This is an action by the appellees, who purchased a ten-acre tract of land from the appellant, to recover the value of a set of platform scales that were on the land at the time of the conveyance. The appellees insist that the scales were fixtures passing with the land, while the appellant contends that they were personal property that might later be removed by the grantor. The trial court, sitting without a jury, found the scales to have been part of the realty and therefore awarded the appellees a judgment for $500 as damages for the appellant’s wrongful removal of the property.
The court was right in holding the device to be part of the land. The scales were used for the weighing of trucks and consisted principally of a platform thirty-four feet long and ten feet wide. This platform was suspended over an excavation of commensurate size, thirty-eight inches deep and lined with concrete. There was also a scale house containing the indicating mechan*689ism. The removal of the platform left the land burdened with the large, useless, concrete-lined excavation. In Waldo Fertilizer Works v. Dickens, 206 Ark. 747, 177 S. W. 2d 398, upon substantially identical facts we held that the scales were fixtures that passed with a conveyance of the land. That case is controlling here.
The appellant is correct, however, in his contention that the circuit court erred in permitting the introduction of incompetent evidence of the value of the scales. Over objection the court allowed Bryant to testify that two other men, Kendrick and Tyson, had tried to buy the scales from him, each offering $500. The court must have relied upon this testimony, as there is very little other proof of value, and indeed no other reference to the exact figure adopted by the court.
Isolated offers for the purchase of property are not ordinarily competent evidence of its value. Jonesboro, L. C. & E. R.R. Co. v. Ashabranner, 117 Ark. 317, 174 S. W. 548; Golenternek v. Kurth, 213 Ark. 643, 212 S. W. 2d 14, 3 A. L. R. 2d 593. Orgel, in discussing the rule, points out that such offers are mere hearsay declarations of third parties, not under oath and not subject to cross-examination. Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain (2d Ed.), § 148.
The appellees suggest that their proof did not involve “isolated” offers, since there was evidence of two offers rather than only one. This fact does not meet the objection. As Wigmore indicates, a merchant or a stockbroker who repeatedly receives and either accepts or rejects offers in the regular course of business may thereby arrive at an admissible opinion of value. Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.), § 719. The testimony of such a witness represents an informed independent judgment and not the mere repetition of hearsay. In the case at bar, however, Bryant’s testimony falls in the latter category and should have been excluded.
The appellant also complains that the appellees failed to show that he is legally responsible for the *690removal of the scales, which were taken away by third persons not parties to this suit. We do not' find it necessary to reach this question. Owing to the error indicated the case must be retried, and upon a new trial the plaintiffs may offer additional evidence tending to fix responsibility upon the appellant. When reversible error appears in a law case it is our practice to remand the cause for a new trial unless it appears that the ease has been fully developed and should be dismissed. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Beck, 84 Ark. 57, 104 S. W. 533, 1102; Ark. Nat. Gas Co. v. Gallagher, 111 Ark. 247, 163 S. W. 791. This cause will therefore be remanded for a new trial.
Reversed.
Ward, J., dissents.