The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder. His appeal presents three issues. First, he contends the statement he made to police officers should not have been admitted into evidence because he had once declined to make a statement. As we determine the statement to have been voluntarily made after waiver of his right to remain silent, we find no error. Second, he contends his tape recorded statement, which was made while he was in custody and which was partially inaudible, was inadmissible, and that a transcription of the tape recording should not have been admitted into evidence and given to the jury because it was inaccurate. We find no unfair prejudice resulting from admission of the recording or evidence to support the claim that the transcription was inaccurate. Third, the appellant contends it was error to permit introduction of gory pictures of the victims. We find the photographs were not so inflammatory as to prejudice the jury unfairly.
1. Voluntariness of statement
The appellant contended he killed the victims in self-defense. After having shot each of them with a shotgun, he called the police to report the killings. Upon his arrest the appellant was taken to the police station where, at 5:00 a.m. on December 25, 1985, he was warned of his rights and signed a waiver form but declined to make a statement. The following morning, at 9:10 a.m., two police officers who had not previously spoken with the *269appellant interrogated him. One of the officers, Detective Sanders, testified that neither he nor the other officer at the second interrogation knew the appellant had earlier refused to make a statement. The appellant was again given the standard notification of his rights and warning that any statement he made might be used against him. He again waived his rights and signed a form to that effect. The appellant made the statement which was tape recorded and admitted into evidence.
The appellant contends his statement was not voluntary. At the trial he testified that he told the officers at the time the statement was made that he was not feeling well and that they should talk to him later. No such testimony was given by Detective Sanders who said the statement was made voluntarily by the appellant who not only signed the waiver of rights form but also said he understood his rights.
In Hatley v. State, 289 Ark. 130, 709 S.W.2d 812 (1986), we held that a resumption of police questioning of an incarcerated suspect by an officer to whom the suspect had not previously refused to speak was not necessarily a violation of the right to remain silent. We pointed out, after reviewing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 98 (1975), and the difference between interrogation after a request for counsel and after refusing to make a statement, that as long as there is no evidence of coercion, a statement made voluntarily may be admissible against an accused who made it even though he once previously refused to make a statement.
A hearing was held by the trial court, at the request of the appellant, to determine the voluntariness of the statement. The only matter presented at the hearing by the appellant was his objection to the statement’s admissibility “as a matter of law” on the ground of the previous refusal of the appellant to make a statement. When the court inquired whether he was contending he had been coerced to make the statement, the appellant’s counsel responded that he could not “relate” to that as the appellant was unsure what had happened. He presented no evidence of coercion whatever at that hearing, and the judge found that the statement was voluntary.
Although we probably need not do so in this case, we will review the evidence as to the voluntariness of the confession *270and come to an independent conclusion, as has been done in other cases where the voluntariness of the confession was at issue. See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966); Cage v. State, 285 Ark. 343, 686 S.W.2d 439 (1985). However, we do not reverse unless the trial court’s determination of voluntariness is clearly erroneous. Fleming v. State, 284 Ark. 307, 681 S.W.2d 390 (1984). The factors we consider are set out in Cessor v. State, 282 Ark. 330, 668 S.W.2d 525 (1984).
The appellant testified he was forty years old and could read and write. Although his counsel intimated the appellant had no education there was no evidence of it one way or the other. He was twice advised of his rights and twice signed waiver forms. There is no evidence that he was held incommunicado for a long time or that he was repeatedly questioned in an attempt to wear him down. Nor does the record contain any other evidence of coercion or promise. The appellant stated to Detective Sanders that he understood his rights just prior to making the statement. He had been incarcerated just a little over twenty-four hours.
The record supports the trial court’s finding that the statement was voluntary.
2. The recording and the transcript
The tape recording of the appellant’s statement is inaudible in places. Detective Sanders testified that a transcript of the tape had been made, and that it reflected what was on the tape, but did not include the inaudible portions. The appellant objected to the admission into evidence of the recording on the basis of its partial inaudibility and to the transcript on the basis of its inaccuracy. The judge admitted both.
The appellant’s argument on this point states simply that the inaudibility of the recording and the fact that the transcript has left out parts of the interview violate his right to due process of law accorded by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. No such constitutional argument was made to the trial court, and thus we will not consider it here. Chapin v. Stuckey, 286 Ark. 359, 692 S.W.2d 609 (1985).
Nor do we find the admission of the transcript into evidence otherwise erroneous. The judge admonished the jury *271that the transcription was to be used only as an aid in understanding the recording. By comparing the recording with the transcript, the jury could ascertain the instances where the person who made the transcript omitted the inaudible portions of the statement. While we have some reservations about the fact that some of what the appellant said in the interview was not recorded, it is not a matter of great concern, as the audible portions of the recorded statement are essentially consistent with the appellant’s testimony at the trial and state he killed the victims in self-defense. The transcript was an accurate representation of the audible portion of the recording. If the transcript is accurate, it is admissible if it would otherwise be necessary to play the tape several times for the jurors. Baysinger v. State, 261 Ark. 605, 550 S.W.2d 445 (1977).
3. The photographs
Even if photographs are inflammatory in the sense that they show human gore repulsive to the jurors, they are admissible within the discretion of the trial judge if they help the jury understand the testimony. In this case a police officer testified that the photographs of the two victims at the scene of the crime fairly depicted the positions in which they were found. A medical examiner testified the autopsy pictures aided his testimony as to the condition of the bodies and their positions at the times the shots were fired. The judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting these photographs. Fairchild v. State, 284 Ark. 289, 293 S.W.2d 380 (1984).
In support of his argument on this point, the appellant cites Berry v. State, 290 Ark. 223, 718 S.W.2d 447 (1986), in which this court found too many photographs were introduced and thus the court’s discretion had been abused. Here, the judge seemed to follow that decision to the letter by excluding pictures which were duplicative. We find no error.
Affirmed.
Purtle, J., dissents.