The original opinion in this case, dated November 12, 1980, is withdrawn, and is replaced by this substitute opinion.
This is a workers’ compensation case. Claimant suffered a work related injury which his treating physician found to constitute 10% impairment to the body as a whole. The Commission, based on a wage loss consideration as well as the *110medical evaluation, awarded claimant 35% permanent partial disability. This opinion was entered on March 10, 1978, and became final thirty days later as the employer took no further appeal.
After the decision became final, and payment had been made for the disability set by the Commission, claimant requested that the employer pay for a program of vocational rehabilitation. This request was refused as not being timely made. At a later hearing on the vocational rehabilitation request, the administrative law judge held that the request was timely made, and the program requested was reasonable as related to the injury. The requested program was thus approved. The employer appealed to the Commission which affirmed the administrative law judge in a split decision. The decision of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission is now brought to this court on appeal.
I
Appellant first argues that the Commission erred in holding that the request for vocational rehabilitation was timely filed. We agree. This claim for benefits is based upon Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1310(f), as it existed on August 22, 1974, the date of claimant’s injury. Under the mandatory requirement of the act, a program of rehabilitation had to be filed with the Commission within sixty (60) days from the final determination of permanent disability benefits. That was not done in this case, and appellant must be sustained in its contention that the request was not timely filed. The award of permanent disability was first made on February 11, 1977, and affirmed by the full Commission on March 10, 1978. There was no “filing” with the Commission of any “program” of rehab until the rehab hearing held November 16, 1978. The 60-day period provided in the “old” act had long since expired by that time. Under either act, “old” (60 days after final award), or “new” (prior to determination), the claimant was barred.
II
Appellee claims that appellant waived the right to object *111by not pointing out below that claimant’s efforts to reserve the question of vocational rehabilitation for a later determination was improper. We cannot agree. The statute is clear on this matter. The claimant, carrying the burden of proof and as the moving party, pushed his claim to a final determination of his permanent disability benefits without requesting vocational rehabilitation training within 60 days thereafter as required by the act. It was the omission of the claimant himself, not of the employer, which foreclosed the right.
Ill
Appellant also contends that the program requested was not reasonable in relation to the disability sustained by the employee. We need not reach that question as the case must be reversed and dismissed on point one.
Reversed and dismissed.
Hays, J., dissents.