Appellants were convicted of theft of property and burglary of a residence in Lonoke County, receiving concurrent ten year sentences on each charge. For reversal, they allege the trial court erred in not suppressing evidence seized without a warrant, in not permitting the introduction of statements elicited from them by the police, and in permitting a police officer to give opinion testimony. We find no error.
*278The facts given us are that shortly after noon on February 4, 1980, a private citizen followed the three appellants from North Little Rock to near Scott, a distance of about 15 miles, and watched them slow down and scrutinize residences along the way. He formed the belief that they were “casing” the residences for a burglary, particularly one at the intersection of Highway 130 and Walker’s Corner Road. Leaving his own pursuits, he drove to the police station at England where he reported the information to Deputy Sheriff Alan Swint. Mr. Swint knew the location to be sparsely settled, to have been subjected to a rash of recent burglaries and knew the residence of George Brown to be at that point. Appellants’ car, a bronze Cadillac, was unfamiliar to him. Swint went directly to the scene where he saw the Cadillac stopped, but positioned diagonally across the highway in such a manner as to suggest having just backed from the Brown driveway. Swint radioed another officer to investigate the residence as he followed the appellants. In North Little Rock he signalled another police vehicle to assist him and with that help he stopped the occupants and told them they were being held for suspicion of burglary. After handcuffing the appellants he received a radio report that the Brown residence had, in fact, been burglarized. With that information, he opened the trunk and observed two garment bags. One, he maintains, was partially opened, enabling him to see articles of silver service. On those facts appellants’ motion to suppress was denied.
I.
Appellants maintain the initial stop and detention was an unlawful arrest and seizure and there was no probable cause for the search. We disagree.
Our Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.1 gives a police officer the right to stop and detain for up to 15 minutes1 any person he reasonably suspects has committed a felony. Rule 2.1 defines the test as more than an imaginary or purely conjectural suspicion, but less than probable cause. Even the *279higher standard of probable cause requires much less than a certainty, as it is said to exist simply if the circumstances known to the officer would warrant a prudent man in believing a suspect had committed a crime. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1958); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1959). It does not depend on the same type of evidence as would be needed to support a conviction. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
Hence, these considerations are relative, and can be compared to a ladder with four rungs: at the highest level is certain knowledge, as in the case of an eyewitness to a crime; next is probable cause, less than a certainty, but enough to satisfy a prudent man; lower yet is a reasonable suspicion; and at the lowest level, a bare or imaginary suspicion, founded on nothing more than a hunch. Applying that standard to this case, we regard the requirements of reasonable suspicion as having been fully satisfied.
To validate this conclusion one need look no farther than the landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The circumstances of that case provide a striking analogy to this case. Terry had appealed a conviction for carrying a concealed weapon. He was observed by a detective about 2:30 one afternoon. The officer’s interest in Terry and two companions was aroused because they walked back and forth in a particular block peering in a store window and then conferring at the corner. The officer became suspicious and believed the men were “casing” the store for a robbery. He approached the men, identified himself as a police officer, and asked for their names; he was not acquainted with any of the three by name or sight and had received no information concerning them from any source. When the men “mumbled something” in response to his question the officer grabbed Terry, “spun him around” to frisk him and found a pistol in his overcoat pocket. The Supreme Court of the United States, whose sensitivity to Fourth Amendment constraints needs no defense, affirmed a decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio that the revolver was properly admitted in evidence, holding that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that Terry was armed and dangerous and that his behavior justified an *280investigative stop. The court noted that the suspects had gone through a series of acts, while innocent in themselves, when taken together warranted further investigation. And while the officer could not rely entirely on his intuition, he could draw on his experience in observing people under a variety of circumstances. The cases are rationally indistinguishable. A similar holding was reached in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), the court dealt with the problem of the United States Border Patrol’s authority to stop automobiles near the Mexican border. Referring to Terry v. Ohio, the court said:
The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response . . . A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980), Terry v. Ohio was described as holding that conduct lawful in itself can be such as to arouse a reasonable suspicion when viewed by a trained police officer.
In United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), the court observed that while trained police officers are able to draw inferences and make deductions that might well elude others, in the final analysis investigatory stops must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person is engaged in criminal activity. Noting that the whole picture must be considered the court said:
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated *281certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same — and so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus collected must he seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case the objective manifestations are found in the fact that the suspects were followed a considerable distance and observed to study residences along the way as if to be “casing” them; coupled to those circumstances are the knowledge and observations of Officer Swint that the area had been frequently burglarized, that the vehicle was unfamiliar to him, the occupants unknown to him and were thought to have just emerged from the Brown driveway 45 minutes to an hour after the informant observed them “casing” the residence. Singly, those circumstances indicate nothing; collectively, they add up to a reasonable suspicion. The case may be stronger than Terry v. Ohio — stores and store windows, unlike private homes, are intended to attract scrutiny. We conclude that the initial stop of the appellants was based on reasonable suspicion and hence not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The second phase of appellants’ argument is that the warrantless search of the automobile was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. But we believe the search comes within the “automobile exception” announced in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The State does not contend the search was incidental to a lawful arrest (assuming appellants’ detention amounted to an arrest), as such searches are restricted to the passenger compartment of the vehicle. New York v. Belton,1 450 U.S. 1028 (1981). What is claimed, correctly we think, is that when Officer Swint learned the Brown residence had been burglarized, at that point he had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the crime and, hence, a search of the vehicle was *282proper. Rule 14.1 (a), A. R. Crim. P., gives an officer the right to make a warrantless search of a vehicle detained on a public way if he has reasonable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence subject to seizure, and exigent circumstances require immediate action to prevent removal or destruction of such evidence. Rule 14.1 is consistent with Carroll v. United States, in permitting search and seizure whenever “probable cause to believe that the area contains evidence of a crime conjoins with any exigency arising out of the mobility and imminent disappearance of that same constitutionally protected area.”3 See also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
Appellants cite Burkett v. State, 271 Ark. 150, 607 S.W. 2d 399 (1980), and Scisney v. State, 270 Ark. 610, 605 S.W. 2d 451 (1980). where we held a warrantless search of wrapped parcels and suitcases was improper. But the distinguishing aspect is that in those cases the initial arrest was due merely to a faulty tail light and there was a lack of probable cause to believe the vehicles contained marijuana.
Appellants also press the argument that the garment bags were closed and, hence, under the “suitcase doctrine” there was an expectation of privacy in such containers, as recognized in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), and United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). But that fact issue was disputed and the trial court apparently relied on the officer’s testimony that one of the garment bags was open and its contents clearly visible to him. Had the garment bags been closed, then the rationale of the suitcase doctrine might arguably apply on the theory that when the suspects and the . containers are in custody, exigent circumstances disappear and a warrant can be sought at leisure. But even that is a debatable point, as the language of footnote 13, page 764, Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, suggests:
Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of *283the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar rools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred by their outward appearance.
Appellants argue inferentially that exigent circumstances disappear when the suspects and the vehicle itself are in custody, but that is not the law and, if reason prevails, will not become the law. Containers the size of suitcases can be readily secured in police custody but the impracticality of securing an automobile is self-evident, as the United States Supreme Court noted in Chambers v. Maroney, supra, where the court reviewed the automobile exception:
Carroll v. U.S. holds a search warrant unnecessary where there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway; the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained. Hence an immediate search is constitutionally permissible. (Page 51.)
This is not to deny the existence of that school of cases which has barred a warrantless search of automobiles where both the suspect and the vehicle are in custody. (See Jenkins v. State, 253 Ark. 249, 485 S.W. 2d 541 (1972), Steel v. State, 248 Ark. 159, 450 S.W. 2d 545 (1970), Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1963).) But those decisions distinguish a search at the scene of arrest as opposed to a search remote in time and distance from the situs of the arrest, under circumstances more conducive to the securing of a search warrant. We think the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress.
II.
Secondly, appellants ascribe error to the refusal to allow the introduction of statements elicited from them by the police. Although appellants declined to testify, they sought to introduce statements each had given the police after their arrest. The statements claimed they had bought the articles *284(consisting of a mink coat and an estimated $20,000.00 worth of silver service) for $300.00 from two men they met that morning at a McDonald’s restaurant and known to them only as Larry and Mike. The statements were offered as an admission against penal interest, under Rule 804 (b) (3), Uniform Rules of Evidence, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-1001 (Repl. 1979), on the theory that the statements exposed them to a charge of receiving stolen property. Before statements against penal interest are admissible under Rule 804 the court must be satisfied that the corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. See Welch v. State, 269 Ark. 208, 599 S.W. 2d 717, cert. den. 449 U.S. 996 (1980). The circumstances surrounding these statements fail decidedly to meet that test and the trial court was right to exclude them.
III.
Finally, appellants contend that the court erred in allowing the deputy to give an opinion that the Cadillac had backed from the Brown driveway just before he saw it. Rule 701, Uniform Rules of Evidence, allows a lay witness to state an opinion if it is rationally based on his perception and would be helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or to the determination of a fact issue. Whether the car had backed from the Brown driveway was a relevant issue. But more, its diagonal position in the highway, relative to the driveway, and its movement as he observed it, provided a rational basis for the opinion he gave. The difficulty of verbalizing the movement of objects and physical events often requires some degree of opinion by the observer and the speed and movement of automobiles, as of people, illustrate the reason for the rule. See Mathis v. State, 267 Ark. App. 904, 591 S.W. 2d 279 (1979). The trial court did not err in allowing the testimony.
The judgments are affirmed.
Hickman, J., consurs.
Holt, Purtle, and Dudley, JJ., dissent.