On August 5,1992, James W. Bolt was charged with the crime of theft of property by deception. He was arraigned on August 31, 1992, and he pled not guilty. At the arraignment, the court informed him of his rights, including his right to a trial by jury. Both Bolt and his attorney signed a form *388which set out those rights. The form further reflects the attorney’s declaration that he believed Bolt was capable of understanding the rights given him and the substance of the proceeding.
Bolt and his attorney appeared for trial on December 9, 1992, and the trial court commenced the proceeding asking the state if it was ready. The state said that it was. The court then asked, “Is the defendant ready to proceed?” Bolt’s attorney said, “We’re ready, Your Honor, and at this time we would formally waive any requirement of a jury trial in this matter. We would proceed for the court to hear the case.” The judge responded, saying, “All right, the record will so reflect.” The trial court then had the witnesses sworn, it tried the case and found Bolt guilty of theft of property. The court sentenced Bolt to three years imprisonment.
Subsequent to trial, Bolt filed a motion for hew trial, and among other things, asserted that he had not entered a waiver of trial by jury. Upon conducting a hearing on Bolt’s motion and denying it, the trial court found Bolt was present when his attorney stood and waived his right to a jury trial. The judge noted that Bolt had assisted his attorney throughout the trial, and that he obviously was intelligent, educated and competent when his important right to a jury trial was waived. Bolt’s sole point on appeal is that the trial court erred in holding Bolt had properly waived his right to a jury trial.
Bolt’s argument is premised upon A.R.Cr.P. Rule 31.2 as it reads in conjunction with A.R.Cr.P. 31.3. Those rules respectively provide as follows:
Should a defendant desire to waive his right to a trial by jury, he must do so personally either in writing or in open court. A verbatim record of any proceedings at which a defendant waives his right to a trial by jury shall be made and preserved.
* * *
In misdemeanor cases, where only a fine is imposed by the court, a jury trial may be waived by the defendant’s attorney, except that a corporation charged with any crime may waive a jury trial through counsel or authorized corporate officer.
*389Bolt argues that, under Rule 31.2, the trial court cannot accept a waiver of jury trial from a defendant’s attorney because the defendant must “personally” waive it. Bolt suggests that only in misdemeanor cases involving fines, as described by Rule 31.3, may a defendant’s attorney waive a jury.1
To further support his argument, Bolt cites this court’s recent decisions in Calnan v. State, 310 Ark. 744, 841 S.W.2d 593 (1992), and Winkle v. State, 310 Ark. 713, 841 S.W.2d 589 (1992), where the court held that an accused’s right of trial by jury shall not be violated unless that right is waived in the manner provided by law. See also Elmore v. State, 305 Ark. 426, 809 S.W.2d 370 (1991). In Winkle and Calnan, the court reversed the defendants’ convictions and held they were entitled to a jury even though they had not requested a jury, nor had objected before or at trial to having been tried without one. In Calnan, the court said that the law is clear that the only way a defendant may waive the jury trial right is by personally making an express declaration in writing or in open court and that the open court proceedings where the defendant waives his or her right must be preserved. 310 Ark. at 747, 841 S.W.2d at 596.
The present case differs from Calnan and Winkle in that, in those cases, the record failed to show that either the defendants or their attorneys affirmatively waived the defendants’ rights to a jury. Here, Bolt’s counsel stated in open court, on the record, and in Bolt’s presence that Bolt waived a jury trial and specifically asked the trial court to hear the case. Bolt was well aware that he had a right to a jury, and the trial court determined that, while Bolt understood this right, he waived it in compliance with Rule 31.2 and Arkansas’s constitutional law providing for a jury trial and its waiver. See Ark. Const. art. 2, § 7. We agree.
Bolt’s argument is narrowly reduced to whether he personally, not his attorney, must waive his right to a jury. In addition to *390what we stated above, we reject Bolt’s contention based on the language of Rule 31.2 and our interpretation of similar wording found in our criminal procedure rules dealing with the receiving and acting upon guilty pleas. Rules 24.4 and 24.5 provide in relevant part that the trial court shall not accept a plea of guilty from a defendant without first addressing the defendant personally and in determining the voluntariness of a plea, the court shall also address the defendant personally to determine if any force, threats or promises were used to induce the plea. Under Rule 24.6, the court cannot enter a judgment upon a guilty plea without making inquiry if there is a factual basis for the plea, and in construing the foregoing rules, this court stated that a factual basis can be established only by addressing the accused personally. McDaniel v. State, 288 Ark. 629, 708 S.W.2d 613 (1986).
In Furr v. State, 297 Ark. 233, 761 S.W.2d 160 (1988), this court corrected its misinterpretation of its rules in McDaniel by stating the court had no rule providing that the factual basis for a defendant’s plea must be furnished only by the defendant. The court upheld Furr’s guilty pleas where the trial court, not Furr, recounted the charges and bases of the crimes in the presence of Furr, his counsel, the prosecutor and where the defendant acknowledged his guilt. Significantly, the Furr court added that Furr’s counsel also confirmed in open court and in the presence of the defendant, the truthfulness of the factual bases recited by the court.2
In sum, we hold that, while a defendant who desires to waive his right to a jury trial under Rule 31.2 must do so either in writing or in open court, his or her attorney may also make such a waiver so long as the defendant has acknowledged he or she had been informed of the right and the attorney waives the right in open court, on the record and in the defendant’s presence. Here, Bolt indisputably had been informed of his right to a jury, acknowledged it and was present in court when his attorney waived the right in open court on the record. The court’s action was plainly proper, for in a matter of this kind, the defendant *391must be bound by his attorney’s action. Cf. Waller v. State, 262 Ark. 331, 556 S.W.2d 655 (1977). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling and decision.
Dudley and Newbern, JJ., dissent.