Ronald McDonald, appellee, a minor, was injured in a collision, between a pickup truck, driven by appellee, and a butane gas delivery truck, owned by appellant, Industrial Farm Home Gas Company, and driven by its employee, James Gathings. The collision took place on a rural road in Greene County in March, 1960, during a time when snow and ice covered the area. The impact occurred at the top of a hill where there is a right angle turn creating a blind curve. The gas truck was proceeding uphill in a westerly direction,1 and McDonald, 15 years of age, was approaching the curve from the north. The road, covered with snow and ice, and according to the testimony, extremely slick and dangerous, ran through a deep cut, so that the vision of each party was obscured. According to McDonald, he approached the curve at a speed of about 15 miles per hour, and according to Gathings, he (Gathings) approached at a speed of approximately five miles per hour. Admittedly, both operators were driving slowly, and, according to the testimony of each, were about 25 feet apart before they observed each other. It appears from the evidence that this distance was the approximate limit of visibility, and neither could have observed the other earlier. When the drivers came into view,. McDonald applied his brakes, and his truck began to skid, striking the gas truck a few inches behind the left headlight, and the left fender of appellee’s truck striking the left fender of appellant’s truck. According to the boy, he had gotten over to the right as far as he could go, and the gas truck was in the middle of the road at the time of the collision. McDonald was unable to say whether any part of his vehicle was across the center of the road. Gathings testified that he had gotten to his right as far as possible, and denied that he was in the center of the roadway. One thing is evident; the road (which was just a dirt, country road, with a little gravel on it) was quite narrow. No one testified as to its width, but photographs *746in the record establish its narrowness probably no wider than to permit two vehicles to barely pass.
Suit for personal injuries was instituted against appellant by Gladys McDonald, mother and next friend of the minor, Ronald. Appellant answered, denied negligence, pleaded contributory negligence, and asserted that the negligence of Ronald McDonald exceeded that of appellant; a counterclaim was filed seeking damages to the gas truck in the amount of $175. A third party complaint was filed against A. C. McDonald, Ronald’s father, alleging that the former was the owner of the truck, and that he was negligent in trusting the vehicle to his son, who was only 15 years of age. Judgment was sought against the father in the amount of $175. The third party defendant subsequently moved to strike so much of the third party complaint as sought relief under the provisions of the Arkansas Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, and the motion was granted. The cause proceeded to trial, and after the taking of evidence, was submitted to the jury on interrogatories. The jury found both McDonald and appellant’s driver, Gathings, to be negligent, establishing Gathings’ negligence at 60%, and McDonald’s at 40%. Damages to McDonald were fixed at $7,000. Judgment against appellant was accordingly entered by the Court in the amount of $4,200 and costs, and the cause dismissed as to A. C. McDonald. From the judgment so entered, appellant brings this appeal. For reversal, several points are urged, and we proceed to a discussion of same.
‘ ‘ The Court erred by informing the jury of the effect of answers to interrogatories on liability of appellant.”
The Court submitted the case to the jury upon interrogatories in the customary form, No. 1, inquiring if they found Gathings guilty of negligence; No. 2, if they found Ronald McDonald guilty of negligence; and No. 3 (if the answer to both questions was “yes”), the percentage of *747fault attributable to each. As previously stated, the jury prorated the negligence as 60% to Gathings and 40% to McDonald. After the jury had retired, they subsequently returned to the courtroom and asked the Court a question. The Court answered that question, and the record then reflects the following:
“Foreman of Jury: Another question, in making this on a percentage basis, if, on account of the boy’s injuries, do we include, stipulate the damage done W the boy?
The Court: You determine that, what you feel the weight of the evidence establishes is his damages, what you feel the total compensation should be.
The Court: Do you have another question?
Foreman of Jury: We want to know, too, if we make this settlement on a percentage basis, the hospital bills we have a record of here, is that going to be on a percentage basis or do we make it in full?
The Court: Let me give you an example, perhaps I might clarify this in an example. I am not using the facts in this ease at all. Going to use, say ‘A’ and ‘B’, who become involved in charges and countercharges of negligence as against each other, each claims to have been damaged. In my example, let us assume the jury says ‘A’ is 25 percent at fault and ‘B’ is 75 percent at fault. The jury found, in response to interrogatories, after it made that determination of 25 and 75 percent, as indicated by the interrogatories, since ‘B’ is 75 percent at fault, which is more than 50 percent, he is not entitled to recover anything, having contributed most of the fault causing the damages. ‘A’, if the jury finds his damages as established, say for example, to be $100.00, then the total amount of his recovery against ‘B’ would be $100.00 less 25 percent, which is a deduction made becaue he contributed 25 percent of the fault that brought about the particular injuries to himself.
*748(Note: Short conference at Bar of Court.)
The Court: At the request of counsel, in the event— go back to my example of ‘A’ and ‘B’. In the event the jury found ‘A’ 50 percent at fault and ‘B’ 50 percent at fault, in that event, since they are equally at fault, neither can recover against the other any damages and it would not be necessary to make any calculation as to damages.
The Court: Any other question.
(Note: The jury again retired to consider case.)
Mr. Walker: The defendant objects to the Court’s explanation insofar as the Court undertook to explain to the jury the effect of a finding of negligence in diminution of the damages by showing the result which would follow from a certain percentage of negligence, on the ground that this example tends to inflame the jury and prejudice them to establish a result which would not follow from a fair, unbiased answer to the interrogatories.
Mr. Howard: Let the record show, the objection was made after the jury retired, counsel stood mute at the time that the Court was instructing the jury.
Mr. Burris: The- third party defendant concurs in the objection and adopts the objection of the defendant.”
Appellant vigorously argues that the Court committed reversible error by informing the jury of the effect of answers to interrogatories. The case of Wright v. Covey, 233 Ark. 798, 349 S. W. 2d 344, is relied upon in support of this contention. In that case, we held that no error was committed because the information given the jury was already known by them, but appellant says that in the matter before us, it is obvious the jury did not-already know, nor understand, the effect of the interrogatories. Quoting from its brief:
“It is obvious that the jury did not already know what the Court told them in detail and with illustrations *749as to how their answers to interrogatories would determine the ultimate outcome of the case. The jury clearly did not understand the effect of the interrogatories or even how they were used and it was quite obvious that they desired to decide the merits of the matter by a general verdict according to their own notions of right and wrong. The effect of the Court’s explanation was to afford them the means of determining how to make certain that the plaintiff prevailed, even though they apparently were not convinced that such a result would follow by simple and direct answers to the plain interrogatories which were addressed to them.”
Appellant further states:
‘ ‘ Thus, the Court followed exactly the practice which was condemned in Wright v. Covey, 233 Ark. 798, at 801, 349 S. W. 2d 344, where the Court made the following statement:
‘The appellants rely upon the rule, often announced in other jurisdictions, which prohibits a trial court, in submitting a case upon special interrogatories, from informing the jury of the effect that their answers may have upon the ultimate liability of the parties. Mitchell v. Perkins, 334 Mich. 192, 54 N. W. 2d 293; Grasso v. Cannonball Motor Freight Lines, 125 Tex. 154, 81 S. W. 2d 482; Anderson v. Seelow, 224 Wis. 230, 271 N. W. 844. The reason for the rule is that the special interrogatories are intended to elicit the jury’s unbiased judgment upon the issues of fact, and this purpose might be frustrated if the jurors are in a position to frame their answers with a conscious desire to aid one side or the other.” We are unable to consider this contention for no proper objection was made. Appellant’s objection does not go to the fact that the Court’s statement informed the jury of the effect their answers would have on the ultimate liability of the parties; rather, the objection is that the Court’s explanation “tends to inflame the jury and prejudice them.” We find nothing in the Court’s statement that could be considered inflammatory, nor anything *750that could possibly have aroused prejudice; in fact, appellant’s own argument in the brief, heretofore quoted, is indicative of the fact that it recognizes that if any prejudice existed, it was present before the questions were asked. Since no proper objection was made, it becomes unnecessary to consider either whether the objection was made too late,2 or if appellant should have gone farther and moved for a mistrial.
“The Court erred in overruling appellant’s objection to testimony of appellee’s witness, Yarvil, as to conversation with appellant’s insurance adjuster.”
Johnny Yarvil, a friend of McDonalds, was following McDonald in another vehicle at the time of the collision. Yarvil testified that McDonald had pulled out of the ruts on the right side of the road prior to the collision; that he did not see the McDonald car skid prior to the collision, and did not see the gas truck prior to the collision. On cross-examination, the witness was interrogated about a written statement which he admitted signing; this statement related that Yarvil had said that both trucks were in the middle of the road, and that the McDonald truck was skidding and hit the gas truck.3 The witness denied saying that both trucks were in the middle of the road. On re-direct examination, counsel for appellee stated, “Will you tell the jury, please, who, according to your best recollection, it was who took the statement?” The answer from the witness was, “I believe, it was the insurance man.” Appellant moved for a mistrial, which was overruled. The witness stated that the insurance man was representing the IFH Butane Company. Several references are thereafter made to the insurance adjuster. Appellant strongly urges that the injection of insurance into the testimony was highly *751prejudicial and justified a mistrial being declared. We do not agree. Our rule is that the injection of insurance coverage (to be proper) must be relevant and pertinent to some issue in the case. Let it be borne in mind that this written, signed, statement was introduced by appellant as an effort to impeach Varvil’s testimony. In Murray v. Jackson, 180 Ark. 1144, 24 S. W. 2d 960, this Court said:
“The next assignment of error relates to the admission of testimony for the plaintiff Mrs. Jackson. It had been shown in behalf of Mrs. Jackson that her injuries were permanent, and that it was necessary to keep her in the hospital for some time with special nurses and a physician attending her daily. The hospital, nurses ’ and physician ’s bills amounted to something over $1,700. The defendant then introduced a physician as a witness who testified that he examined Mrs. Jackson at the hospital, that she could walk about while there, that it was not necessary to keep her there for so long, and that her injuries were not permanent. On cross-examination counsel for the plaintiff asked for whom he made the examination, and he replied that he did not remember, but believed that it was for an insurance company, and stated further that the Southern Insurance Company asked him to make a report on the case.
A reversal of the judgment was asked on account of the admission of this testimony. The claim is made that the cross-examination of the witness as to who employed him was made for the purpose of showing that an insurance company was in reality defending the case, and that the cross-examination of the witness brought the case within the rule announced in Pekin Stave & Manufacturing Co. v. Ramey, 104 Ark. 1, 147 S. W. 83. We do not agree with counsel in this contention. The testimony of the physician introduced by the defendant tended to contradict the testimony of the physician introduced by Mrs. Jackson as to the character and extent of her injuries and as to the necessity of expending the money that was expended for her for hospital bills and attendance by *752nurses and a physician. The cross-examination was proper for the purpose of impeaching or contradicting the witness. The jury might have found that the employment of the physician made him biased in favor of the defendant, or at least tended to show the interest of the witness in the case.”
This is in accord with the general rule, which is expressed in 4 A. L. E. 2d, § 9, p. 782, under the title, “Showing of Liability Insurance ’ ’, as follows:
“Asa general rule, where a previously written statement is produced in court and used for the purpose of impeaching plaintiff or one of his witnesses, it is proper for plaintiff’s counsel to show that the person procuring such statement was a representative of defendant’s insurance company.”
It thus appears that when a witness is asked about a statement, previously given, and he denies making some of the remarks appearing in the writing, opposing counsel may then show who wrote the account as a matter of permitting the jury to determine whether the person who took the statement had any possible bias or interest in the matter. Therefore, if a defendant desires to impeach the testimony of a witness by interrogating him relative to a statement taken by an insurance company representative, he must be prepared for the jury to know that insurance is involved.
“The Court erred in refusing appellant’s instruction on inevitable accident.”
Appellant requested the following instruction, which was refused over its objection and exceptions:
“If you find from the evidence in this case that the collision was caused solely by conditions of weather or of the road, or any other conditions beyond the control of either driver, without negligence on the part of either *753driver, then the collision would be an unavoidable accident which neither party would be liable, and, if you should so find, you should answer the interrogatories in this case that neither party was negligent.”
After thorough study, we have reached the conclusion that this point contains merit. There are quite a number of cases involving this question, in some of which we held the instruction proper, and contrariwise in the others. Really, whether such an instruction is justified depends upon the facts in evidence in each particular case. In St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Bryan, 195 Ark. 350, 112 S. W. 2d 641, we said:
“It has been frequently stated by this and other courts that in order to warrant a finding that negligence is the proximate cause of an injury it must appear that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the negligence or wrongful act, and that it ought to have been foreseen in the light of the attending circumstances. Appellee cites the cases of Bennett v. Staten, 229 Ark. 47, 313 S. W. 2d 232, and Sullivan v. Fanestiel, 229 Ark. 662, 317 S. W. 2d 713, as authority for the fact that the instruction was properly refused. However, a reading of the opinions, as well as the transcripts, of those cases, reflects notable differences from the case at bar. In the Bennett case, this Court said that the facts did not warrant such an instruction, and we quoted from an earlier case with the comment that the statement equally applied in Bennett, as follows: “Moreover, there is no evidence in the record tending to show an unavoidable accident. ’ ’ In the Sullivan case, we upheld the trial court in refusing to instruct the jury relative to unavoidable accident, and commented that the collision was certainly caused by somebody’s negligence. There, also, both parties contended and testified that the collision was the fault of the other. This is not the situation before us. Neither the Bennett nor Sullivan cases related to situations involving unusual weather conditions, and more than that, the testimony was completely different. For instance, during the examination of McDonald, the question was *754asked, “How wide was the curve in the narrow part of it there?” Appellee answered, “Wasn’t very wide.” “Wasn’t?” “I don’t think room for the gas truck and my truck to pass.” Subsequently, McDonald stated that he put on his brakes and slid, and did not slide to the other side. “Q. You say you were on the right-hand side, he was on the left-hand side coming around the curve, you got over and hit him? A. I couldn’ta missed him. Q. You couldn’t miss him? A. No, sir.” Gathings, appellant’s truck driver, stated, “As near as humanly possible, it was an unavoidable accident.” Accordingly, we have both parties making statements that certainly bring into issue the question of whether the collision was an unavoidable accident. In fact, the quoted testimony of the two principals, together with the testimony about the weather conditions, and the admitted slow speed of each vehicle, was sufficient to warrant the giving of the instruction. Appellee states that the jury’s finding of negligence has the effect of rendering this question moot; however, we do not agree; we do not know what view the jury might have taken had it been instructed on inevitable accident, for the evidence was sufficient to have sustained such a finding. Really, it is difficult to visualize a case where the instruction would be more proper than in the case at bar; in fact, the strongest evidence of negligence on the part of appellant’s driver was his failure to sound his horn as he entered the curve. We are of the opinion that appellant was entitled to have this instruction given, and the court committed reversible error in failing to comply with the request.
It is also urged that the court committed error in refusing to permit appellant to prove by the witness Yarvil that McDonald had previously made a statement to Varvil that contradicted testimony given on the witness stand by appellee. Without entering into a detailed discussion of this point, suffice it to say that we find no error, since appellant had not laid the proper foundation (for asking Yarvil the question) while McDonald himself was on the stand.
*755For the error herein indicated, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
McFaddin & Johnson, JJ., dissent.