in-house lawyers determine is appropriate, through the Shared Services Agreement and Sub-Advisory Agreement. Thus, Highland should at all times be the Alleged Debtors' main creditor. The court finds that Mr. Terry had a good faith belief that the Alleged Debtors had only a handful of creditors (maybe four or so) besides him and Highland. The court also finds that Mr. Terry-at the time he filed the Involuntary Petitions-had a good faith belief that the Alleged Debtors and those controlling them were engaged in an orchestrated, sophisticated effort to denude the Alleged Debtors of their assets and value (i.e. , transferring assets and rights for less than reasonably equivalent value), which started with intensity after issuance of the Arbitration Award (if not sooner).54

33. The court found the testimony of almost all of the witnesses for the Alleged Debtors to be of questionable reliability and, oftentimes, there seemed to be an effort to convey plausible deniability. For example, sometimes business decisions concerning the Alleged Debtors were said to have been made by a "collective," and other times the in-house Highland lawyers (who, of course, are not themselves officers or employees of Acis LP and Acis GP/LLC) stressed that Mr. Dondero (the president and manager of the two entities) had ultimate decision making authority for them. Meanwhile, Mr. Dondero testified that, while he has decision making authority at Acis LP, he usually delegates to Highland's in-house lawyers Scott Ellington and Isaac Leventon. He testified that he signs hundreds of documents per week and often must rely on information of others when signing. Additionally, Mr. Dondero (again, the President of each of the Alleged Debtors) testified that he had never even read the Arbitration Award. While Mr. Dondero is the chief executive of a multi-billion dollar international investment company, and naturally has widespread responsibilities and must delegate to and rely upon others including lawyers, this court simply does not believe that he never read the Arbitration Award. The court perceived the animosity between Mr. Dondero and Mr. Terry to be rather enormous and Mr. Dondero even testified (as did others) that the litigation with Mr. Terry was hurting Acis LP and Highland in the CLO marketplace (i.e., no investors or underwriters wanting to be associated with the Acis brand).55 If that were the case, it strains credulity to suggest Mr. Dondero never even read the Arbitration Award.

34. As mentioned earlier, in December 2017, Acis GP/LLC became 100% owned by a Cayman Island entity known as Neutra, Ltd. (whose beneficial owner is a Dondero family trust) and Acis LP became 99.9% owned by Neutra, Ltd. The directors of Acis GP/LLC and Acis LP are provided to it now by an entity known as "Maples Fiduciary Services"-another Cayman Island entity, but the Highland Assistant General Counsel could not remember *132the names of those directors provided to Acis GP/LLC and Acis LP, except for perhaps one. Mr. Dondero, when questioned about some of the recent transactions pertaining to Acis LP, testified that there were tax reasons-tax lawyers recommended the recent transactions and transfers. No tax lawyers testified. Mr. Dondero also testified that certain transactions were at the directive of the Thomas Surgent group (the Highland chief compliance officer). Neither Mr. Surgent nor anyone else from the compliance group testified.

35. Meanwhile, Mr. Akada, who, while testifying, seemed like a generally lovely person and seemed as knowledgeable as a human being could possibly be on the topic of CLOs generally, had no idea if he was an officer or director of the Alleged Debtors, nor did he know whom its officers were. He could not testify as to the meaning of certain transactions in which Acis LP had engaged in during recent weeks and said that he signed certain documents on advice of counsel. He also could not even testify as to whether Highland was opposing the Involuntary Petitions.

36. Again, there was a lot of plausible deniability at Trial as to the "whos" and "whys" for the recent maneuverings involving the Alleged Debtors assets and rights in the weeks since the Arbitration Award. The one thing that the court was wholly convinced of was that conflicts of interest among Highland and the Alleged Debtors abound, and no one is looking out for the interests of the Alleged Debtors as a fiduciary should.

E. Evidence Regarding the Number of Creditors of the Alleged Debtors.56

37. The Alleged Debtors do not dispute Mr. Terry's claim for the purposes of counting creditors under section 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. However, Mr. Terry asserts that the Alleged Debtors have fewer than 12 creditors, and the Alleged Debtors dispute this fact. Specifically, the Alleged Debtors initially filed on January 31, 2018, a Notice of List of Creditors Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1003(b) signed by Mr. Dondero listing 18 creditors (the "Original Notice of Creditors").57 The Alleged Debtors subsequently filed on February 5, 2018, a First Amended Notice of List of Creditors Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1003(b) signed by Mr. Leventon listing 19 creditors (the "First Amended Notice of Creditors").58 Finally, the Alleged Debtors filed on March 6, 2018, a Second Amended Notice of List of Creditors Pursuant to Fed. R. Bank. P. 1003(b) signed by Mr. Leventon listing 20 creditors (the "Second Amended List of Creditors").59 The following chart summarizes the name, amount, and nature of the 20 creditors listed by the Alleged Debtors in their Second Amended List of Creditors.

*133Creditor No. Creditor Name Nature of Claim Total Indebtedness60 1 Andrews Kurth Legal Fees $211,088.13 2 Case Anywhere, LLC Law Firm Vendor $417.20 3 CSI Global Law Firm Vendor $38,452.56 Deposition Services 4 David Langford Court Reporter/Law $550 Firm Vendor 5 Drexel Limited Fee Rebate $6,359.96 6 Elite Document Data Hosting/Law $199.72 Technology Firm Vendor 7 Highfield Equities, Fee Rebate $2,510.04 Inc. 8 Highland Capital Advisory and $2,770,731.00 Management, L.P. Participation Fees 9 JAMS, Inc. Law Firm Vendor $1,352.27 10 Jones Day Legal Fees $368.75 11 Joshua Terry Judgment Creditor $8,060,827.84 12 KPMG LLP Auditor Fees $34,000 13 Lackey Hershman Legal Fees $236,977.54 LLP 14 McKool Smith, P.C. Legal Fees $70,082.18 15 Reid Collins & Tsai Legal Fees $17,383.75 LLP 16 Stanton Advisors Testifying Expert $10,000 LLC Fees/Law Firm Vendor 17 Stanton Law Firm Legal Fees $88,133.99 18 The TASA Group. Testifying Expert $14,530.54 Inc. Fees/Law Firm Vendor 19 CT Corporation Report Filing $517.12 Representation 20 David Simek Expense $1,233.19 Reimbursement

[Editor's Note: The preceding image contains the reference for footnote60 ].

38. First, the court believes it necessary to remove certain insider creditor claims, which are required not to be counted pursuant to section 303(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.61 This would clearly include Highland (the Alleged Debtors do not dispute this).

39. Additionally, there were certain creditors that filed sworn statements saying they were not creditors of the Alleged Debtors or were subsequently removed from the creditor list by agreement of the Alleged Debtors. These creditors would include Case Anywhere, CSI Global Deposition Services,62 Elite Document Technology, JAMS, Inc.,63 Stanton Advisors LLC,64 and the TASA Group, Inc.65 Thus, *134the updated chart now shows 13 creditors of the Alleged Debtors.

Creditor No. Creditor Name Nature of Claim Total Indebtedness 1 Andrews Kurth Legal Fees $211,088.13 2 Case Anywhere, LLC Law Firm Vendor $417.20 3 CSI Global Law Firm Vendor $38,452.56 Deposition Services 4 David Langford Court Reporter/Law $550 Firm Vendor 5 Drexel Limited Fee Rebate $6,359.96 6 Elite Document Data Hosting/Law $199.72 Technology Firm Vendor 7 Highfield Equities, Fee Rebate $2,510.04 Inc. 8 Highland Capital Advisory and $2,770,731.00 Management, L.P. Participation Fees 9 JAMS, Inc. Law Firm Vendor $1,352.27 10 Jones Day Legal Fees $368.75 11 Joshua Terry Judgment Creditor $8,060,827.84 12 KPMG LLP Auditor Fees $34,000 13 Lackey Hershman Legal Fees $236,977.54 LLP 14 McKool Smith, P.C. Legal Fees $70,082.18 15 Reid Collins & Tsai Legal Fees $17,383.75 LLP 16 Stanton Advisors Testifying Expert $10,000 LLC Fees/Law Firm Vendor 17 Stanton Law Firm Legal Fees $88,133.99 18 The TASA Group. Testifying Expert $14,530.54 Inc. Fees/Law Firm Vendor 19 CT Corporation Report Filing $517.12 Representation 20 David Simek Expense $1,233.19 Reimbursement

40. Next, the court finds that there are certain creditors included in the "Law Firm Vendor" category (e.g. , experts, data hosting, document managers, court reporters) that are really creditors of the individual law firms and/or Highland, and that these law firm vendor creditors should not be considered creditors of the Alleged Debtors. For these, there was no evidence of a direct contractual obligation on the part of either the Alleged Debtors or Highland-although the court certainly understands that, when the law firms would retain vendors, they would bill these to either the Alleged Debtors or Highland as an expense to be reimbursed. Most of these were already eliminated with agreement of the Alleged Debtors but, from the remaining list of creditors, this would include David Langford (a Dallas County court reporter).66 To be clear, while the individual law firm creditors may ultimately have a right to reimbursement for these vendor expenses from Highland (who may *135then potentially have a right to reimbursement from the Alleged Debtors via the Shared Services and Sub-Advisory Agreements), the court does not find this vendor to have a claim directly against the Alleged Debtors for purposes of section 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.

41. Next, as to the Stanton Law Firm, the court finds that this creditor should also be removed from the pool of creditors that "count," for section 303(b) purposes, since this claim appears to be the subject of a "bona fide dispute as to liability or amount,"67 based on the evidence presented at the Trial. First, there was no engagement letter between either of the Alleged Debtors and the Stanton Law Firm produced.68 Second, the heavily redacted invoice of the Stanton Law Firm dated October 18, 2016 shows only that it was relating to the "Joshua Terry Matter" and that it was billed to Highland.69 Third, the Responses and Objections to Mr. Terry's Notice of Intention to Take Depositions by Written Questions sent to the Stanton Law Firm70 provides the following responses:

Question No. 11 : What is the total amount of debt Acis Capital Management L.P. to the Firm. is liable to the Firm.
Answer : Acis Capital Management L.P.'s debt to the Firm is unknown at this time.
Question No. 12 : What is the total amount of debt Acis Capital Management GP, LLC is liable for to the firm?
Answer : Acis Capital Management GP, LLC to the Firm is unknown at this time.
Question No. 13 : Is any other party also liable for the debt of Acis Capital Management L.P. to the Firm? If so, please state the liable party and portion of Acis Capital Management L.P. debt the other party is liable for to the Firm.
Answer : Whether any other party is also liable to the firm for the debt of Acis Capital Management, L.P. is unknown at this time.
Question No. 14 : Is any other party also liable for the debt of Acis Capital Management GP, LLC to Firm? If so, please state the liable party and portion of Acis Capital Management GP, LLC debt the other party is liable for to the Firm.
Answer : Whether any other party is also liable for the debt of Acis Capital Management GP, LLC is unknown at this time....
Question No. 21 : Does the Firm currently represent Acis Capital Management, L.P.? If so, please state the representation.
Answer : Based on Acis's assertion that this question calls for information protected by the attorney-client privilege, the Firm cannot answer this question at this time.
Question No. 22 : Does the Firm currently represent Acis Capital Management GP, LLC? If so, please state the representation?
Answer : Based on Acis's assertion that this question calls for information protected by the attorney-client privilege, the Firm cannot answer this question at this time....71

The court finds that this evidence demonstrates that the claim of the Stanton Law Firm is the subject of a bona fide dispute as to either liability or amount and should not be counted since there is no real way of even knowing who the Stanton Law Firm was engaged by and, thus, whether the Alleged Debtors are even responsible for these alleged legal fees. The court would also specifically refer to the testimony of Mr. Leventon, the in-house lawyer employed by Highland who was in charge of allocating all of the bills that came into Highland's legal invoicing system, where he described a process in which all legal bills relating to the "Terry Matter" would automatically be assigned to the Alleged Debtors, without any real regard to whether the particular law firm had even been engaged by the Alleged Debtors or if whether the representation was actually relating to one of the other parties in the Terry litigation (e.g. , Highland, Mr. Dondero, etc.). Accordingly, the court finds that there is a bona fide dispute as to whether the Alleged Debtors are actually liable for the Stanton Law Firm legal fees and that they should not be counted as a creditor for purposes of section 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.72

42. Thus, it appears, at most, that there are 11 creditors73 of the Alleged Debtors as set forth in the chart below:

*137Creditor No. Creditor Name Nature of Claim Total Indebtedness 1 Andrews Kurth Legal Fees $211,088.13 2 Case Anywhere, LLC Law Firm Vendor $417.20 3 CSI Global Law Firm Vendor $38,452.56 Deposition Services 4 David Langford Court Reporter/Law $550 Firm Vendor 5 Drexel Limited Fee Rebate $6,359.96 6 Elite Document Data Hosting/Law $199.72 Technology Firm Vendor 7 Highfield Equities, Fee Rebate $2,510.04 Inc. 8 Highland Capital Advisory and $2,770,731.00 Management, L.P. Participation Fees 9 JAMS, Inc. Law Firm Vendor $1,352.27 10 Jones Day Legal Fees $368.75 11 Joshua Terry Judgment Creditor $8,060,827.84 12 KPMG LLP Auditor Fees $34,000 13 Lackey Hershman Legal Fees $236,977.54 LLP 14 McKool Smith, P.C. Legal Fees $70,082.18 15 Reid Collins & Tsai Legal Fees $17,383.75 LLP 16 Stanton Advisors Testifying Expert $10,000 LLC Fees/Law Firm Vendor 17 Stanton Law Firm Legal Fees $88,133.99 18 The TASA Group. Testifying Expert $14,530.54 Inc. Fees/Law Firm Vendor 19 CT Corporation Report Filing $517.12 Representation 20 David Simek Expense $1,233.19 Reimbursement

[Editor's Note: The preceding image contains the reference for footnote74 ].

*13843. Finally, on the topic of creditor numerosity, the court further finds that the evidence strongly suggested hurried manufacturing of creditors on the part of the Alleged Debtors and Highland, in order to bolster an argument that having a sole petitioning creditor was legally inadequate in this case.75 For example, the Klos Declaration and other information, that was provided to State Court 2 and in discovery, only days before the Involuntary Petitions were filed, seemed to show only a small number of creditors of Acis LP-Mr. Terry credibly testified that he thought there were less than 12 creditors based on his review of such information, as well as his understanding of the Alleged Debtors' business. Yet, only a few days later, the Alleged Debtors filed their Original Notice of Creditors, which showed 18 creditors, which was amended twice to add another creditor and then yet another. This simply does not jive in the court's mind and supports this court's belief that the Alleged Debtors were scurrying to determine which Highland creditors might cogently be painted as Acis LP creditors-so as to preclude Mr. Terry from being able to file the Involuntary Petitions as the single, petitioning creditor.

F. Evidence Regarding Whether the Alleged Debtors are Generally Not Paying Debts as They Become Due (Unless Such Debts are the Subject of a Bona Fide Dispute as to Liability or Amount).

44. The evidence submitted reflects that, for the 11 creditors identified above, 9 out of 11 have unpaid invoices that were more than 90 days old. The remaining 2 of the 11 were McKool Smith, P.C. (current counsel for the Alleged Debtors) and the Petitioning Creditor.76 The court makes findings with regard to each of the 11 creditors below-focusing specifically on whether the Alleged Debtors have been paying these creditors as their debts have become due.

45. First, with regard to Andrews Kurth & Kenyon ("AKK"), the evidence reflected that out of the $211,088.13 allegedly owed by Acis LP to AKK, the great majority of it-$173,448.42-was invoiced on November 16, 201677 (more than 14 months before the Petition Date). Other, smaller amounts were invoiced on a monthly basis in each of the months August 2017, September 2017, October 2017, November 2017, and December 2017. Although requested in discovery, no engagement letter for AKK was produced and AKK represented in written discovery that, to its knowledge, none existed.78 The court notes anecdotally that AKK's invoices (although allegedly related to Acis LP legal matters) were addressed to Highland.79 In any event, AKK represented that both the Alleged Debtors and Highland are jointly and severally liable for the fees owed to it.80 AKK also represented that, to its knowledge, the amounts owing to it by Acis LP and Highland are not disputed.81 AKK also represented that it has not provided legal work on a contingency basis for the Alleged Debtors or Highland.82 The court makes a logical inference *139that AKK expected timely payment of its invoices-the largest of which was dated more than 14 months prior to the Petition Date-and, thus, it has generally not been paid timely.

46. Next, with regard to Drexel Limited, the Petitioning Creditor concedes that its $6,359.96 indebtedness (which is a fee rebate owing to it) is not past-due.

47. Next, with regard to Highfield Equities, Inc., the Petitioning Creditor concedes that its $2,510.04 indebtedness (which is also a fee rebate owing to it) is not past-due.

48. Next, with regard to the Jones Day law firm, the $368.75 indebtedness owed to it is well more than 90 days old. Specifically, there is a six-and-a-half-month old invoice dated July 19, 2017 invoice in the amount of $118.75, and two five-month old invoices dated August 30, 2017 (both in the amount of $150).83 The court makes a logical inference that Jones Day expected timely payment of its invoices prior to the Petition Date and, thus, it has generally not been paid timely.

49. Next with regard to the Petitioning Creditor, Mr. Terry, the court notes that his liquidated claim in the amount of $8,060,827.84 first arose with the final Arbitration Award on October 20, 2017 (although such award was not confirmed by State Court 2 until December 18, 2017). The judgment was unstayed as of the January 30, 2018 Petition Date, although the Alleged Debtors state that they still desire to appeal it-as difficult as that is in the situation of an arbitration award. The court makes a logical inference that the Alleged Debtors had, on the Petition Date, no intention of paying this claim any time soon based on their conduct after the Arbitration Award-although the Arbitration Award had only been in existence for three-and-a-half months as of the Petition Date. The cash in the Alleged Debtors' bank accounts is wholly insufficient to cover the Arbitration Award and, meanwhile, corporate transactions have been ongoing to ensure that no cash streams will be coming into Acis LP in the future in the same way that they have in the past. Thus, this court finds that this large claim, as of the Petition Date, was not being paid timely.

50. Next with regard to KPMG LLP, the $34,000 indebtedness owed to it was for the service of auditing Acis LP's financial statements, pursuant to an engagement letter with it dated March 1, 2017.84 KPMG's engagement letter reflected a $40,000 flat fee was agreed to by Acis LP for the service, of which 40% was due October 2017 (i.e., $16,000), with another 45% was due in January 2018 ($18,000), and the remaining 15% would be due at the time that a final bill was sent. Acis LP has only paid $6,000 of the agreed upon amount-meaning $28,000 was overdue as of the January 30, 2018 Petition Date (with $10,000 of that being four months past due). The court makes a logical inference that KPMG LLP expected payment of its audit fees in accordance with its engagement letter and, thus, it has generally not been paid timely.

51. Next with regard to Lackey Hershman LLP, the $236,977.54 indebtedness owed to it was for legal services provided to the Alleged Debtors and Highland in connection with the arbitration and litigation with Mr. Terry. No engagement letter was provided, but the invoices for their services are all directed to Highland.85 The *140evidence reflected that three invoices had not been paid as of the Petition Date: an October 31, 2017 invoice in the amount of $56,909.53; a November 30, 2017 invoice setting forth new fees in the amount of $84,789.83; and a December 31, 2017 invoice setting forth new fees in the amount of $95,278.18.86 The court makes a logical inference that Lackey Hershman LLP expected prompt payment on its invoices (if nothing else, the statement on its invoice indicating "Total now due")87 and, thus, it has generally not been paid timely.

52. Next with regard to Reid Collins & Tsai LLP, the $17,383.75 indebtedness owed to it was billed in an invoice dated August 31, 2017, indicating an August 31, 2017 "Due Date" (five months before the Petition Date).88 Although requested in discovery, no engagement letter for this firm was produced and Reid Collins & Tsai LLP in fact represented in written discovery that none existed.89 Moreover, written discovery propounded on the law firm indicated that, while Acis LP was liable on this debt, other parties including Acis GP/LLC, Highland, Mr. Dondero, the Dugaboy Trust, and Mr. Akada might also be liable for the full amount of the debt-subject to Highland's allocation determinations.90 Based on this evidence, the court makes a logical inference that Reid Collins & Tsai LLP generally has not been paid timely.

53. Next with regard to CT Corporation and the $517.12 indebtedness that the Alleged Debtors represent is owed, CT Corporation asserts that $4,074.84 is, in fact, owed to it by Acis LP and Acis GP/LLC.91 CT Corporation also believes Highland has liability for the Alleged Debtors' indebtedness.92 CT Corporation also believes the amount owed to it is undisputed.93 CT Corporation further represents that its invoices are due upon receipt.94 CT Corporation produced several invoices in discovery, all showing due upon receipt, and one was dated as far back as December 31, 2016 (in the amount of $932).95 Based on this evidence, the court makes a logical inference that CT Corporation expected prompt payment on its invoices and, thus, has not been paid timely.

54. Next with regard to David Simek, the Petitioning Creditor concedes that his $1,233.19 indebtedness (which is apparently an expense reimbursement relating to some consulting) is not past-due.

55. In summary, the evidence reflects that the creditors of the Alleged Debtors are generally not being paid timely (except for perhaps four that are relatively insignificant and which may also be able to look to Highland for payment).96

*14156. Further on the topic of timeliness, Mr. Leventon (Highland's in-house Assistant General Counsel) testified that 96% of bills submitted get paid more than 90 days after they are submitted, that approximately 70% of bills are later than 120 days after they are submitted, and some are even later than 150 days. Mr. Leventon testified that this was a result of Acis LP receiving cash on a quarterly basis from the CLOs. He further elaborated and testified that, for example, if Acis LP got cash on say February 1st, and it received a legal bill on that same day, that he would probably not approve it and allocate it until say February 8th. By that time, Acis LP would have already used up all its cash, and that particular creditor would need to wait until the next quarterly payment was received in order to be paid. He further testified that he explained this to law firms before their engagements and that, if they wanted the business, they would need to understand the process. There are several things the court finds problematic about this testimony. First, no testimony was offered showing that this was, in fact, the understanding of the law firms or other creditors, and, moreover, none of the engagement letters or invoices submitted into evidence reflect such payment terms. Without this additional evidence, the court believes that the Alleged Debtors' testimony regarding how it paid invoices was mostly self-serving and did not support a finding that the Alleged Debtors were generally paying their debts as they became due.97 Second, to the extent Mr. Leventon's testimony demonstrates that creditors of the Alleged Debtors expected to be paid on a quarterly basis (at the latest), certain of the remaining 11 creditors have debts that are significantly older than four months (i.e. , CT Corporation, Jones Day, AKK, and possibly even Reid Collins & Tsai LLP). Third, the Financial Statements of Acis LP submitted into evidence do not support the notion that the cash balances at Acis LP were only sufficient enough to pay vendors once every quarter.98 For example, the balance sheet for January 31, 2017 shows a cash balance in Acis LP bank accounts of $1,061,663.19; the balance sheet for February 28, 2017 shows a cash balance in Acis LP bank accounts of $905,212.36; the balance sheet for March 31, 2017 shows a cash balance in Acis LP bank accounts of $525,626.59; the balance sheet for April 30, 2017 shows a cash balance in Acis LP bank accounts of $117,885.96; the balance sheet for May 31, 2017 shows a cash balance in Acis LP bank accounts of $62,733.31; the balance sheet for June 30, 2017 shows a cash balance in Acis LP bank accounts of $10,329.15; the balance sheet for July 31, 2017 shows a cash balance in Acis LP bank accounts of $701,904.39; the balance sheet for August 31, 2017 shows a cash balance in Acis LP bank accounts of $332,847.05.99 In summary, while there may be cash fluctuations with Acis LP, there is not a clear *142pattern of Acis LP being only able to pay vendors once every quarter.

II. Conclusions of Law

Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the various requirements for initiating an involuntary bankruptcy case. First, pursuant to section 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, an involuntary case may be filed against a person by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under Chapter 7-

(1) by three or more entities, each of which is either a holder of a claim against such person that is not contingent as to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount ... [that] aggregate at least $15,775 more than the value of any lien on property of the debtor securing such claims held by the holders of such claims;
(2) if there are fewer than 12 such holders, excluding any employee or insider of such person and any transferee of a transfer that is voidable under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, by one or more of such holders that hold in the aggregate at least $15,775 of such claims ...100

Thus, if there are twelve or more eligible creditors holding qualified claims on the Petition Date, three or more entities must participate in the involuntary filing and must hold unsecured claims aggregating $15,775.00. If there are less than twelve creditors, a single creditor with an unsecured claim of $15,775.00 may file the involuntary petition. To the extent a bankruptcy court finds that the requisite number of petitioning creditors have commenced the involuntary case, the court shall order relief against the debtor under the chapter under which the petition was filed only if "the debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount."101

Here, as noted earlier, the Alleged Debtors have made four arguments as to why an order for relief should not be entered against the Alleged Debtors: (1) the Alleged Debtors have 12 or more creditors, and, thus, with Mr. Terry being the sole petitioning creditor, the Involuntary Petitions were not commenced by the requisite number of creditors; (2) the Alleged Debtors are generally paying their debts as they become due; (3) the Involuntary Petitions were filed in bad faith by Mr. Terry; (4) the interests of creditors and the debtors would be better served by dismissal and the court should abstain pursuant to section 305 of the Bankruptcy Code.

A. Have the Requisite Number of Creditors Commenced the Involuntary Proceedings?

Pursuant to section 303(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, a sole petitioning creditor holding at least $15,775 in claims can initiate an involuntary bankruptcy case so long as the alleged debtors have fewer than 12 creditors. After the Second Amended List of Creditors was filed, Mr. Terry had the burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, of showing that the Alleged Debtors actually had less than 12 qualified creditors.102 Here, the court has found that the Alleged Debtors have, at *143most , 11 qualified creditors.103 Accordingly, Mr. Terry has met his burden of showing that the Alleged Debtors have less than 12 creditors for section 303(b) purposes, and that he, as the sole petitioning creditor, was permitted to file the Involuntary Petitions. While Mr. Terry has made additional arguments as to why certain of these 11 creditors should not be counted as creditors for purposes of section 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the court does not believe it necessary to address these arguments at this time.104

B. Are the Alleged Debtors Generally Paying Their Debts as They Become Due?

Section 303(h) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that a court shall enter order for relief in an involuntary case "if ... (1) the debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount ...."105 Again, the burden is on the Petitioning Creditor to prove this element by a preponderance of the evidence.106 The determination is made as of the filing date of the Involuntary Petitions.107 In determining whether an alleged debtor is generally paying its debts as they come due, courts typically look to four factors: (i) the number of unpaid claims; (ii) the amount of such claims; (iii) the materiality of the non-payments; and (iv) the nature of the debtor's overall conduct in its financial affairs.108 No one factor is more meritorious than another; what is most relevant depends on the facts of each case.109 Courts typically hold that "generally not paying debts" includes regularly missing a significant number of payments or regularly missing payments which are significant in amount in relation to the size of the debtor's operation.110 Furthermore, any debt *144which the alleged debtor is not current on as of the petition date should be considered as a debt not being paid as it became due.111

Here, the court concludes that the creditors of the Alleged Debtors-what few there are-are generally not being paid as their debts have become due (except for perhaps four112 that are relatively insignificant and which may also be able to look to Highland for payment). Mr. Terry has met his burden by a preponderance of the evidence as to section 303(h) of the Bankruptcy Code.

C. With the Section 303 Statutory Requirements Being Met by the Petitioning Creditor, Should the Court, Nonetheless, Dismiss the Involuntary Petitions Because They Were Filed in Bad Faith?

Despite Mr. Terry meeting the necessary statutory requirements for this court to enter orders for relief as to the Alleged Debtors pursuant to section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Alleged Debtors have argued that the Involuntary Petitions must, nonetheless, be dismissed because they were filed in "bad faith" by Mr. Terry. As support for this argument, the Alleged Debtors rely primarily on the Third Circuit's decision in In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc. , 804 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2015). While the court certainly acknowledges that authority exists in other circuits that suggests that dismissal of an involuntary bankruptcy case may be appropriate-even when section 303's statutory requirements have been met-based upon an independent finding of "bad faith," the court need not ultimately decide the efficacy or applicability of such authority, because the court does not believe that the evidence demonstrated any "bad faith" on the part of Mr. Terry (or his counsel) in filing the Involuntary Petitions. Indeed, the evidence suggested that Mr. Terry and his counsel filed the Involuntary Petitions out of a legitimate concern that Highland was dismantling and denuding Acis LP of all of its assets and value and that a bankruptcy filing was the most effective and efficient way to preserve value for the Acis LP creditors. The court concludes that Mr. Terry was wholly justified in pursuing the Involuntary Petitions.

D. Should This Court, Nonetheless, Abstain and Dismiss the Involuntary Petitions Pursuant to Section 305 of the Bankruptcy Code ?

Section 305(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that:

*145(a) The court, after notice and a hearing, may dismiss a case under this title, or may suspend all proceedings in a case under this title, at any time if-
(1) the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such dismissal or suspension; ...113

Courts construing section 305(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code have found that abstention in a properly filed bankruptcy case is an extraordinary remedy .114 Moreover, granting an abstention motion pursuant to section 305(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code requires more than a simple balancing of harm to the debtor and creditors; rather, the interests of both the debtor and its creditors must be served by granting the request to abstain.115 The moving party bears the burden to demonstrate that dismissal benefits the debtor and its creditors.116 Courts must look to the individual facts of each case to determine whether abstention is appropriate.117

Case law has set forth a litany of factors to be considered by the court to gauge the overall best interests of the creditors and the debtor for section 305(a)(1) purposes:

(1) the economy and efficiency of administration;
(2) whether another forum is available to protect the interests of both parties or there is already a pending proceeding in state court;
(3) whether federal proceedings are necessary to reach a just and equitable solution;
(4) whether there is an alternative means of achieving an equitable distribution of assets;
(5) whether the debtor and the creditors are able to work out a less expensive out-of-court arrangement which better serves all interests in the case;
(6) whether a non-federal insolvency has proceeded so far in those proceedings that it would be costly and time consuming to start afresh with the federal bankruptcy process; and
(7) the purpose for which bankruptcy jurisdiction has been sought.118

*146While all factors are considered, not all are given equal weight in every case and the court should not conduct a strict balancing.119

i. Factor 1: The Economy and Efficiency of Administration.

The economy and efficiency of administering a case in the bankruptcy court is routinely evaluated in considering abstention under section 305 of the Bankruptcy Code. Here, the evidence suggests that the most economical and efficient forum for these parties to resolve their disputes is the bankruptcy court. The court heard ample evidence that the Alleged Debtors are already, essentially, in the process of being liquidated by Highland. This is not a situation where an ably-functioning, going-concern business is being foisted in disruptive fashion into a bankruptcy.120 Because of the fact that the Alleged Debtors are already in the process of being liquidated, the bankruptcy court (and not a state court) is the most efficient and economical forum to complete this liquidation and distribute whatever assets remain to creditors in accordance with the distribution scheme set forth in the Bankruptcy Code and with the oversight of a neutral third-party trustee. Thus, with the bankruptcy court being the more economic and efficient forum for administering this case, this factor goes against abstention.

ii. Factors 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 : Whether Another Forum is Available to Protect the Interests of Both Parties or There is Already a Pending Proceeding in State Court; Whether Federal Proceedings are Necessary to Reach a Just and Equitable Solution; Whether There is an Alternative Means of Achieving an Equitable Distribution of Assets; Whether the Debtor and the Creditors are Able to Work Out a Less Expensive Out-of-Court Arrangement Which Better Serves All Interests in the Case; and Whether a Non-Federal Insolvency Has Proceeded so Far in Those Proceedings That it Would Be Costly and Time Consuming to Start Afresh With the Federal Bankruptcy Process.

The court believes that factors 2-6 should be grouped together for purposes of its abstention analysis, since all of these factors specifically touch on the availability of an alternative forum to achieve an equitable distribution.121 By way of example, where bringing a case into the bankruptcy court would simply add an additional layer of expense to the resolution of a two-party dispute and another forum already provides a suitable place to resolve the dispute, some courts have found that abstention is the more appropriate choice since *147keeping the case would transform the bankruptcy process into a collection device.122 Here, the Alleged Debtors have repeatedly argued that, because there is already pending state court litigation involving Mr. Terry, Highland, and the Alleged Debtors, these cases should be dismissed and the parties should go back to state court to resolve their issues. The court does not agree for several reasons.

First, it is worth noting that this court has already heard multiple days of evidence in this case (including almost five days just for the Trial) and would certainly not be "starting afresh" by any means if things go forward in the bankruptcy court. Additionally, while the Alleged Debtors have argued that a significant amount of attorney's fees have already been spent litigating this case in state court (which they believe supports abstention), the court surmises that these fees have not been wasted dollars, as the money expended by the parties developed discovery of facts that could assist a bankruptcy trustee in pursuing avoidance actions that may be viable and might lead to value that could pay creditors' claims.123

Second, this court heard considerable evidence involving potentially voidable transfers that may have occurred involving the Alleged Debtors and Highland/Highland-affiliates and, while the state court certainly provides a forum for eventually bringing fraudulent transfer claims, the court also heard evidence that none of these claims have actually been brought in the state court.124 Moreover, to the extent fraudulent transfer claims were to be pursued in state court and were successful, the state court would still need the ability to reach the assets of alleged fraudulent transfer recipients (which, in this situation, include certain Highland-affiliates located in the Cayman Islands). The bankruptcy court has concerns whether a state court process could efficiently accomplish this task.125 Similarly, it is worth noting that, while a request for a receiver was filed in the state court by Mr. Terry, such request had not yet been heard and decided by the state court. Thus, at the present time, it does not appear that there is an alternative forum to address the pertinent issues in this case, without the necessity of significant, additional steps being taken by the parties in the state court.

Third, this court believes that a federal bankruptcy proceeding is necessary in order to achieve an equitable result in this case. Specifically, the court heard evidence from the Alleged Debtors that, if this court chose to abstain and dismiss the Involuntary Petitions, the Alleged Debtors *148would ultimately pay all of their creditors in full, except for Mr. Terry. This clearly demonstrates how keeping the case in the bankruptcy court is necessary to allow an equitable distribution to all creditors , including Mr. Terry. Additionally, a federal bankruptcy court has certain tools available to it that are not available to a state court such as the ability to invalidate potential ipso facto clauses in contracts pursuant to section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, sell assets free and clear of liens, claims and encumbrances pursuant to section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, and impose the automatic stay pursuant to section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. These are all useful tools available to the Alleged Debtors in a bankruptcy case that would be lost if this court were to ultimately abstain.

Finally, there was more than enough evidence showing the acrimonious and bitter relationship that exists between Mr. Terry and Mr. Dondero. Thus, the availability of an out-of-court arrangement being obtained in this case is, in this court's mind, slim to none.

In summation, the court finds that all of the factors above support this case staying with the bankruptcy court.

iii. Factor 7: The Purpose for Which Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Has Been Sought.

The Alleged Debtors have repeatedly argued that Mr. Terry filed this case in bad faith and as a litigation tactic to gain some sort of advantage in the state court proceedings. The court has already found above that these cases were not filed in bad faith and that Mr. Terry has met the necessary statutory requirements of section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, it is worth noting that at least one court has stated that the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition is always a "litigation tactic," but whether the filing is inappropriate for abstention purposes is a fact-dependent determination.126 Here, the facts show that there was no inappropriateness behind Mr. Terry's decision to file the Involuntary Petitions. Specifically, Mr. Terry repeatedly and credibly testified that the purpose for filing the Involuntary Petitions was to ensure that creditors (including him) were treated fairly and received an equal distribution from the Alleged Debtors' assets, not to gain some sort of advantage in the state court. This testimony was absolutely consistent with additional evidence showing that, since the entry of the arbitration award, there has been a calculated effort (largely by Highland) to effectively liquidate the Alleged Debtors. Unlike the bankruptcy court in In re Selectron Mgmt. Corp. ,127 which had no evidence or "smoking gun" showing that steps were being taken by the alleged debtor to evade payment on the petitioning creditor's judgment, thereby necessitating abstention, this court has heard ample evidence *149showing that the Alleged Debtors, with the aid of Highland, were transferring assets away from the Alleged Debtors, so that Mr. Terry would have nowhere to look at the end of the day.

In light of the court's analysis of all the seven factors above, the Alleged Debtors have not credibly shown how both the Alleged Debtors and the creditors are better served outside of bankruptcy. If this matter were to remain outside of bankruptcy, there seems to be a legitimate prospect that the Alleged Debtors and Highland will continue dismantling the Alleged Debtors, to the detriment of Acis LP creditors. Abstention would fly in the face of fundamental fairness and the principles underlying the Bankruptcy Code.

Beyond just addressing the factors above, the Alleged Debtors have also argued that, if this court were to not abstain under section 305 of the Bankruptcy Code, there would be significant harm to the "equity" of the Alleged Debtors. Specifically, the Alleged Debtors have argued that, if this court were to enter orders for relief, the equity would be forced to "call" and ultimately liquidate CLO 2014-3 (and perhaps all of the CLOs Acis LP manages), resulting in substantial losses to the equity on their investments. First, to be clear, the current equity of the Alleged Debtors is being held by a Highland-affiliate called Neutra, Ltd., which actually only became the equity of the Alleged Debtors on December 19, 2017. But this is not the "equity" being referred to by the Alleged Debtors in its argument. Rather, the so-called "equity," about which the Alleged Debtors seemed so concerned, is actually certain parties that own the equity of the entity that owns the equity in the CLOs -which includes (a) an unnamed third-party investor out of Boston (49%),128 (b) a charitable foundation managed by a Highland-affiliate (49%), and (c) Highland employees (2%). However, abstention under section 305 of the Bankruptcy Code does not require this court to look at what is in the best interests of these third-parties (who are not current creditors or interest holders of the Alleged Debtors), but rather what is in the best interests of the Alleged Debtors and the creditors. Accordingly, the Alleged Debtors' effort to argue potential harm to these parties is misplaced for purposes of evaluating abstention under section 305 of the Bankruptcy Code, and, if anything, further highlights who the Alleged Debtors are really out to protect-Highland and Highland-affiliates. Moreover, the court would note that, even if there were to be a "call" and liquidation of CLO 2014-3, thereby ending the Alleged Debtors' right to receive future management fees, there would still be potential assets for a chapter 7 trustee to administer such as chapter 5 causes of action (which include fraudulent transfers) as well as the Alleged Debtors' contingent claim for approximately $3 million in expense reimbursement owing by Highland CLO Management Ltd., as part of the November 3, 2017 transfer of the Acis LP Note Receivable from Highland. Thus, even if the so-called doomsday scenario of an equity call on CLO 2014-3 (or other CLOs) were to happen, there is still a potential benefit to creditors if this court chooses not to abstain.

III. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, these involuntary proceedings were appropriately filed under section 303, and orders for relief will be issued forthwith. This court declines to exercise its discretion to abstain, because a chapter 7 trustee appears necessary to *150halt the post-Arbitration Award transactions and transfers of value out of Acis LP, as discussed above. A chapter 7 trustee appears necessary to resolve the inherent conflicts of interest between the Alleged Debtors and Highland. A chapter 7 trustee will have tools available to preserve value that a state court receiver will not have. The bankruptcy court is single-handedly the most efficient place to administer property of the estate for creditors. This is not just a two party dispute between Mr. Terry and the Alleged Debtors, and even if it were, dismissal or abstention is clearly not warranted.