Appellant Ben Wesley Hicks was convicted by jury of the first-degree murder of Lonnie Muldoon, and was sentenced to forty years’ imprisonment. His sole point for reversal is that, during sentencing, the trial court erred in admitting certain victim-impact evidence. Specifically, Hicks urges the State should not have been allowed to present a videotape consisting of photos of Muldoon, his family, or friends. He argues that the video was narrated by Muldoon’s brother, Alfred, and because Alfred improperly elaborated and wept during the video’s showing, the tape’s probative and informative value to the jury was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. He further suggests that, because the video contained numerous photos of Muldoon’s children, the tape was needlessly cumulative and compounded the prejudice. We disagree.
Hicks concedes that the Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 808 (1991), held that a state is permitted to authorize victim-impact testimony, and Arkansas has done so. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-97-103(4) (Supp. 1995); Nooner v. State, 322 Ark. 87, 907 S.W.2d 677 (1995). He argues, as well, that Muldoon’s brother, wife, and two sons were legitimate witnesses to testify about how Muldoon’s death has affected their lives. Hicks argues, however, that the State’s case here exceeded appropriate victim-impact evidence because the format of the videotape and excessive number of photographs of Muldoon’s children were so unduly prejudicial that the evidence violated the Due Process Clause. He relies on that part of the Payne decision which says, “In the event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for *729relief.” Contrary to Hicks’s belief, no due process violation is present here.
We point out first that Hicks’s objection below was that Alfred’s narration on behalf of the Muldoon family included hearsay and should have been excluded. The trial court sustained Hicks’s objection, stating that the family members could be called to testify. Nonetheless, Alfred continued his narration, and Hicks later only said he wanted to note his previous objection to the videotape’s introduction. He never again mentioned his hearsay objection, asked for clarification or moved to strike, nor does he specify any hearsay issue on appeal.1 Instead, Hicks merely argues on appeal that the videotape was needlessly cumulative and prejudicial.2
This court has previously held that videotapes, like photographs, are not rendered inadmissible merely because they are cumulative. Hickson v. State, 312 Ark. 171, 847 S.W.2d 691 (1993); see also Willis v. State, 309 Ark. 328, 829 S.W.2d 417 (1992). The Willis court further stated that it reverses the trial court in such circumstances only upon a showing of prejudice and a resulting abuse of discretion. Willis at 330 and 331. In considering what the State may offer as relevant victim-impact testimony, we look to the Supreme Court’s holding in Payne where it stated the following:
We are now of the view that a State may properly conclude that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant’s moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant. “[T]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a *730unique loss to society and in particular to his family. (Emphasis added.)
See also Wooten v. State, 325 Ark. 510, 931 S.W.2d 408 (1996), (where this court rejected as too narrow Wooten’s argument that Payne permits victim-impact evidence only to rebut mitigating evidence).
Here, the trial judge viewed the videotape before allowing it to be played to the jury, and he ruled portions of the tape inadmissible. The judge also ordered the State to instruct Alfred, as narrator, to describe the pictures, but not embellish them, or the judge would stop the tape. Touching on the tape’s further relevancy and probative nature, the trial judge said that the jury should be allowed to know who Muldoon was, especially in view of Hicks’s earlier testimony describing Muldoon as being the aggressor and as having had an aggressive or violent character in the past. In this respect, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-97-103(5) and (7) (Supp. 1995) permitted the State, during sentencing, to present relevant character evidence and evidence relevant to the guilt phase of the trial.
The record reflects that the trial court carefully reviewed and closely monitored the videotape shown at Hicks’s sentencing phase. The trial court carefully spelled out the probative value of the tape and its intended purpose to show a side of Muldoon different from the one described by Hicks. Hicks, in support of his own self-defense claim, repeatedly testified that Muldoon had without provocation argued, cursed, and fought others, and had utilized weapons in earlier altercations.
The State’s victim-impact evidence sanctioned by the Supreme Court is designed to show each victim’s uniqueness as an individual human being, and that the victim’s death represents a unique loss to society and, in particular, to his family. Muldoon was no longer able to counter the charges asserted against him by Hicks, and the videotape merely served as a reminder to the jury that, just as Hicks, the murderer, should be considered as an individual, so, too, the State could show that Muldoon’s, the victim’s, death represents a unique loss.
*731 In conclusion, we mention this court’s consistent view that, where the trial court has exercised its sound discretion in monitoring or limiting the admissibility of purported cumulative and prejudicial photos at trial, this court on review will not reverse. For example, see Williams v. State, 322 Ark. 38, 907 S.W.2d 120 (1995); Williams v. State, 316 Ark. 694, 874 S.W.2d 369 (1994); Weger v. State, 315 Ark. 555, 869 S.W.2d 688 (1994); Harris v. State, 314 Ark. 379, 862 S.W.2d 271 (1993); Hickson v. State, 312 Ark. 171, 847 S.W.2d 691 (1993); Zinger v. State, 313 Ark. 70, 852 S.W.2d 320 (1993); Crow v. State, 306 Ark. 411, 814 S.W.2d 909 (1991); Coulter v. State, 304 Ark. 527, 804 S.W.2d 348 (1991). Given the trial court’s expressed and careful consideration of the videotape’s relevancy and purpose, we have no hesitation in upholding the trial court’s decision admitting the tape and its narration. We affirm.
Brown and Imber, JJ., concur.