Appellant was charged by information with burglary and rape by deviate sexual activity. He was found guilty of both crimes but appeals only from the conviction of rape by deviate sexual activity. He was sentenced to imprisonment for life and jurisdiction is in this Court pursuant to Rule 29 (1) (b). The appeal is meritorious.
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1803 (Repl. 1977), in pertinent part, provides that either of two different types of conduct can constitute the crime of rape:
Rape — (1) A person commits rape if he engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with another person:
(a) by forcible compulsion . . .
(Emphasis added.)
Here, the information charged appellant with rape by forcibly engaging in deviate sexual activity. Deviate sexual activity is defined by statute as “any act of sexual gratification involving: (b) the penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anus of one [1] person by any body member or foreign instrument manipulated by another person.” Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1801 (1) (b). The proof at trial was insufficient to sustain the charge or rape by deviate sexual activity as the crime is defined. The only evidence relating to such a form of rape was the prosecutrix’s testimony that “he jerked my panties off and began to lick my bottom.” There was no evidence that appellant’s tongue penetrated the prosecutrix’s vagina or anus. Yet, the testimony of the prosecutrix, a retired nurse, aptly demonstrated her thorough knowledge of human anatomy. Manifestly, the State failed to prove the crime charged, rape by deviate sexual activity.
The information did not charge appellant with the crime of rape by forcible sexual intercourse. That type of *535rape is statutorily defined as the “penetration, however slight, of a vagina by a penis.” Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1801 (9). The detailed and specific testimony by the prosecutrix leaves no doubt that appellant was guilty of rape in this nature. She testified “he made me hold the labia, get hold of it and hold it open for me to get his penis inside of me.” Nonetheless, the State at no time sought to amend the information to correctly describe the nature of the rape which was committed. See Jones v. State, 275 Ark. 12, 627 S.W.2d 6 (1982). Subsequently, the appellant made a timely objection to the variance between the information and the proof and, in addition, moved for a directed verdict on the charge of rape by forcible deviate sexual activity, the trial court not only denied both motions but, over appellant’s additional objection, instructed the jury on rape by forcible sexual intercourse, which had never been charged, and instructed the jury on rape by forcible deviate sexual activity, which was not proven. Since there was no proof of rape by deviate sexual activity the jury must have found the appellant guilty of rape by sexual intercourse, a crime with which appellant was never charged. The appellant correctly contends that he cannot be found guilty of a crime with which he was never charged.
The State makes two counter arguments. The first is that appellant was charged with forcible rape, proven guilty of forcible rape, convicted of forcible rape and therefore no fatal variance existed. That argument assumes a fallacious base because appellant was not solely charged with rape. If he had been charged only in general terms, then it might have been sufficient under our liberal rules of procedure, especially in the absence of a motion for a bill of particulars, But here appellant was charged with rape by forcibly engaging in deviate sexual activity. Such a charge includes the crimes formerly labelled by statute as sodomy and buggery, except for the bestiality aspect, and the penetration may be by finger, tongue or dildo.
The statute defining this crime, as distinguished from rape by sexual intercourse, contains no reference to the sex of either the offender or the victim. A neuter gender definition is essential since either a male or a female could be the victim *536or the perpetrator of this nature of rape. It includes homosexual conduct as well as most types of unnatural hetersexual conduct. See Commentary to Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-1801 and -1803. Acts of deviate sexual activity have been judicially described as unnatural acts. Strum v. State, 168 Ark. 1012, 272 S.W.2d 359 (1925).
On the other hand, the crime of forcibly engaging in sexual intercourse has been separately defined and is limited to penetration of a vagina by a penis. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1801 (9). Obviously it is restricted to heterosexual conduct and, except for the forcible compulsion, is a natural sex act. The essential elements of the crimes differ.
The test for determining whether an information for one offense includes another is whether the offenses are of the same general character and whether the information for one offense contains all of the essential elements of theother. For example, in Ridgeway v. State, 251 Ark. 157, 472 S.W.2d 108 (1971), the defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon, a knife, with intent to kill. The proof developed that the assault was with a pistol. We held no variance occurred because only one crime was involved, assault with intent to kill. The distinguishing fact in this case and the case at bar is that essentially two different crimes are involved here. Where two different crimes are involved the defendant may not be, as here, charged with a crime and convicted of another. To sustain a conviction on the ground that the evidence supports a charge not made would be a sheer denial of due process. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
The State’s second argument is that the sexual intercourse proven in this case comes within the statutory definition of deviate sexual activity. The argument is without merit. Criminal statutes must be strictly construed. Breakfield v. State, 263 Ark. 398, 566 S.W.2d 729 (1978). Under our prior law these criminal acts had separate names; rape by sexual intercourse was termed rape and rape by deviate sexual activity was termed sodomy or buggery. Under the Criminal Code of 1976 the separate criminal acts *537continue to be defined separately and they must be so construed.
The current statutory definitions of these crimes are derived from New York Penal Law § 130.00. See Commentary to Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1801 (Repl. 1977). We note that the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York stated: “The definition of deviate sexual activity does not refer to sexual intercourse in its ordinary meaning but refers to specific sexual conduct — contact between the penis and the anus, the mouth and the penis, or the mouth and the vulva.” People v. Griffith, 80 A.D.2d 590, 435 NYS2d 767 (1981). The two crimes are not the same. Forced sexual intercourse does not come within the crime of forced deviate sexual activity.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Purtle, J., concurs.
Hickman and Hays, JJ., dissent.