The issue in this case is whether the appellees, Oaklawn Jockey Club, Inc. (Oaklawn) and American Totalisator Co., Inc. (Amtote), owed any duty to the appellant, Paul Register, the breach of which would give rise to a tort action for negligent conduct on their part.
*319On February 10, 1989, Mr. Register attempted to place a Classix wager, where the bettor correctly selects the winning horse in six consecutive races, at Oaklawn Park in Hot Springs. When Mr. Register attempted to place his bet, the Amtote machine failed to issue a ticket conforming to his designated selections. Upon inquiry, Mr. Register was erroneously advised by Oaklawn’s ticketing clerk that one of the horses he had selected had been withdrawn from its race. Mr. Register subsequently chose another horse and made his bet. At the conclusion of the six races, Mr. Register had correctly selected five winning horses. Apparently, though, the horse that Mr. Register had been told had been withdrawn had not been “scratched” and was in fact the winner of its race. Had Mr. Register’s original wager been accepted, he would have been the holder of a winning ticket to a major share in the Classix.
The “Major Share” of the Classix pool (75% of the net amount in the pool) that day was $56,165.40, which was paid to the holder of one winning ticket issued for that wager. Mr. Register filed suit to recover one-half of that amount, $28,082.70. The trial court granted the appellees’ motion for summary judgment, and Mr. Register appeals and alleges that the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment on the following bases: 1) Oaklawn and Amtote owed him a duty to use ordinary care, 2) Oaklawn and Amtote owed him a contractual duty on theories of implied contract, quasi-contract, and third party beneficiary, and 3) his cause of action is not barred by the Arkansas State Racing Commission Rules.
We find that the appellees owed a duty to Mr. Register, and it was error for the trial court to grant summary judgment in light of the alleged negligence of Oaklawn and Amtote by Mr. Register. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and remanded.
In Rickenbacker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 302 Ark. 119, 788 S.W.2d 474 (1990), we noted that Ark. R. Civ. P. 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. On appeal, in determining whether there is an issue of fact, the proof is viewed most favorably to the party resisting the motion, with all doubts and inferences resolved *320against the moving party. The burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact rests with the party moving for summary judgment.
In order to make a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must show that he sustained damages, that the defendant was negligent, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the damages. To prove negligence, a party must show that the defendant has failed to use the care that a reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence in the case. Earnest v. Joe Works Chevrolet, Inc., 295 Ark. 90, 746 S.W.2d 554 (1988). Further, a party may establish negligence by direct or circumstantial evidence, but he cannot rely upon inferences based on conjecture or speculation. Earnest v. Joe Works Chevrolet, Inc., supra, (citing Glidewell Adm. v. Arkhola Sand and Gravel Co., 212 Ark. 838, 208 S.W.2d 4 (1948)).
Mr. Register contends in his first point of error that Oaklawn and Amtote owed him a duty to use ordinary care in responding to his specific requests for a wager. The existence of a duty depends upon whether a relation exists between the parties that the community will impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the other. W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 235 (5th ed. 1983). Under our well-established principles of common law duty and the facts before us, we find that a duty existed between the appellees and Mr. Register. Whether this duty was breached in this case is a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the granting of summary judgment.
Oaklawn and Amtote’s reliance on cases decided in other jurisdictions is misplaced in that those cases generally had statutes or rules and regulations limiting tort liability or dealt with the contractual theory of liability. See Bourgeois v. Fairground Corp., 480 So. 2d 408 (La. App. 1985); Seder v. Arlington Park Race Track Corp., 481 N.E.2d 9 (Ill. App. 1985); Valois v. Gulf Stream Racing Ass’n, 412 So.2d 959 (Fla. App. 1982); Hochberg v. New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., 343 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1973), aff'd 352 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1974); Holberg v. Westchester Racing Ass’n, 53 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1945). In Arkansas, there is no statute, rule, or regulation that limits or restricts civil liability for negligence under these circumstances. *321 Cf. Ark. Code Ann. § 23-110-406 (1987) (contractual liability limitation.)
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING DECEMBER 23, 1991
In addressing Mr. Register’s second point of error, that Oaklawn and Amtote owed him a contractual duty on theories of implied contract, quasi-contract, and third party beneficiary, we note that horse racing in our state is authorized and regulated pursuant to the Arkansas Horse Racing Law (Law), codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 23-110-101 to -415 (1987 and Supp. 1989). The Law specifically provides that the only legislatively authorized way for a patron at a race track to recover money based upon the outcome of a horse race is through pari-mutuel or certificate system of wagering. Section 23-110-102. Any wagering contract on horse races outside of the scope of the Law is therefore invalid and illegal. Section 23-110-405(d)(2).
In fact, the Law prescribes that money in the betting pool “shall be paid over to bettors holding winning pari-mutuel tickets . . . .” Section 23-110-406(a). In Holberg v. Westchester Racing Ass’n, supra, the court reasoned that “ [t] here can be no valid pari-mutuel bet or wager independent of a pari-mutuel ticket. The ticket not only is essential but is the contract itself.” We find this rationale persuasive.
Consequently, as Mr. Register makes no claim to having a winning ticket representing entitlement to a major share in the Classix pool, there can be no recovery sounding in contract.
Finally, Mr. Register argues that his cause of action is not barred by the Arkansas State Racing Commission Rules. However, these rules have not been included in the abstract, and we are unable to address the issue. Burgess v. Burgess, 286 Ark. 497, 696 S.W.2d 312 (1985).
Reversed and remanded.
*321-A Carl A. Crow, Jr., for appellant.
Janis Whitt and James Simpson, for appellee.