The State, through the attorney general, prosecutes this appeal under the authority of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2720 (Repl. 1964), contending the ruling of the trial court should be corrected to preserve uniformity in the administration of the criminal law. Willie Gene Jacks, defendant below, successfully moved to quash an information charging him with failure to discharge mechanics’ and materialmen’s liens in violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 51-640 (Supp. 1965).
Jacks’ motion to the trial court raises two points. First, he contends § 51-640 is unconstitutional in that it attempts to establish a prima facie case of intent to defraud when a contractor fails to discharge a lien within ten days after receipt of payment. Second, after he is alleged to have received the money, Jacks was adjudged a bankrupt by the United States District Court; that *79adjudication, so Jacks contends, placed Ms person and property within the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. The two contentions must he separately considered.
Prior to 1963, the penalty statute for failing to satisfy the involved liens was controlled by Ark. Stat. Ann. § 51-601 (1947). That section was declared unconstitutional in Peairs v. State, 227 Ark. 230, 297 S. W. 2d 775 (1957). The absence of the requirement that intent to defraud be established in a prosecution was the basis for the holding in Peairs. Apparently for the purpose of filling the void, the Legislature enacted a new penalty statute in 1963, Ask. Stat. Ann. § 51-640 (Supp. 1965). This is the law under which Jacks was charged. It contains the element of “intent to defraud" and in addition contains tMs sentence:
“In any prosecution under this act [§§ 51-640, 51-641] as against the person so receiving payment when it shall be shown in evidence that any lien for labor or materials existed in favor of any mechanic, laborer or materialmen and that such lien has been filed within the time provided by law in the office of the circmt clerk or other officer provided by law for the filing of such liens, and that such contractor, subcontractor or other person charged has received payment without discharging the said lien to the extent of the funds received by him, the fact of acceptance of such payment without having discharged the same lien within ten [10] days after receipt of such payment or the receipt of notice of the existence of such lien, whichever event shall occur last, shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud on the part of the person so receiving payment. ’ ’
Appellee asserts that the statutory presumption of intent to defraud is unconstitutional. He cites Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219 (1910) and Pollock v. Williams, 322 U. S. 4 (1944). The statute in Bailey was struck *80down on other grounds. First, it was found to be in violation of the federal anti-peonage statutes. Secondly, Alabama had a rule of evidence that would prohibit Bailey from testifying as to uncommunicated intentions. Combining that rule with the “prima facie evidence rule,” it is readily seen that Bailey’s defense was literally “blocked in.” Finally, it was found to be the fundamental purpose of the Alabama statute “to compel, under the sanction of the criminal law, the enforcement of the contract for personal service. . .” Pollock involved a statute classified by the court as a peonage statute and in the context of the type of legislation the presumption section was held unconstitutional. The court said the presumption in Pollock “in a different context might not be invalid, Indeed, we have sustained the power of the state to enact an almost identical presumption of fraud, but in transactions that did not involve involuntary labor to discharge a debt. James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119.” (1927)
The general rule, well established in many jurisdictions, including the United States Supreme Court, is well stated in O’Neill v. United States, 19 F. 2d 322 (1927):
“The general principle is well recognized that even in criminal prosecutions, Congress or a state Legislature may with certain limitations enact that when certain facts have been proved they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the main fact in question. . . The limitations are these: There must be some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed; the inference of the existence of the ultimate fact from proof of the other fact must not be so unreasonable or unnatural as to be' a purely arbitrary mandate; and the accused must not be deprived of a proper opportunity to present his defense to the main fact so presumed and have the case submitted upon all the evidence to the jury for its decision.”
*81The case at bar clearly cannot be classified as a peonage statute. It is more comparable to our law making it an offense to execute an overdraft which likewise contains the presumption clause. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 67-720-24 (Repl. 1966). This court said in Edens v. State, 235 Ark. 284, 357 S. W. 2d 641 (1962) that the only effect of the presumption clause in § 67-722 is to place the burden on the defendant to go forward with the case. The burden of proof is not shifted.
Further protection is afforded Jacks by the holding-in Reno and Stark v. State, 241 Ark. 127, 406 S. W. 2d 372 (1966), where we held that it is improper .for the trial court to advise the jury of the presumption provision. Reno and Stark involved the charge of failure to discharge materialmen’s liens.
We hold that the presumption clause has a rational connection with the balance of our statutes governing-mechanics’ and materialmen’s liens. It is not arbitrary. The accused is not deprived of opportunity to present his defense on the main fact. The presumption of innocence remains with the accused and the burden of proof on the whole case is in the State. The accused is merely required to go forward with his proof when the lien is established, payment is proven, and the failure to satisfy the lien is shown.
We can quickly dispose of the argument that if one violates a state law of this nature and before prosecution is adjudged a bankrupt, he gains immunity from the violation. That is the substance of the second point raised by Jacks. If a contractor receives payment which under valid legislation is required to be used to discharge lawful liens, but instead, misappropriates the payment with criminal intent, he is subject to prosecution. The federal bankruptcy law is a civil proceeding enacted for the relief of persons financially distressed and certainly does not purport to pre-empt our state penal statutes.
*82Reversed and remanded.
Byrd, J., dissents.