The appellant, Dr. Robert Thompson, was convicted of twenty separate offenses of carnal abuse occurring over a two-year period. The jury returned a verdict fixing his sentence at the statutory maximum of ten years imprisonment and a ten thousand dollar fine for each charge. At a separate sentencing hearing, the circuit judge ordered the sentences to run consecutively for a total of 200 years imprisonment and a $200,000.00 fine.
Appellant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The victim, a child of barely *268twelve years, was taken by his father, Lynn Ross Wilmoth, known as Moe, to appellant’s house February 24, 1980, where appellant engaged in carnal abuse with him. The victim identified appellant and testified that his father had taken him there on 19-20 occasions from February, 1980, through January, 1982. He further testified that of those 19-20 occasions there were three or four times he did not have sex with appellant. Over this two year period, Richard Purifoy and other men were sometimes present at appellant’s house. As many as four or five different men were involved. The victim testified he had sex with the other men, but appellant always went first. The sexual acts the victim engaged in with appellant were sodomy, fellatio, and an act wherein one person uses his fist in a sexual way in the anus of another person. The victim identified a photograph depicting appellant having anal intercourse with him. The victim identified three other photographs depicting various sexual activity between him and appellant and testified the photographs were taken by appellant over the two year period. On one occasion he and his father stayed at appellant’s house all night. During the time that he engaged in sexual activities with appellant, his father either watched, watched a movie, or masturbated. The victim testified he did not enjoy the sex acts but participated in them because he was scared of his father who had whipped him, beat him, and abused him sexually. Finally, in February, 1982, he ran away from home. At the time of trial he was living in a foster home.
The victim’s testimony that he engaged in sex with appellant at least sixteen times is substantiated by names and notations in appellant’s handwriting on calendars and in a notebook minutely documenting his sex life. The evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for 16 of the 20 offenses. We therefore reverse and dismiss four of the twenty convictions.
Second, appellant argues that the penalties imposed on appellant violate both the United States and Arkansas constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const, amend. VIII; Ark. Const, art. 2 § 9. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, *269applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits not only barbaric punishments but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
The United States Supreme Court has recently stated that the type of inquiry a court should conduct to determine if a given sentence is constitutionally disproportionate is a case-by-case determination. Solem v. Helm, _ U.S. _, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3012 (1983). The court in Solem further states:
[a] court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
For a determination of the gravity of the offense, the court notes that comparisons can be made both in the light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society and in a consideration of the culpability of the offender. For example, nonviolent crimes are less serious than violent ones; stealing a million dollars is more serious than stealing a hundred dollars. As to the culpability of the offender, a court may consider the defendant’s intent or lack of intent and his motive in committing a crime. Id., at 3011. The court ki Solem adds that the above list of criteria for comparing the severity of different crimes is not meant to be exhaustive. Id.
Counsel for appellant argues that the offenses committed by appellant were nonviolent, that neither force nor coercion were used against the victim, and that appellant posed no particular threat to society. Counsel also points out that given appellant’s age, he has in effect received a life sentence, a punishment concomitant to that imposed for murder in the first degree and other violent crimes. Even though appellant’s crimes involved no violence, they were *270crimes against a young person. Given the victim’s testimony that he did not enjoy these acts and was afraid of his father, it could not really be said that his participation was consensual.
The sexual abuse of children is an abhorrent crime which clearly poses a threat to society. Appellant was found guilty by the jury which imposed the maximum penalty on each count. The trial court in turn exercised its discretion to order the sentences to be served consecutively. We have previously stated that the cumulative effect of consecutive sentences does not make punishment cruel and unusual. Clark v. State, 264 Ark. 630, 634, 573 S.W.2d 622, 624 (1978); Hinton v. State, 260 Ark. 42, 48, 537 S.W.2d 800, 804 (1976). We do not find the cumulative sentence of 160 years imprisonment and $160,000 fine to be barbarous, outside the law, or wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense charged.
Third, appellant argues that the trial court erred in holding the affidavit sufficient to support the issuance of the search warrant. We do not agree. Heretofore, the Arkansas Supreme Court has applied the two-prong test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) codified at A.R.Cr.P. 13.1 (b). State v. Prue, 272 Ark. 221, 225, 614 S.W.2d 221, 223, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1982). The affidavit must reflect 1) some underlying circumstance showing the reliability of the informant and 2) some underlying circumstance from which the informant concluded that the items to be seized were where he said they were. Among the circumstances set forth in the affidavit indicating the reliability of the informant were: the informant’s correct information as to the appellant’s profession, place of employment and residence; the description of the young white male and the older white male later determined to be the victim and his father, Lynn Wilmoth, known as Moe; the positive identification of Lynn Wilmoth from a photographic spread of six unknown white males; and the informant’s admission to engaging in sodomy with appellant, an admission against interest which would subject him to criminal liability. Among the circumstances indicating that the items to be seized were located where the informant had said were: the informant’s *271possession of a key to the residence given him by appellant; and his intimate knowledge of the residence indicated by a sketch he had drawn.
The United States Supreme Court recently enunciated a new test for the review of search issues where an officer obtains a search warrant on the basis of an informant’s statement. The new test is a totality of the circumstances test whereby the issuing magistrate is to make a practical, common sense decision based on all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983). Here, the affidavit meets both the Aguilar two-prong test and the new totality of the circumstances test. In the future we adopt and will apply the new, more flexible, totality of the circumstances test as is now permissible under Illinois v. Gates.
Fourth, appellant argues that certain testimony should have been excluded pursuant to Unif. R. Evid. 403. Defense counsel objects to the admission of evidence that the victim’s father was playing with his penis while appellant committed these offenses. We find that Wilmoth’s actions were part of the res gestae and are presumptively relevant and admissible. There is no showing of unfair prejudice to appellant by the admission of this evidence.
Fifth, appellant argues that the State failed to comply with A.R.Cr.P. 17.1 (a) (1) in that the State did not notify defense counsel that Richard Purifoy would be a witness until a few days before trial. Purifoy had been a co-defendant of appellant and had apparently entered into an agreement to plead guilty and to testify. The record reflects that defense counsel were informed that all co-defendants were potential witnesses. In light of this fact, we find no prejudicial error.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
Purtle, J., concurs.
Holt, J., dissents.