The appellant appeals from the Chancellor’s refusal to grant an unlimited variance from Lake City’s zoning ordinance. We affirm the Chancellor’s ruling.
*268In 1982, Lake City passed a zoning ordinance and, pursuant to that ordinance, appellant’s property was zoned R-l. It is undisputed that under the terms of the zoning ordinance appellant’s use of her land was restricted to a single family residence with only one main building to be located on the lot. The city ordinance did not provide for a zoning board; instead, it provided that the city council alone could grant a variance in zoning. Appellant had a single family home on her lot and, in 1988, wanted to build an “addition” so that her sister, who is very ill, could live with her. She did not need a variance for a simple “addition.”
She did not seek a zoning variance from the city council, and no one from the city council represented to her that she had obtained any type of variance. Her builder went to the city building inspector and said he wanted to build an “addition” to the house. The inspector asked what the distances would be from the structure to the boundaries of the lot. The builder answered by giving the distances, and the building inspector said, “Go ahead.” Later the builder took a blueprint of the construction proposal to the inspector, and the inspector initialed it without examining it. The builder then took the initialed blueprint to the city recorder’s office and, with it, asked for a building permit. A building permit for an “addition” was issued. The blueprint, in truth, did not reflect an “addition,” but, instead, reflected another separate living quarters connected only by a common roof, in other words, a duplex.
The builder started construction. The building inspector, who was also the water superintendent, dug a waterline to the project and, while there, dug the footing for the project. He testified that he had no idea that the project was going to be a duplex. Shortly thereafter, when the framing was up on the separate quarters and the plumbing and electrical work were roughed in, the City realized what was happening. The city attorney immediately wrote appellant a letter stating:
Some of your neighbors have expressed concerns to the Mayor that your “add-on” you are currently building may in fact turn your house into a duplex. The Mayor has asked that I write and remind you that your house is zoned in R-l and duplexes are prohibited in a R-l zoning.
*269As you know the City of Lake City has strictly enforced our zoning laws in the past and we will continue to do so in the future.
Appellant went ahead and completed her duplex. The City filed an interesting complaint — an understanding complaint — in which it asked that appellant be enjoined from using the property as a multi-family dwelling, or as a rental unit “with a minimum amount of hardship on the defendant.” In a ruling accommodating the foregoing language, the Chancellor held that the City was estopped from enforcing the zoning ordinance for so long as appellant’s ailing sister lived in the duplex. The City did not appeal the ruling. Appellant does appeal and asks that we make the variance unlimited in time.
Through the years we have held that estoppel can be applied against a city, and we have a fully developed body of case law on the subject. For example, we have said that a city is estopped from asserting an irregularity in a contract of purchase when the city has purchased an item, used it for a considerable period of time, and refused to pay for it. City of Fort Smith v. United States Rubber Co., 184 Ark. 588, 42 S.W.2d 1004 (1931). In that case we approved the following language:
The theory of these cases is that a corporation, such as a county or city, should not be permitted to stultify itself by accepting property for necessary use, use it for years until it is worn out, and then refuse to pay on the ground of a lack of authority to make the contract. A municipal corporation, which has enjoyed the fruits of a contract fairly made, cannot, when called to account, deny the corporate power to make it.
We used similar reasoning in the case of City of Fort Smith v. Taylor, 228 Ark. 722, 310 S.W.2d 13 (1958). In each of the foregoing cases, the city itself acted either through an ordinance, a resolution, or a contract. There is no such action by the City in the case at bar and, therefore, those cases are not applicable.
There is a second line of cases which deal with acts of city officers. They hold that a city can be estopped to deny the authorized acts of its officers, see Klinger v. City of Fayetteville, *270297 Ark. 385, 762 S.W.2d 388 (1988), but that a city cannot be estopped by the unauthorized act of its officers. Green County v. County of Paragould, 166 Ark. 192, 265 S.W. 839 (1924).
Unlike the long-time application of the doctrine of estoppel against cities, estoppel has only recently been applied against the State. Foote’s Dixie Dandy, Inc. v. McHenry, 270 Ark. 816, 607 S.W.2d 323 (1980). In applying the doctrine against the State we have said four requirements, other than authorization, are necessary: (1) the party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct must be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe the other party so intended; (3) the party asserting the estoppel must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must rely on the other party’s conduct to his injury. Padgett v. Bank of Eureka Springs, 279 Ark. 367, 651 S.W.2d 460 (1983); see also Foote’s Dixie Dandy v. McHenry, supra. Those requirements are equally applicable here.
The appellant does not meet all of the requirements. First, the building inspector and the permit clerk were not authorized to waive the zoning requirements. Second, they did not know the facts. They thought the appellant was building an addition to her house. They did not know she was building a duplex. Third, they never intended that their conduct would constitute a waiver of the zoning requirements. Thus, estoppel was not properly applicable against the City in this case.
Appellant seeks to take advantage of the Chancellor’s kindness and, in effect, argues that, if estoppel applies at all, its application must be unlimited. The argument begs the question. The City did not appeal. The only issue before us is whether the Chancellor erred in ruling that the appellant was not entitled to an unlimited variance. The Chancellor did not err in so ruling.
Affirmed.
Turner, J., dissents.