This appeal is from a decision of the Columbia Chancery Court regarding the ownership of about thirty-three acres in Columbia County. Helen Bottenfield, the appellant, claimed that a deed to this property required the appellees to hold the land in trust to be divided equally between all the heirs of Emma Payne Miller, the deceased mother of Helen Bottenfield.
The chancellor found that the trustees held title to the property in trust for the heirs of Emma Miller, to the exclusion of Mary Moses, a daughter. The court considered the value of sixty acres in Louisiana (which Emma Miller had conveyed in 1971 to three of her children, including Helen *507Bottenfield) and the value of the property in Arkansas, and arrived at a finding that Helen Bottenfield should have an undivided one-thirty-second interest in the Arkansas property, which would be a just and fair interest considering all the evidence. Mrs. Bottenfield contended that she was entitled to a one-ninth interest.
Mrs. Bottenfield appeals alleging three errors: the court lacked the legal authority to reduce the quantity of appellant’s beneficial interest; the court failed to give Full Faith and Credit to a Louisiana decree; and, the chancellor’s decision ignores the doctrine of res judicata.
Emma Payne Miller executed a will in May of 1968, leaving all her property to seven surviving children and one share to two children of a deceased son. The will specifically excluded her daughter, Mary Miller Moses, from sharing in any of the real property. Shortly thereafter, in July of 1968, she executed a quitclaim deed to about thirty-three acres to Thomas Wood, Larry Miller and Marion Miller as “Trustees”. Wood was a son-in-law, Larry Miller was a son, and Marion Miller was a grandson. The word “Trustees” was the extent of the description of the trust.
After Mrs. Miller died and executors were appointed for her estate, they filed suit in Louisiana to set aside the Louisiana deed alleging that it was executed without consideration. The deed recited a consideration of one hundred dollars. The probate court in Louisiana ruled that there was adequate consideration and quieted title in that land to the three daughters.
This suit in Arkansas originated when the three “trustees” filed suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of the land and to prevent Helen Bottenfield from claiming an interest in any of the Arkansas property. This claim was dismissed and the case proceeded to trial on Bottenfield’s counter-claim praying that title be quieted to her in an undivided one-ninth interest.
It was Mrs. Bottenfield’s burden, of course, to prove the existence of a trust. Kansas City Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 184 Ark. 772, 43 S.W. 2d 372 (1931).
*508A good deal of oral testimony was offered to prove the trust, but it was conflicting, and not clear and convincing as to the existence of the trust or its purposes. The quitclaim deed was executed in a lawyer’s office in Magnolia, Arkansas, and the witnesses who were present when the deed was signed gave varying testimony regarding what transpired.
Fay Miller Wood, the wife of Thomas Wood, one of the “trustees”, who was present when the deed was signed, testified that it was her mother’s intention that the Arkansas property be held in trust to be distributed according to her will; that is, to evenly divide the property but exclude the daughter, Mary Moses, who had received property during the lifetime of her mother. She said there was no distinction made between the Louisiana and Arkansas land. At one point she testified that it was her mother’s intention for the three grantees to make up their own minds how the property was to be distributed.
Marion Miller, listed as a “trustee”, testified that he was present when the deed was executed. He said that his grandmother wanted to get the property out of her name so she wouldn’t be bothered by it. He said that “she wanted to get it out of her name so she could live in peace, or something like that.” There was evidence Mrs. Miller was being pressured to favor one or more of her children by distributing her property before her death. He went on to state that he asked the lawyer in his grandmother’s presence to explain to her if she knew what she was signing; that if she signed it, those getting the property could sell it the next day. He said he was given no instructions whatsoever about the land.
Thomas Wood, one of the “trustees” who was not present when the deed was signed, said “I figured Mrs. Miller figured that I would give each one of the children a fair shake in the settlement”. He felt that since Mrs. Bottenfield had received an interest in the Louisiana land she was not entitled to any of the Arkansas land.
Larry Miller, another “trustee” who was not present when the deed was signed, said that he thought his mother’s purpose was to get the property out of her name so she *509wouldn’t have to worry about it. He went on to state that he never received any instructions.
Mrs. Bottenfield was not present when the deed was executed.
The so-called trust contained in the deed fails as an express trust because it violates the statute of frauds. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 38-106 (Repl. 1962); Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 40 (1959). Parole evidence is not admissible to prove an express trust. Hawkins v. Scanlon, 212 Ark. 180, 206 S.W. 2d 179 (1947). (See, also, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 50-412 [Repl. 1971] on the effect of such language in an instrument when title is passed to a third party.)
The obvious question then is: Did the so-called trustees take the property in fee, or was the evidence sufficient to create a resulting or constructive trust, which may be proved by parole evidence? Ark. Stat. Ann. § 38-107 (Repl. 1962); Harbour v. Harbour, 207 Ark. 551, 181 S.W. 2d 805 (1944).
We find no evidence to support a finding that the trust would be a resulting trust. A resulting trust arises in one of the following situations: where a private or charitable trust fails in whole or in part; where a private or charitable trust is fully performed without exhausting the trust estate; and, where property is purchased and the purchase price is paid by one person and at his direction the vendor transfers the property to another person. Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 404 (1959).
The evidence is insufficient to support a finding that there was a constructive trust. There must be clear, cogent and convincing evidence of fraud, or a confidential relationship to establish a constructive trust. Robertson v. Robertson, 229 Ark. 649, 317 S.W. 2d 272 (1958).
There was no such evidence in this case. There was no allegation of fraud or false inducement on behalf of any of the grantees. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary.
One grantee, the only one present when the deed was signed, said he wanted his grandmother to know that he, a *510grantee, understood the property could be disposed of the next day. The other two grantees, not present when the deed was signed, received no instructions, and had to surmise her intent. One arrived at his understanding of his duty by “figuring what she figured.”
Simply because the grantees were related to Mrs. Miller could not, alone, create a confidential relationship imposing a constructive trust on the land. See Jones v. Gachot, 217 Ark. 462, 230 S.W. 2d 937 (1950).
Consequently, we have a situation where the trust fails, is void and the grantees may dispose of the property in fee as they see fit. The grantees’ duty, if any such duty exists by virtue of the deed, would be moral and not legal. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, § 69 (2d ed. 1965).
The trustees did not elect to dispose of the property in fee. They elected not to appeal the decision of the chancellor awarding Mrs. Bottenfield a one-thirty-second interest in the Arkansas property.
The net result of the appellees’ failure to appeal is that the decision of the chancellor will be affirmed. The appellant, Bottenfield, for the reasons stated herein, has failed to make a case that a trust existed and, therefore, her appeal must fail.
The arguments of the appellant regarding res judicata and Full Faith and Credit are irrelevant. The appellant’s entire case depends on whether or not she could prove, as the law requires, that the trust existed. Harbour v. Harbour, supra. She could not prove an express trust by parol; there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that there was a resulting or constructive trust; and, consequently, her claim must be denied.
Affirmed.
Fogleman, J., dissents.