Jones was convicted upon an indictment which charged him with a failure to work upon the public roads. He was subject to road duty; but he alleges that he had not received timely notice of the proposed working. The statute under which he was indicted (Gantt’s Digest, sec. 5324) provides for “ at least three days’ actual notice.” He was warned late on Saturday evening to attend and work on the following Tuesday morning. The court charged that the notice was sufficient.
*94Section 5648 of Gantt’s Digest directs that when a certain number of days are required to intervene between two acts, the day of only one of the acts is to be counted. This is> the common practice everywhere. But it seems that when a statute requires notice of at least a certain number of days before a meeting, this means so many clear days ; that is, the day of notice and the day of meeting are both excluded from the computation. Such is the rule in England. The cases are collected in 1 Robinson’s Practice, ch. 78, pp. 430-1; also in Bishop on Written Laws, p. 110.
The English rule was followed in O’ Conner v. Towns, 1 Texas, 107. But in State v. Gasconade, 33 Mo., 102, the court, for the purpose of avoiding a forfeiture, departed from it; otherwise it would have been adhered to.
The defendant had but two full days’ notice, when by law he was entitled to three.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.