The appellant, McCracken, obtained judgment against the defendants, and caused their property, consisting mostly of timber, lumber, and saw mill machinery, to be levied on and sold to satisfy his judgment. An appeal was prayed_from the judgment, but no supersedeas bond was given, and no supersedeas writ issued. At an adjourned day of the term of the court, the defendants having filed a second motion for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered testimony, among others, and after the execution sale, the court sustained the second motion, and set aside the former judgment, under which the sale of the property was had. Defendants then filed their amended answer and cross-complaint, claiming damages growing out of the sale of their said property under the judgment aforesaid; and the plaintiff first demurred, which being overruled, he answered, and a new trial was had-, resulting in a verdict and judgment against the plaintiff for the full value of all the property sold. Plaintiff filed his motion for new *556trial, showing that he had newly discovered evidence as to the sale of the property, tending to show who were the real purchasers, but this was overruled, and this appeal was taken. The record is too complicated and confused to justify a more extended statement of the case.
The trial court should have treated the amended answer and cross-complaint of defendants, as we now treat it, as a motion or petition for an order of restitution and prayer for damages in the alternative. That motion should have stated clearly and pointedly who was the real purchaser of the property sold at the execution sale, and how much of it each purchaser, if moi’e than one, purchased at the sale, so that the plaintiff might have been permitted to restore the property to the defendants, or to the court, as the case might be and, failing to do so, show cause why he did not or would not do so. The plaintiff, in pursuing his remedy to collect his debt, was neither a trespasser nor wrongdoer in the true sense, but had obtained a valid judgment fairly, and no supersedeas had been issued to stay his proceedings. He was therefore entitled to the protection of the rule, now of universal application in such cases, which is in substance thus laid down by Fi’eeman in his woi’k on Judgments, and which we give here for the future guidance of the court in the tidal of this cause. Plaintiff purchasing at his execution sale, on reversal of the judgment under which the sale is made, is entitled to the benefits of the order of restitution, so that he may restore the property in specie, if he can. If he cannot, he is responsible to the defendant for its loss. If the property is purchased by a third pei’son, the measure of damages is the price it brought at the sale and interest, and if the defendant is the purchaser, there is no recovery against plaintiff, except for money paid, because the defendant has what he claims. Freeman, Judgments, §§ 482, 483, 484.
Reversed and remanded.