The Little Rock City Board of Directors voted unanimously to change the zoning classification of property located at 4908-4932 West Markham, between Monroe and Jackson Streets, from a single family and quiet office classification to “C-3”, a general commercial classification as requested by the property owners. A Wendy’s restaurant is to be constructed on that site if rezoned. The appellants, who are property owners in that vicinity, filed suit in chancery court to have the rezoning set aside. The chancellor held there is a presumption the Board had acted in a reasonable manner and the appellants had failed to meet their burden of proof which requires them to demonstrate the arbitrariness of its action, so he denied the petition. We affirm.
The appellants first contend: (1) The Court erred in not holding that the City of Little Rock was arbitrary and capricious in acting contrary to Arkansas law as stated in *7 City of Little Rock v. Faith Evangelical Lutheran Church, 241 Ark. 187, 406 S.W.2d 875 (1966); (2) The Court erred in not finding the City of Little Rock to be arbitrary and capricious in creating a commercial zone in the middle of a residential block; (3) The Court erred in not finding that the zoning ordinance Number 14 196 was unrelated to the public health, safety, moral and general welfare of the city and that the power of the city board in passing the ordinance was, therefore, arbitrary and capricious; and (4) The Court erred in not finding the City of Little Rock to be arbitrary and capricious in failing to consider the rights of the residents who have relied upon the existing residential zoning. We will discuss these points together since they relate to whether the rezoning by the city was arbitrary and capricious.
The standard of review applicable here is well settled. The decision of the chancellor will be affirmed unless it is clearly erroneous (clearly against the preponderance of the evidence). ARCP, Rule 52 (a); City of Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. 437, 619 S.W.2d 664 (1981). There we also said there is a presumption that the City Board acted in a fair, just, and reasonable manner when it rezones or refuses to rezone property and the burden is on the persons attacking the rezoning or refusal to show otherwise. The courts do not have the authority to review zoning legislation de novo. City of Conway v. Conway Housing Authority, 266 Ark. 404, 584 S.W.2d 10 (1979). There we said:
[W]hen a municipality, pursuant to authority granted by the General Assembly, takes action in zoning classifications, it is exercising a legislative function and is not subject to review by the courts of its wisdom in so doing.... The judiciary has no right or authority to substitute its judgment for that of the legislative branch of government. In zoning matters the General Assembly has delegated legislative power to the cities in matters relating to zoning property. The role of the courts is, therefore, simply to determine whether or not the action of the municipality is arbitrary. Arbitrary has been defined as ‘arising from unrestrained exercise of will, caprice, or personal *8preference, based on random or convenient choice, rather than on reason or nature.’ Courts are not super zoning commissions and have no authority to classify property according to zones.
To the same effect are City of Batesville v. Grace, 259 Ark. 493, 534 S.W.2d 224 (1976); and City of Little Rock v. Parker, 241 Ark. 381, 407 S.W.2d 921 (1966).
The appellants argue, inter alia, that the rezoning here is inconsistent with The Heights/Hillcrest Plan, a guide for land use decisions adopted in an ordinance on March 17, 1981. This plan, of course, serves only as an advisory or guide and is not binding. Taylor v. City of LR, 266 Ark. 384, 583 S. W.2d 72 (1979). Here, eight property owners in the area testified that the rezoning to allow a Wendy’s restaurant to be built would have detrimental effects on the largely residential neighborhood; e.g., there would be increased traffic problems and hazards, noise, litter, unpleasant odors, vandalism, lights shining into windows at night, and rodents. One was of the view it would be spot zoning. Most of the witnesses were longtime residents in the area. None of the property owners testified they had relied upon the recent Heights/Hillcrest Plan, but some did testify they had chosen to live in the area because of the type of neighborhood it was.
The property in question is, as indicated, located between Monroe and Jackson Streets on the north side of the Markham Street corridor. On the south side of Markham are located the State Hospital, the University of Arkansas Medical Center, War Memorial Park (directly across from the subject property), the State Health Department, and War Memorial Stadium. Jerry Speece, Zoning Administrator for the City of Little Rock, testified in detail with respect to the character of the area on the north side of Markham Street. To the east on the same block are located a single family home and an establishment which sells and rents scuba diving equipment. On the six blocks east of Monroe are located a savings and loan, a branch bank, Peck’s Drive-In, a liquor store, a drug store, and other businesses. In the three blocks west of the rezoned property are situated a McDonald’s restaurant, an Exxon station, the Black Angus restaurant, a *9Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant, Rob’s restaurant, and a motel. Speece also testified that the volume of traffic on Markham is 6,000 to 8,000 vehicles per day below its capacity. He said the Heights/Hillcrest Plan is merely a general guide for city planning and, furthermore, the rezoning in this case is not inconsistent with that plan. He stated the rezoning did not constitute spot zoning, because spot zoning involves zoning one lot in a manner entirely different from the surrounding area, which was not done here. A building permit mandates certain lighting requirements to prevent reflection of lights on adjacent property. The zoning ordinance requires the construction of a four foot opaque fence between commercial and residential property. Access to the rezoned property is limited to Markham Street. In his opinion, as a professional planner, the rezoning from single family and quiet business to commercial use is a reasonable classification.
We cannot say that the decision of the chancellor holding that the rezoning by the City Board of Directors was not arbitrary and capricious is clearly erroneous.
Neither is the decision of the chancellor contrary to our holding in City of Little Rock v. Faith Evangelical Lutheran Church, supra. There we held the refusal of the City of Little Rock to rezone these properties to “F” commercial was not an arbitrary and capricious decision. We did not hold that it would have been arbitrary and capricious for the city to so rezone the property. We did say, as appellants argue, the proper zoning classification for the property would be “E-l” Quiet Business, but that dictum was merely a comment on the evidence presented in that case and not a decision of this court imposing on the City an unalterable zoning classification for this location.
Appellants next contend that the City Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in limiting residents to ten minutes in which to present their objections. However, the City Planning Commission had held two public hearings at which the residents were allowed to state their objections. These objections were transcribed and furnished to the City Board before the meeting at which the rezoning decision was *10made. Hence, this case is unlike Wenderoth v. Freeze, Mayor, 248 Ark. 469, 452 S.W.2d 328 (1980), upon which appellants rely, where we held that property owners were arbitrarily denied their right to present their objections to a reclassification to the Planning Commission.
Next appellants assert that the court erred in excluding from the evidence the answers to interrogatories given by the members of the City Board. The appellants sought to introduce the interrogatories and answers during the cross-examination of Speece. Although the interrogatories were placed in the record, they are not abstracted. The answers were neither placed in the record nor abstracted. The burden is upon the appellant to bring up a record sufficient to demonstrate that the trial court committed reversible error. King v. Younts, 278 Ark. 91, 643 S.W.2d 542 (1982); SD Leasing v. RNF Corp., 278 Ark. 530, 647 S.W.2d 447 (1983). Appellants failed to meet their burden on this issue.
Finally appellants contend that the chancellor abused his discretion in refusing to grant them a continuance in order to subpoena the members of the City Board of Directors, after the chancellor refused to admit the interrogatories into evidence. Eight witnesses had testified at the time the appellants moved for a continuance. It is apparent from the record that they had ample opportunity to subpoena whomever they wished before the hearing. Pursuant to ARCP, Rule 40, the granting or denial of a continuance is a matter within the sound discretion of the court, and such a ruling will not be disturbed unless the trial court abused that discretion by acting arbitrarily and capriciously. Bolden v. Carter, 269 Ark. 391, 602 S.W.2d 640 (1980). Here, the chancellor did not abuse his discretion.
Affirmed.
Hickman, Smith and Purtle, JJ., dissent.