This appeal presents the question whether a trial court may inquire into and modify a jury verdict after the jury has been discharged. We hold that the trial court did not have authority to change the verdict by allowing the ninth juror to sign the verdict eleven (11) days after the jury had been discharged.
The appellants sued the appellee for breach of express and implied warranties in constructing a house for the appellants. The case was tried to a jury and a verdict was returned by the jury in open court on May 22, 1987. At that time the court announced that the verdict was for the defendant and had been signed by nine (9) of the jurors. Upon inquiry by the trial court, the foreman of the jury confirmed that the verdict had been signed by nine jurors. The trial judge then inquired of counsel whether the jury should be polled. Neither lawyer requested the jury be polled. The *524verdict was accepted by the court and the jury was discharged.
Several days later it was discovered that only eight (8) jurors had signed the verdict. The trial court then inquired of the foreman of the jury concerning the jury’s decision. In this ex parte communication, the foreman informed the judge that in fact he had thought nine (9) jurors had signed the verdict because nine (9) had agreed with it.
On June 2, 1987, eleven (11) days after the jury had been discharged, the court convened a hearing to inquire into the irregularity in the verdict. At the beginning of the hearing the court announced to the parties present that he had spoken to the foreman of the jury and had learned that nine of the jurors had indeed intended to sign the verdict for the defendant. The foreman then testified at this hearing as follows:
We returned a verdict for the defendant, and as I recall, nine jurors voted for that verdict. I think I can explain what happened. I believe the problem arose because certain of the people who needed to sign the interrogatory did not vote, or were not supposed to sign the verdict. We were all in a hurry, it was getting late. It was my recollection that Mr. Faddis was the one who didn’t sign.
During this hearing it was determined that it was Mr. Faddis who had intended to sign the verdict but did not do so because they were “in a hurry to get out.” The trial judge then allowed Mr. Faddis to add his signature to the verdict form at the conclusion of the hearing.
The Constitution of the State of Arkansas, Article 2, Section 7, provides that “in all jury trials in civil cases, where as many as nine of the jurors agree upon a verdict, the verdict so agreed upon shall be returned as the verdict of such jury, provided, however, that where a verdict is returned by less than twelve jurors all the jurors consenting to such verdict shall sign the same.” Also pertinent to this appeal is Arkansas Rules of Evidence, Rule 606(b), which provides:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or *525emotions as influencing him to asset [assent] to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received, but a juror may testify on the questions whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.
The Constitution requires that at least nine (9) jurors sign a verdict, if it is less than unanimous. If it is unanimous, only the foreman must sign. Only eight (8) signed the verdict here in question.
The issue presented in this case is whether the appellant waived the irregularity when the verdict was announced in open court. An early case concerning waiver of irregularities in the verdict is Hodges v. Bayley, 102 Ark. 200, 143 S.W. 92 (1912). This court affirmed the trial court in entering a verdict for the plaintiff. The Hodges opinion relied upon the case of Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Urlin, 158 U.S. 271 (1895). In Urlin the jury had returned a verdict which was not signed by the foreman as was required by Montana law. When the verdict was rendered the defendant requested that the jury be polled. Each juror responded that the verdict as read was theirs. After the jury was polled and all confirmed that the verdict returned was that intended, the judgment was entered of record. No further objection was made. We agree with both the Urlin and Hodges decisions. However, neither control the present case.
A jury verdict should in all cases reflect the actual final conclusion of the jury on the matter being tried before them. However, if before the jury is discharged it is made known to the court that the jury misunderstood the instructions, it is not error for the court to permit the jury to further consider their verdict, after the instructions are again read to them. Clift v. Jordan, Administrator, 207 Ark. 66, 178 S.W.2d 1009 (1944). The time to correct or clarify a verdict is before the jury is discharged. Barham v. Rupert Crafton Commission Company, 290 Ark. 211, 718 S.W.2d 432 (1986).
In Williams v. State, 264 Ark. 77, 568 S.W.2d 30 (1978), *526the trial court convened a hearing after the jury had been discharged, for the purpose of inquiring into their deliberations. In reversing we stated:
[W]e have disregarded the testimony of the individual jurors, as to their deliberations, statements made during the deliberation, matters considered, the votes taken, the votes of the individual jurors and other such matters admitted into evidence over the strenuous and repeated objection of the prosecuting attorney. . . . [T]his testimony was inadmissible ....
We have found it to be improper for plaintiffs attorney to question members of the jury after the verdict has been read and the jury dismissed. Stull v. Ragsdale, 273 Ark. 277, 620 S.W.2d 264 (1981). We likewise have refused to allow questioning of jurors concerning unsubstantiated allegations of “extra-judicial communications” during the trial. Pride v. State, 285 Ark. 89, 694 S.W.2d 819 (1985). Even an affidavit of a juror describing the discussions during deliberations has been held inadmissible as evidence of juror misconduct. Waterfield v. Quimby, 277 Ark. 472, 644 S.W.2d 241 (1982). We recently discussed A.R.E. 606(b) and noted that the only issues which may be inquired into concerning the jury’s deliberations are extraneous prejudicial information or improper outside influence. Watkins v. Taylor Seed Farms, Inc., 295 Ark. 291, 748 S.W.2d 143 (1988).
In the very recent case of Coran v. Keller, 295 Ark. 308, 748 S.W.2d 349 (1988), we considered the question whether it was proper for a trial judge to engage in an ex parte conversation with a juror concerning the deliberations and the meaning of the verdict. The verdict was announced in open court and neither party requested that the jury be polled or otherwise questioned the verdict. In Coran we stated: “Similarly, a trial judge, before ruling on a motion to modify the verdict, should not have an ex parte conversation with some of the jurors about anything which caused them to assent to the verdict. To do so is error.”
The cases allowing incomplete verdicts to stand are based upon waiver or failure to object at the time the verdict is presented in open court. We recognize the general rule that failure to object to an irregularity in a verdict prior to discharge of the jury constitutes a waiver of the irregularity. Coran v. Keller, *527supra. However, in the present case the trial judge and the foreman both announced in open court that the verdict has been signed by nine (9) jurors. Under these circumstances the attorneys had no reason to object to the irregularity because they did not know about it until after the jury had been discharged. Therefore, the irregularity was not waived.
Appellants also submit it was error for the trial court to refuse to give their instruction No. 1, clarifying the definition of ordinary care by a building contractor. Appellants contend the instruction is based on Dixon v. Ledbetter, 262 Ark. 758, 561 S.W.2d 294 (1978), and reads: “That a contractor uses customary methods is a matter to be considered, but that standard does not necessarily meet the test of ordinary care.”
The trial court was right. It refused the instruction tendered by the appellants because the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions — Civil contains an instruction (AMI 1204) dealing with ordinary care by a contractor, and the jury was instructed accordingly. Appellants argue that the trial court gave “a modified version of AMI 1204.” But the instruction appearing on page fourteen of the record conforms exactly to AMI, Civil 2d, 1204. The AMI instruction covered the issue of the degree of care required of a contractor and it was not error for the court to refuse to instruct differently. Instructions which doTiot conform to AMI should be given only when the trial judge finds the AMI instruction does not accurately state the law or the AMI does not contain a necessary instruction on the issue. Henderson v. State, 284 Ark. 493, 684 S.W.2d 231 (1985); Beaumont v. Robinson, 282 Ark. 181, 668 S.W.2d 514 (1984); Blaney v. State, 280 Ark. 253, 657 S.W.2d 531 (1983).
The irregularity in the verdict in this case was sufficient to render the verdict void because it did not conform to the constitutional requirement that at least nine (9) jurors sign the verdict in civil cases. The defect was not waived because the announcement in open court that the verdict had been signed by nine (9) jurors relieved counsel of responsibility to inquire. Therefore, the constitutional deficiency of the jury verdict requires that the decision be reversed and remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
*528Holt, C.J., and Hickman and Hays, JJ., dissent.
Glaze, J., concurs.