Appellant was found guilty of violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2102 (Repl. 1977) by threatening to immediately employ physical force against Betty English, an employee of the Seven-Eleven store at Eighteenth & Main, North Little Rock, with the purpose of committing a theft, having a gun in his possession at the time. He was sentenced to a term of 50 years’ imprisonment. *283Appellant asks us to reverse that judgment upon two grounds. He says that the court erred by denying consideration by the jury of a verdict of not guilty and by excluding a portion of an instruction requested by him. We find no prejudicial error and affirm.
There was not only substantial evidence that appellant committed the crime, but appellant took the witness stand and testified that he had committed the robbery and that he was armed at the time, but said that he was under the influence of drugs and had been drinking beer. He said that he never used physical force, pulled the weapon or pointed it at the “girl,” or even represented to her that he had the weapon or that he would kill her if she didn’t give him the money. He said that when she began “hassling” him about the money, he was about to leave, but looked out over the fog on the window and saw the top of a police car. He said that he did not see a police officer approaching him with a riot gun until that officer had jumped out of the car and appellant had opened the door. Appellant said that he retreated into the store, took the weapon out of his britches and put it on a stack of cans because he did not want to be found with it, knowing exactly what the officer would do if he had been seen with it in his hand. He said he had gone into the store to rob it but that he was caught before he could get out and he never took the money outside the front door.
He also testified on direct examination that he had been convicted of prior felonies—burglary and grand larceny, assault with intent to rob and armed robbery. He said he knew that, because he had taken the witness stand, the jury was going to find out about these prior convictions and that he could have avoided the jury’s knowing about them, if he had not taken the witness stand. He explained that some of his prior convictions were “just neighborhood type situations” in which the alleged victims also went to the penitentiary.
Appellant stated he knew the jury was going to find him guilty but that he couldn’t plead guilty because he wanted the jury to decide his sentence. He told the jury that, because he was an habitual offender, he would not be eligible for *284parole as others were, but would have to serve “whatever I get.” He explained that he had been employed at the time of the “incident” but “goofed up” again and got to drinking and had been taking Valium and drinking on the day of the robbery.
In order to properly evaluate appellant’s arguments, it is necessary that we consider his trial strategy. Not only did he testify that he had decided to let the jury fix his sentence, he said that he felt more comfortable with a jury of 12 deciding “on me.” He also made a plea for leniency by pointing out that he had a drinking problem, but had conquered a drug problem. He told the jury that he had been treated in the state hospital for alcohol abuse. Virtually all this information was given during his direct examination.
In closing argument, appellant’s trial attorney (who is not his attorney on appeal) opened with a statement that “honesty is the best policy*” reminded the jurors that at the beginning of the case he had told them that there were only two issues to be decided, i.e., whether Smith was guilty of aggravated robbery or of criminal attempt to commit robbery and the extent of the punishment to be imposed. He pointed out that the jury had five options but that the fifth one, a finding of not guilty, was not actually an option. He said that Smith was only asking the jury to make the punishment fit the crime but not “to let him loose.” He said that Smith was guilty.
After the jury retired, this attorney, in Smith’s presence, advised the court that Smith had instructed him to argue to the jury and base his defense on the fact that Smith was in fact in the store, and was guilty of some offense, but not aggravated robbery. Smith confirmed the attorney’s statement and said that he had advised the attorney to argue that he was not guilty of aggravated robbery, but that he was in fact guilty of “going and robbing the place.”
The form of verdict submitted to the jury provided for findings of guilty or not guilty of aggravated robbery, robbery, criminal attempt to commit aggravated robbery, or “criminal attempt to robbery.” The trial judge told the jury *285that it could disregard the form for not guilty of aggravated robbery, because Smith had admitted he was guilty of something. Appellant’s attorney then stated that he was not sure that he understood the judge’s comment about “the jurors disregarding what.” The judge responded that there was an admission of guilt of criminality and that a not guilty verdict should not be considered by the jury. No objection was made to either statement by the judge.
Appellant now argues that the judge commented on the evidence, and in effect, directed a verdict of guilty. The attorney’s inquiry cannot be transformed into an objection as appellant would have us do. He would also have us ignore the fact that he made no objection, on the ground that plain error was committed, relying on Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2725.2 (Repl. 1977) and Camp v. Arkansas, 404 U.S. 69, 92 S. Ct. 307, 30 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1971).
We have no “plain error” rule and Camp certainly does not require one. We do not take § 43-2725.2 to mandate such a rule. Just a few months ago—long after the adoption of that section of the statute—we held that an appellant is barred from arguing a point not supported by an objection in the trial court. We overlook a failure to object in the trial court only when the error is so great the trial judge was under a duty to correct his own action immediately and when no objection or admonition could have undone the damage or erased the effect of his error from the minds of the jurors. Wilson v. State, 261 Ark. 820, 552 S.W. 2d 223. We pointed out in Wilson that even that practice should be indulged in with great caution and invoked only to avoid a clear miscarriage of justice.
Appellant correctly contends that the statements of the judge were a comment on the evidence and his action tantamount to directing a verdict of guilty of aggravated robbery or a lesser included offense. The error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. A declaration of error certainly is not necessary to avoid a clear miscarriage of justice. Nor would it mandate a reversal. The trial judge’s statement conveyed no thought to the jury that was not communicated to it with greater potential impact by both appellant and his attorney. *286Appellant’s trial strategy was inconsistent with an objection to the judge’s statements. The verdict forms submitted to the jury still permitted a finding of not guilty, but appellant did not seek such a verdict. His deliberate strategy was to make a judicial confession to the jury in order to avoid sentencing by the judge. He is in no position to complain on appeal.
Appellant has never contended that the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding that he was guilty of aggravated robbery.
Appellant offered and the judge refused the following instruction to the jury:
You must not consider any prior trouble in which the Defendant may have been involved for any purpose other than in assessing his credibility as a witness. It is for you as jurors to say what weight you will give to the testimony of each witness.
He argues here that evidence of prior convictions is admissible only for the purpose of attacking the credibility of the witness. That is true when the evidence is offered by the state. Appellant voluntarily testified as to his prior convictions, not for the purpose of showing the jury that he was not credible, but for the purposes of impressing the jury with his honesty and sincerity and of emphasizing the fact that his eligibility for parole would be postponed on account of these convictions. Under these circumstances he was not entitled to the requested instruction, even if it is correct. The use of the words “prior trouble” casts considerable doubt about its correctness.
Since we find no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.
Hickman and Purtle, JJ., dissent.