Following our decision in Skelton v. B. C. Land Co., 256 Ark. 961, 513 S.W. 2d 919 (1974), denying a net operating loss carryover to B. C. Land Co., appellant Walter Skelton, Assistant Director of the Department of Finance and Administration, filed a certificate of indebtedness and caused an execution to be issued thereon on February 3, 1975. On March 31, 1975, the Govennor signed Act 676 of 1975. Section 1 of Act 676 provided that, for income tax purposes, an acquiring corporation would succeed to any net operating loss carry-over that the acquired corporation could have claimed — i.e. it brough the Arkansas income tax law in conformity with the provisions of § 381 and § 382 of the Internal Revenue Code. Sections 2 and 4 of Act 676 provide as follows:
SECTION 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all corporate income returns for income years beginning on or after January 1, 1975, and to all corporate income tax returns filed for years prior to January 1, 1975 which are pending on the effective date of this Act and on which the taxes have not been paid.
SECTION 4. It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the present corporate income tax law does not permit one domestic corporation which acquires the assets of another domestic corporation to succeed to the net operating loss carry-over of the acquired corporation under any circumstances; that the absence of any such authority creates a serious hardship on some acquiring corporators and that provision should be made as soon as possible for permitting such acquiring corporations to succeed to the net operating loss carry-over of the acquired corporations under specified conditions, and that this Act is designed to accomplish this purpose. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and that this Act being *124necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Pursuant to a petition filed by appellee on April 2, 1975, the trial court entered a final order on August 20, 1975, holding the certificate of indebtedness to be void. For reversal, appellant makes the following contentions:
“I. Act 676 of 1975 is not applicable to the appellee because his tax return was not pending on the effective date of the Act.
II. The appellee has failed to meet his burden of proof showing his entitlement to this tax deduction.
III. Act 676 of 1975 is inapplicable to the appellee because the rights of the State had vested prior to the effective date of the Act and therefore those rights are protected from legislative invasion.”
Under points I and II, supra, appellant takes the position that appellee’s income tax return was not pending on the effective date of Act 676, supra. In this connection appellant would have us construe the phrase “which are pending on the effective date of this Act” to exclude all corporate income tax returns that had become res judicata in the courts. However, Section 2 does not refer to court litigation but to income tax returns. Furthermore, in making this contention appellant ignores the cardinal principle that in construing remedial legislation the courts should do so with appropriate regard to the spirit which prompted its enactment, the mischief sought to be abolished and the remedy proposed, United States v. Colorado Anthracite Co., 225 U.S. 219, 32 S. Ct. 617, 56 L. Ed. 1063 (1912) and Peet v. Mills, 76 Wash. 437, 136 P. 685 (1913). When the provision with respect to pending corporate income tax returns is construed with respect to the mischief sought to be abolished and the remedy proposed, we must agree with the trial court that appellee’s corporate income tax return, uoon which a certificate of indebtedness had been filed and an execution issued, was “pending on the effective date of the Act” within the meaining of Section 2 of Act 676, supra.
*125Little need be said as to appellant’s contention that appellee has not proven its entitlement to the provisions of Section 2 of Act 676, supra. Since appellant has agreed that appellee meets all of the criteria established in Section 1 of the Act, there is no dispute as to the facts.
In making the argument that Act 676 of 1975 was inapplicable to appellee because the rights of the State had become vested prior to the effective date of the Act, appellant relies upon cases involving only the rights of private individuals, Files, Auditor v. Fuller, 44 Ark. 273 (1884). However, the general rule applicable to individuals does not apply to retroactive legislation impairing a state’s own rights, Greenaway’s Case, 319 Mass. 121, 65 N.E. 2d 16 (1946) and People ex rel. Clark v. Gilchrist, 243 N.Y. 173, 153 N.E. 39 (1926). A state has no vested rights which are immune from its legislative control, 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 243 (1956).
Affirmed.
George Rose Smith, Fogleman and Roy, JJ., dissent.