Upon the jury’s verdicts of guilty the appellant was sentenced to (1) a $5,000 fine and five years’ imprisonment with three years suspended, for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, and (2) four years’ imprisonment with two years suspended, for possession of marihuana with intent to deliver, the sentences to be concurrent. The Court of Appeals certified the case to us as presenting a significant and important issue concerning the effect upon our law of recent Supreme Court decisions modifying the exclusionary rule in search-and-seizure cases. United States v. Leon,_U.S__, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard,-U.S--- 104 S. Ct. 3424, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737 (1984). By now we have expressed our intention of following the modified rule, a position to which we shall adhere. McFarland and Soest v. State, 284 Ark. 533, 684 S.W.2d 233 (1985). There is no merit in the appellant’s six arguments for reversal.
First, the search-and-seizure issue. On the evening of February 15, 1983, police officers obtained a warrant to search Lincoln’s Fort Smith apartment for cocaine. The seárch was conducted immediately and yielded the drugs upon which the present charges were filed. Counsel for the appellant, in challenging the sufficiency of the affidavit for the search warrant, relies upon the law that was applicable before the Leon and Sheppard cases, although they were decided three months before the appellant’s brief was filed. The earlier law is no longer applicable. There is no vested right in a rule of evidence. Reid v. Hart, 45 Ark. 41 (1885). Indeed, the Supreme Court applied its new rule retroactively in Leon, reversing a federal Court of Appeals decision which had invalidated a search-warrant affidavit in reliance on the pre-existing law.
The appellant’s only argument falling within the possible purview of Leon is the contention that statements in the affidavit were false. In Leon, the court said that deference to the magistrate’s finding of probable cause does not preclude inquiry into the knowing or reckless falsity of *109the supporting affidavit. Here the affidavit stated that recently an informant had obtained a sample of cocaine that was purchased from Lincoln. The affiant admitted at the suppression hearing that he should have said that the informant obtained the sample from somebody else who reported to the informant that it had come from Lincoln. There is no reason to think the circuit judge who issued the warrant would have acted differently had the affidavit been exact. To the contrary, the really vital statement in the affidavit was that another informant who had been in Lincoln’s residence that very evening said she had purchased cocaine from Lincoln at that time and that Lincoln had stated he had more cocaine available, but it was selling fast. Evidently the judge relied on that statement, for the warrant contains a finding that the objects to be seized were in danger of imminent removal, and the search was carried out at once. We attach no importance to the fact that the affidavit said that the informant had knowledge of “the penal implications” of her statement, for even though she was released without being charged, her release was conditioned on her promise to cooperate in the prosecution of Lincoln. We hold that under Leon the affidavit was sufficient to support the issuance of the search warrant.
Second, the court allowed the State to prove, for the purpose of showing Lincoln’s possession of the drugs with intent to deliver, that various witnesses had bought drugs from Lincoln in the past. One witness, for example, testified that for about a year he had bought drugs from Lincoln once or twice a month. The court cautioned the jury that proof of prior sales was admitted only to be considered with regard to the intent with which Lincoln had possessed the drugs on the evening in question. Such prior sales are admissible if not too remote in time, which is not the case here. Rowland v. State, 262 Ark. 783, 792, 561 S.W.2d 304 (1978); Cary v. State, 259 Ark. 510, 514, 534 S.W.2d 230 (1976). Our holding in Moser v. State, 266 Ark. 200, 583 S. W.2d 15 (1979), is not in point, for there the prosecutor charged possession with intent to deliver, instead of the actual sale that was proved, as a subterfuge to get before the jury prior sales, as bearing on intent.
*110Third, the court did not improperly limit the appellant’s cross examination of five codefendants who were also present when the police searched Lincoln’s apartment and arrested all six persons. The court simply confined cross examination to the drugs in question. We find no abuse of its discretionary authority to confine cross examination to matters relevant to the charges on trial.
The remaining arguments do not need extended discussion. A requested instruction about the weight to be given to proof of prior sales was properly refused, for it was heavily slanted in favor of the defense, even to the point of being a comment on the weight of the evidence. See per curiam order, AMI Criminal, viii (1982). The court’s refusal to grant Lincoln a separate trial is not shown to have been error for either of the reasons argued: that a codefendant’s statement that a certain substance was “cutter” instead of cocaine was admitted in evidence or that there was proof of a single sale by another resident of the apartment, in addition to the many sales by Lincoln that were shown. Neither ruling can be said to have been substantially prejudicial to the defendant, for there was abundant proof of drug activity in the apartment. Finally, we do not perceive that the proffered proof that two codefendants had pleaded guilty to possession of a different drug, LSD, was relevant to the charges on trial.
Affirmed.
Purtle, J., dissents.