This is an appeal from a judgment of the Washington County Circuit Court, wherein the court directed a verdict in favor of appellees on appellants’ counter-claim. The litigation arose out of a collision which occurred on Highway 68 in Benton County, on what is variously known as ‘ ‘ Gallaher Curve”, “Dead Man’s Curve”, “Rainbow Curve”, and “Illinois River Curve”, at approximately 3 p.m., on September 29,1958. The collision involved two trucks, traveling in opposite directions, each being occupied solely by its operator. Joseph Keel Greenwood was operating a gravel truck for the Burbank Rock Company, and was traveling in a general easterly direction, toward Springdale. The truck was a 1956 F-800 Ford, dump cable bed, loaded with wood and steel. Norman Cline was operating a truck for George Feed and Supply Company, Inc., and was traveling in a general westerly direction, toward Siloam Springs. The George truck was a new 1958 International, and was carrying a load of approximately three and a half tons, at the time of the collision. The curve is considered a dangerous one, and several witnesses mentioned that numerous accidents have occurred in the general location, both before and after this particular collision. The highway is blacktop, twenty-four feet wide, with guard posts on each side, located about three feet outside the edge of the blacktop, and spaced 16.4 feet apart. The collision occurred during a drizzling rain, that had been in progress all day, and testimony indicated that the highway would become slick when wet, and was slick on this occasion. In approaching the curve from the east (moving west), the view around the curve is partially obscured by a hill; a vehicle traveling west would then go down a shallow downgrade, enter the curve to the right, and thereafter, climb a somewhat steep upgrade for the remainder of the turn. A vehicle approaching from the opposite direction would enter a sharp descending curve to the left. At the time of the collision, the George truck had almost completed making the curve, and the Burbank truck was just entering the curve, to its left. *80The evidence shows that the Burbank truck hit the George truck on the left side within 2% feet of the rear of the feed truck. After striking the George vehicle, the Burbank truck continued on to the left, across the road, and after apparently knocking down one of the guard posts, rolled into a deep gully. The George truck, upon being struck, made a 180-degree turn in a counterclockwise manner, stopped with its left side up, in its own lane, facing the direction from whence it came, and not too far from the place where the gravel truck left the road. Greenwood, driver of the Burbank truck, was killed. Cline only suffered minor bruises. Appellee Cline testified that he was traveling from 15 to 20 miles per hour, and observed the Burbank truck about 150 yards away, the latter apparently traveling at 30 to 45 miles per hour. He stated that the Burbank driver appeared to be crowding the yellow line, and that he (Cline) was on his right side of the highway at all times. The witness testified that the cabs of the two trucks were three or four feet apart when they passed, and that the Burbank driver was doing nothing to give appellee any cause for alarm; “The first I knew was after we hit— kebang! Like that, I knew he had hit me.” When the collision occurred, feed (from the feed truck) covered the highway to such an extent that the point of impact could not be determined. Luther George, vice-president of appellee company, and Victor Hanshaw, trooper with the Arkansas State Police, both went to the scene soon after the collision occurred. Feed was all over the highway, and George had several employees sweep the highway clean. The witness stated that he could not find any signs or marks indicating, or relating to, the collision, either before or after the feed was removed from the highway. Hanshaw likewise testified that he was unable to find any marks on the highway. Others viewed the premises soon after the collision, but no witness was presented by either side who could testify that marks or signs were present on the highway following the collision. The wet highway, feed spilled onto the highway, *81and traffic going through, apparently obliterated any marks that might have been made.
Appellee, George Feed and Supply Company, Inc., instituted suit for property damage, and appellee Cline sought damages for personal injuries. Burbank Rock Company filed an answer and counterclaim seeking damages for the value of its truck which it alleged to be demolished, and the administrator in succession of the estate of Greenwood answered, and filed his counterclaim against appellees, seeking recovery for alleged mental pain and anguish, conscious pain and suffering, loss of consortium, funeral expenses, and loss of contributions in the total amount of $200,000. The case proceeded to trial, and at the conclusion of the evidence, both sides moved for a directed verdict. The court granted the motion as to the counterclaim, and instructed the jury to find for appellees in that respect; the court, however, denied the motion to direct a verdict in favor of appellants as to the complaint filed by George and Cline, and this issue was presented to the jury. The jury returned its verdict, finding for Burbank Rock Company, Inc. From the judgment entered in accord therewith, appellants prosecute this appeal. There is no cross-appeal by appellees. Appellants stringently insist that the court erred, first, in not admitting expert testimony proffered by appellants, and secondly, in directing a verdict against the appellants. We proceed to a discussion of these contentions in the order mentioned.
The first contention relates to the refusal of the court to admit the testimony of Ralph H. Snyder, of Oklahoma City, a safety engineer. The proof, relative to his qualifications, showed that he had been in the engineering field for approximately 28 years, and had been doing accident analysis work for several years. He had served as safety director for Spearman Aircraft Company (now Boeing), and Beechcraft Company, for 2% or 3 years; assistant state safety consultant for the Works Progress Administration in Oklahoma; chief safety engineer for Tinker Air Force Base at Oklahoma City, and had served as safety director for the City Bus *82Company of Oklahoma City. Snyder is now in business for himself, operating, according to his evidence, three businesses, including an “accident analysis laboratory”. Snyder explained that, in the latter business, he reconstructed the manner of an accident on the basis of the physical evidence, such as skid marks, gouge marks, and other physical evidence that might be present.1 Snyder testified that he made an investigation of the collision here in litigation, making a visit to the scene on May 8, 1959; that on the same date, he took photographs of the George truck, and two or three weeks later, made a trip to Ponca City, Oklahoma, about 100 miles away, and viewed the remains of the Burbank truck, tractor and trailer unit. In the meantime, the wheels and tires had been taken off, and the motor and radiator removed from the truck. Measurements were made at the scene, and measurements were furnished relative to the vehicles involved. Snyder testified that he had an opinion as to how the accident happened, and in response to a hypothetical question propounded by appellants’ counsel, offered the opinion. After numerous objections2 and *83much discussion between the court and counsel on both sides, the witness commenced to answer the question as follows: “A. My opinion is that at the time of impact, the rear end of the feed truck was over the center line, that is, at the instant of impact, in order for the feed truck to make a complete revolution, come to rest on its side of the road without striking a pole and * * *” Upon objection, the court held that the reasoning was not supported properly from the testimony and the evidence, and on motion of appellees’ counsel, ordered that it be stricken and withdrawn from the jury.
Appellants assert:
“This is a classic example for the need of expert testimony. The usual, normal and expected indicia of negligence are not present. There are no eye witnesses. Cline states that each vehicle was on its side of road and he does not know how the accident happened, and rain and chicken feed obscured all marks of impact on the pavement. It becomes necessary, therefore, to reconstruct the accident from the damage done the vehicles, the missing guard post, and the nature and dimensions of the vehicles and highway. To contend that the average juror has competent knowledge to interpret the various ramifications involving stresses, strains, kinetic force and effects of impact upon vehicles and metals is utterly ridiculous.”
The offer of proof on behalf of the witness covers several pages, and would unduly extend the length of this Opinion. His opinion was based, inter alia, on the following premises: First, the fact that a guard post was not knocked down by the George truck as it made its counterclockwise turn. Since the posts were located at intervals of approximately sixteen feet, each post being approximately fifteen feet from the center of the highway, and the truck was something over twenty-two feet in length, Snyder concluded that the feed truck could not have been on its right side of the highway at the time of the *84•collision, for it would have, due to its length, knocked •down a post when spinning around; serrations or gouges were found on the highway, which, according to the witness, had been caused by a bar, or rail, on the side of the feed truck, which dug into the highway after the overturned truck first slid up the highway — then back for ■several feet. His opinion was further based on an examination of the vehicles, which the witness stated indicated that the collision was a “whipping type”, rather than a sideswipe; in his view, if the trucks had sideswiped, contact would have been made nearer the front, rather than to the rear of the truck. He was of the opinion that the feed truck had to have been over the center line, and the rear portion at an angle, in the process of returning to its own side of the highway at the time of the collision, in order for the two vehicles to make contact as heretofore described, and also, for the feed truck to have had room to make a half-turn, without hitting one of the posts on the side of the highway. We think the court .acted properly in excluding this testimony. In Conway v. Hudspeth, 229 Ark. 735, 318 S. W. 2d 137 (which involved the collision of three vehicles), a trained state police officer, who had investigated the accident before the vehicles were removed, was asked his opinion as to the order in which the collisions occurred. The appellants recognize that we sustained the trial court’s view that such testimony was inadmissible. This Court said:
“We do not agree with the appellants’ contention that the proffered testimony was admissible as the opinion of an expert. It has been said that the courts look with disfavor upon attempts to reconstruct traffic accidents by means of expert testimony, owing to the impossibility of establishing with certainty the many factors that must be taken into consideration. Moniz v. Bettencourt, 24 Cal. App. 2d 718, 76 P. 2d 535. In the case at hand the officer was not asked to describe every physical fact that he had seen and then to explain Ms deductions, in the manner that ballistic experts often explain their conclusion that a certain weapon fired a ■certain bullet. Here the officer was asked his opinion on *85the basis of the position of the vehicles, the damage to them, ‘and other physical evidence found at the scene.’ In the absence of anything to indicate that it was beyond the jurors’ ability to understand the facts and draw their own conclusions, there was no need to resort to expert opinion. ’ ’
Appellants argue that in the Hudspeth case, other evidence, concerning the manner in which the collission occurred, was available, while such is not true in the case before us. We do not unequivocally hold “reconstruction” of an accident by an expert to be inadmissible when supported by proper evidentiary facts, but we do say that the evidence in this case, upon which Snyder’s opinion was predicted, was inadequate to support his conclusions. For instance, it is clear that his opinion was, in part, based upon the serrations, or gouges, found in the highway. The unqualified testimony introduced at the trial was to the effect that no marks, of any kind, were found upon the road following the collision. Of course, there was no way of determining that the gouges referred to by Snyder were occasioned by the wreck on September 29th. In fact, all the evidence was to the contrary. Traffic had been traveling this highway for seven months before Snyder made his investigation. It is true that the witness stated that he could give an opinion without taking these marks into consideration, but Snyder’s answers in response to extensive interrogation by the court, leave the impression that the marks contributed somewhat to his opinion in the overall picture.3 The court also inquired as to the scientific basis *86used by Snyder in reaching certain deductions, to which no concrete answer seems to have been given, and we agree with the trial court that it appears that the witness’ opinion was, at least to some degree, based upon assumptions, not justified by the evidence. We are aware of the Oklahoma case of Leeper v. Thornton, 344 Pac. 2d 1101, cited by appellants. There, the Court said: “The testimony of the witness, Ralph H. Snyder, when considered with supplemental and corroborative evidence, is sufficient to support the verdict.” The “corroborative evidence” is not fully set out, though the facts enumerated disclose some factual difference between that case and the one at Bar. Without entering into a detailed discussion, suffice it to say that we are not, under the circumstances of the case before us, willing to permit an opinion based on evidence obtained at the scene more than seven months after the collision, and an inspection of the vehicles subsequent to that time, and after one of the vehicles had been partially dismantled. As stated in 32 C. J. S., § 522, p. 220:
“While absolute certainty is not required of an expert, it is necessary that the facts on which an expert relies for his opinion should afford a reasonably accurate basis for his conclusions. Accordingly, no matter how skilled or experienced the witness may be, he will not be permitted to guess or to state a judgment based on mere conjecture; in other words, the factual foundation for the expert opinion must not be nebulous.”
Appellants assert that even though this Court should find that Snyder’s testimony was properly excluded, there was still sufficient evidence to submit appellants’ counterclaim to the jury. In this connection, they point out that the undisputed testimony shows “that the curve on which the collision occurred was very dangerous; that *87the view was obscured when approached from Spring-dale; that it was raining and the highway was very slick; that the plaintiff, Cline, was familiar with the curve and aware of the danger; that the plaintiff, Cline, went into the curve doing 20 to 25 miles per hour with three and one-half tons of feed on his truck;4 that he had no cause for alarm as he passed the Burbank truck.” Of course, Cline testified that his truck was on the right side at all times, but appellants correctly state that this evidence cannot be considered in the motion for directed verdict made by appellees, since the testimony of a party is considered disputed as a matter of law. Appellants state:
“Under this state of facts, certainly the jury might have found that 20 to 25 miles per hour was too fast to proceed in a dangerous curve, especially with limited vision and on slippery pavement, and that the negligence of the plaintiff Cline in this respect proximately caused the fatal collision which is otherwise left unexplained by plaintiff Cline. The question of speed and its proximate effect are traditionally for the jury, especially under hazardous circumstances as existed here.”
In addition, appellants again urge the fact that the George truck admittedly did not strike a post when turning around; that the truck turning within a 15-foot radius (as the George truck would have been doing on its own side of the highway) would necessarily have hit a post; and they contend this was a circumstance indicating, and from which the jury could have found, that the George truck was on the wrong side of the highway at the time of the collision. We do not agree with appellants’ contentions.
Leaving out Cline’s testimony, which was disputed as a matter of law, there is no testimony as to Cline’s speed at the time of the collision.5 If the jury had not believed Cline, there simply would have been no evidence *88of speed, and no basis for the jury to find that he was proceeding up the hill in a careless or negligent manner, i. e., the failure to believe appellee would not have given appellants any affirmative evidence. If, on the other hand, the jury considered Cline’s speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour on entering the curve to be too fast, that fact would have to be tied-in with another premise before the jury could find that it was the proximate cause of the collision, i. e., such speed caused him to skid to the wrong side of the highway. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the George truck was skidding, and that its rear skidded onto appellants’ side of the highway; in fact, if we enter the field of speculation, ordinary experience teaches that one is more likely to skid on slick pavement when applying brakes — and brakes are more frequently applied while going down hill, as was the Burbank truck, than in going up hill. Appellants’ argument relative to the George truck not striking the post is predicated upon the theory that the truck spun around its front wheels, i. e., the front wheels served as the axis of rotation, but there is no showing that this was true. The axis of rotation could have been the center of the truck, in which event the front of the George truck would have been thrown onto the left side of the highway, and the back end, swinging around, would have cleared the posts. In fact, one could surmise that the wreck happened in any number of different ways, which only emphasizes the “guesswork” involved in reaching a conclusion. We think it evident that to return a verdict for appellants, the jury would have been required to enter the field of conjecture.
Finding do reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.
McFaddin and Robinson, JJ., dissent.