Appellants, Jim Guy Tucker, and others, appeal from an order of the Pulaski County Chancery Court which declared that the public school financing system then in effect violated the equal protection and education provisions of the Arkansas Constitution.
Appellants raise two points on appeal: the trial court erred by 1) misapplying the equal protection and education provisions of the Arkansas Constitution; and 2) incorrectly applying statistical measures of equity. As the ruling by the chancellor does not constitute a final appealable order, we dismiss the appeal.
Facts
On September 19, 1994, appellees Lake View School District (“Lake View”) and various of its students and patrons filed an amended complaint against Governor Jim Guy Tucker, the State Board of Education and its members, the State Treasurer, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Senate President Pro Tempore, and the Director of the Department of Education (“the State”). The complaint alleged that the system of school funding then in place violated the Arkansas constitutional guarantees of equal protection and of a general, suitable, and efficient system of education. The complaint also asserted that the funding system violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Lake View sought declaratory and injunctive relief, mandamus against the State to enact a constitutional system of school funding and to increase funding for public schools, nominal damages, attorney’s fees, and costs.
After a trial on the merits before Chancellor Annabelle Clinton Imber, involving numerous witnesses and exhibits, the chancellor issued 147 findings of fact and eighteen conclusions of law on November 9, 1994.1 She determined that the school fund*695ing system was constitutional under the United States Constitution and dismissed with prejudice Lake View’s claims in that regard. However, she ruled that the funding system was in violation of the equal protection provision of the Arkansas Constitution, “as it has no rational bearing on the educational needs of the district,” and that the system also violated the education provision of the Arkansas Constitution by “failing to provide a general, suitable, and efficient system of free public education.” The chancellor stayed the effect of her decision for two years to allow the General Assembly time to enact and implement appropriate legislation in conformity with her opinion.
The General Assembly subsequently enacted new school funding statutes, Acts 916 and 917 of 1995, which effectively repealed the funding system at issue in this appeal.
There are three questions raised by the posture of this case and by the chancellor’s decree which would all have to be answered in the affirmative for us to reach the merits of this case — whether the order entered by the chancellor was a final, appealable order, whether the chancellor had jurisdiction to hear the case, and whether the enactment of a new school funding system renders this matter moot. We conclude that there has been no final order entered in this action.
Finality of Order
Because the chancellor stayed for two years the effect of her decision finding the school funding system unconstitutional, and declined to grant Lake View any of the specific remedies requested, we must consider whether the decision is a final, appealable order. This is a requisite for appellate jurisdiction, which we have a duty to determine. See Walker v. Kazi, 316 Ark. 616, 875 S.W.2d 47 (1994); Chambers v. Manning, 315 Ark. 369, 868 S.W.2d 64 (1993).
*696We first note that the question of whether the chancellor can stay the effect of her decision finding the statutes unconstitutional is not before us. The State does not raise this issue and Lake View has not filed a cross appeal or even a brief in this case.
For a judgment to be final and appealable, it must dismiss the parties from the court, discharge them from the action, or conclude their rights to the subject matter in controversy. Kelly v. Kelly, 310 Ark. 244, 835 S.W.2d 869 (1992); Jackson v. Yowell, 307 Ark. 222, 818 S.W.2d 950 (1991). To be final, an order must not only decide the rights of the parties, but also put the court’s directive into execution, ending the litigation or a separable part of it. Kilgore v. Viner, 293 Ark. 187, 736 S.W.2d 1 (1987). See also Bonner v. Sikes, 20 Ark. App. 209, 727 S.W.2d 144 (1987).
The case primarily relied upon by the parties and the trial court on the questions of substantive law, Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983), appears to be precisely on point and was also tried before a chancellor. However, the issue of finality was not presented by the chancellor’s award of declaratory relief in Dupree. There, eleven school districts brought a class action suit against members of the Arkansas State Board of Education, charging, as in the present case, that the system of school financing then in effect violated the Arkansas Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection and its requirement that the state provide a general, suitable and efficient system of education. The trial court declared the system to be in violation of the constitutional provisions in question, and this Court affirmed that decision. The opinion in Dupree does not indicate whether any further relief was sought by the appellee school districts, however, the effect of the trial court’s order was not stayed, and the chancellor’s decision granting declaratory relief was a final order.2
*697Here, as in Dupree, the chancellor made a final determination that the school funding system was unconstitutional. However, she stayed the effect of her decision to allow the General Assembly to implement a constitutional system, and consequently did not consider the constitutionality of the individual elements of the system, nor did she address Lake View’s requests for injunctive relief and mandamus. The chancellor’s failure to grant the specific relief requested by the prevailing parties was in effect a deferral; she provided in her decree that the two-year stay was to “give the State of Arkansas time to enact and implement appropriate legislation in conformity with this opinion.” By the terms of the decree, Lake View could request further hearings at the end of two years to determine if the new funding system conforms to the chancellor’s ruling, or had the State failed to take any action at all. Lake View’s rights in this matter have not been concluded and they have no way to put the chancellor’s directive into execution without further proceedings before the trial court; the requirements for finality are thus not met.
Jurisdiction and mootness
Because we dismiss this appeal for lack of a final order, we need not reach the issues of whether the chancellor had jurisdiction to hear the case, or whether the enacting of a new funding system has rendered this matter moot. However, we point out that the matter of jurisdiction may again arise if further proceedings before the trial court result in another appeal of this case. The issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, like that of finality, is one that we raise on our own motion. Villines v. Lee, 321 Ark. 405, 902 S.W.2d 233 (1995). As to mootness, we note that repeal of the funding system declared unconstitutional does not become effective until July 1, 1996. Act 917 of 1995, *698§ 15(b).
Appeal dismissed.
Glaze, J., concurs, and Brown, J., dissents.