This is a taxpayer’s action challenging the constitutionality of Act 274 of the General Assembly of 1971 and Act 2 of the General Assembly of 1973.
Act 274 authorizes the members of the General Assembly to obtain reimbursement for actual, reasonable, and necessary expenses incurred by the members in performing activities which are directly connected with and incidental to their official duties during the interim period between legislative sessions. The Act fixes an escalating maximum as follows: $150.00 per month for the 1971-72 fiscal year, $200.00 per month for the 1972-73 fiscal year, $250.00 per month for the 1973-74 fiscal year.
Act 2 of 1973, appropriates the necessary funds to defray the expenses of the Senate of the 69th General Assembly, and reimburse the Senators as provided in Act 274.
Appellee taxpayers filed this action alleging that Act 274 of 1971 and Act 2 of 1973 are void as an effort to make an allowance to the legislators, thereby increasing their salaries in violation of Amendment 48 to the Arkansas Constitution. We agree with the following facts as found by the Trial Court: Senator V. T. Fletcher received payment of the following sums under authority of Act 274 of 1971, from an appropriation made by Act 798 of 1971: $150.00 per month for the month of July, 1971 through January, 1972, $150.00 per month for the months of April through June, 1972; and $200.00 per month for the months ofjuly through December, 1972, inclusive; a total of $2,950.00. These payments were made to Senator Fletcher as a result of his filing with the Secretary of the Senate his statements of interim expenses incurred on a monthly basis. These statements were not accom*827panied by supporting papers showing that said expenses claimed had been incurred in the transaction of official duties required by law. Senator Fletcher kept no records itemizing individual expenses for which reimbursement was claimed.
On January 10, 1973, each of the Defendant Senators received a warrant in the amount of $600.00 for postage, telephone and telegraph expense; $1200.00 for per diem expense and $1800.00 for contingency expenses, issued under authority of Act 2 of 1973. The amounts paid to each of the Defendant Senators by the warrants for contingency expense in the amount of $1800.00 and postage, telephone and telegraph expense in the amount of $600.00 were paid to them before any expenses for these purposes were incurred.
Based on these findings of fact, the Trial Court concluded that the members of the General Assembly had no official duties during the interim period between sessions, and that Act 274 and Act 798 of the 1971 Acts of the General Assembly were unconstitutional and void, restrained the Treasurer and Auditor of the State of Arkansas from paying warrants under the authority of Act 274 and granted judgment against Defendant Senators for the amounts received by them under the authority of the Act.
The points relied on for reversal by appellants include: (1) Act 274 of 1971 does not increase the salaries of members of the General Assembly and does not violate Amendment 48 to the Arkansas Constitution; (2) Act 2 of 1973 does not increase the salaries of the members of the Senate of the General Assembly and does not violate Amendment 48 to the Arkansas Constitution; (3) Judgment should not have been granted in favor of the State of Arkansas against the appellant State Senators for the sums each received under the authority of Act 274 of 1971 and Act 2 of 1973.
The constitutionality of Act 274 of 1971 and Act 2 of 1973, will be considered separately.
It is our opinion that Act 274 of 1971 is constitutional, and we so hold. In so holding, we restate our adherence to two fundamental rules of construction; first, that the *828Constitution of this State is not a grant of enumerated powers to the legislature, not an enabling, but a restraining act, and that the legislature may rightfully exercise its powers, subject only to the limitations and restrictions of the Constitution of the United States and the State of Arkansas; second, that an act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional and will not be held by the Court to be unconstitutional unless there is a clear incompatibility between the act and the Consitution. All doubt on the question must be resolved in favor of the Act. Bush v. Martineau, 174 Ark. 214, 295 S.W. 9 (1927), and cases therein cited.
Compensation of legislators of the General Assembly of this State was originally set by Article V., Section 16, of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas. After delineating the compensation of the legislators, that Section contained the following express prohibition:
“And they shall receive no compensation, perquisite or allowance whatever, except as herein provided.”
After a series of amendments, compensation was ultimately fixed by Amendment 48 to the State Constitution. Amendment 48 contains no such express prohibition. The Amendment provides:
“Salary and per diem allowance - mileage - The members of the General Assembly shall receive as their salary, the sum of $1200.00 (twelve hundred) dollars per annum, except the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who shall receive his salary of $1350.00 (thirteen hundred and fifty dollars) per annum, with such salaries to be payable in equal monthly installments; and in addition to such salary, the members of the General Assembly shall receive twenty dollars ($20.00) per day for each day the General Assembly is in regular session, and shall receive five cents ($0.05) per mile for each mile traveled in going to and returning from the seat of government over the most direct and practicable route; and provided, further, that when said members are required to attend an extroardinary session of the General Assembly, they shall receive an addition to salary herein provided, the sum of six dollars ($6.00) per *829day for each day they are required to attend, and mileage at the same rate herein provided.”
Appellees cite the case of Ashton v. Ferguson, 164 Ark. 254, 261 S.W. 624 (1924), for the proposition that Act 274 is unconstitutional. We emphasize that Ashton v. Ferguson, was decided prior to the adoption of Amendment 48, and under a constitutional provision containing the prohibition above cited. Our interpretation of the absence of that prohibition in Amendment 48 is succinctly stated in Berry v. Gordon, 237 Ark. 547, 865, 376 S.W. 2d 279 (1964):
“The Ashton case simply ruled that members of the legislature were not entitled to allowances prohibited by the Constitutional provisions in effect at that time. Those constitutional provisions have been repealed.”
Inasmuch as there is no constitutional prohibition against the reimbursement granted by Act 274, the Act does not violate the Constitution of the State of Arkansas.
We agree that the evidence elicited from Senator Fletcher at the trial level concerning the incurring of the reimbursed expenses in his capacity as a legislator during the interim period is border line, but officers of the State are cloaked with the presumption that their actions are lawful, correct, and in good faith and sincerity of purpose in the execution of their duties. Rockfeller v. Hogue, 244 Ark. 1029, 429 S.W. 2d 85 (1968). Appellees have not overcome this presumption by showing that Senator Fletcher did not actually have legitimate reimbursable expenses in excess of the amount claimed. However this Court could countenance no claim which appeared to be a sham to evade the constitutional limitation on compensation.
We also hold Act 2 of the General Assembly of 1973 constitutional as adopted. However, the application of the provision to the facts in this case does not meet with the requirement of allowing reimbursement only for expenditures actually incurred. The evidence is clear that on January 10, 1973, each of the Defendant Senators received a warrant in the amount of 1600.00 for postage, telephone and telegraph *830expenses; $1200.00 for per diem expense, and $1800.00 for contingency expense. The $1200.00 voucher for per diem expense was paid before earned, and the $600.00 voucher for postage, telephone and telegraph and the $1800.00 voucher for contingency expense were paid before these expenses were incurred. With respect to the $1200.00 per diem, we affirm the trial court’s judgment that the payment of the per diem in advance is not a fatal defect inasmuch as each Senator did serve for the session and ultimately earned the per diem.
With respect to the $600.00 voucher for postage, telephone and telegraph, and the $1800.00 voucher for contingency expense, we hold that the advance payment of these sums is violative of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas, and affirm the judgment rendered by the trial court against Defendant Senators for these sums.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
FOGLEMAN, J., concurs; Hdlt J., disqualified.