Woodruff v. Logan, 6 Ark. 276 (1845)

Oct. 1845 · Arkansas Supreme Court

6 Ark. 276

Woodruff vs. Logan.

The contract of an infant, in binding himself an apprentice, being an act manifestly for his benefit,' is binding in law, and, when bound, he cannot dissolve the relation. If such a contract is binding, a right of action necessarily results to the injured party for a breach thereof.

Writ of error to the circuit court of Pulaslci county.

This was an action of covenant, upon an indenture of apprenticeship, brought by Wm. E. Woodruff against John D. Logan, and determined in the circuit court of Pulaski county, at the Nov, term, 1843, before the Hon. J. J. Clendenin, judge.

The declaration set out the cause of action, in substance as follows :

On the 4th day of November, 1834, the defendant, Logan, by consent of his father, (who was a party to the deed, but not sued) then in the 17th year of his age, voluntarily bound himself, by deed of apprenticeship, to Woodruff, a printer, to learn the art of printing, and was to continue in the service of plaintiff until the 11th day of September, 1839, at which time he would be 21 years of age. Which indenture, it was alleged, and the covenants and obligations therein contained, to be performed on the part of the defendant, he acknowledged, ratified, and confirmed after his maturity, and before the commencement of the suit. Breach: that, though the plaintiff kept the covenants on his part, the defendant did not, nor would, faithfully serve the plaintiff according to the tenor and effect of the indenture, but abandoned his service on the 14th day of January, 1838, &c.

The defendant demurred to the declaration, on the grounds that it showed upon its face that he was an infant, under 21 years of age, when he made the indenture, and was in law incapable of making a valid contract, and that there was no sufficient allegation^ in the declaration, that he affirmed the contract in writing, or under seal, after he arrived at lawful age. The court sustained the demurrer, and gave judgment for defendant.

Ashley & Watkiys, for the plaintiff

The declaration was demurred to on the ground that the defendant could only be charged by a new promise made in writing. Rev. St. 531, sec. 34. This is assuming that the defendant was sued for a debt contracted while an infant, upon a voidable contract, if not absolutely void, because the suit would have to be brought upon the new promise based upon moral considerations. It would be in all respects a new contract, and not a revival of the original contract.

The allegation in the declaration that the defendant ratified and confirmed the indentures, has no connection with the statutory provision. If objectionable, it is only so, as being surplusage.

The contract sued on is valid in law and binding upon the infant. 2 Kent’s Com. 264.

Fowlee, contra.

It is a general rule of law, incontrovertible, that an infant cannot bind himself by deed. And the statute is express that “no action shall be maintained whereby to charge any person, upon any promise made after full age, to pay any debt com tracted during infancy, .unless such promise or satisfaction shall be made by some writing signed by the party to be charged therewith.” Rev. St. 531, sec. 34.

Oldham, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The circuit court most unquestionably erred in sustaining the demurrer to- the plaintiff’s declaration, because it appeared upon the face of the declaration that the defendant was a minor at the time of the execution of the indenture sued upon.- The contract of an infant in binding himself an apprentice, being an act manifestly for his benefit, is binding in law; and when bound he cannot-dissolve the relation. 2 Kent’s Com. 241. If such a contract is binding, a right of action necessarily results to the injured party for a breach thereof: for it is difficult to concieve a binding contract, the breach of which will not give to the injured party a right of action. Reversed,-