The appeal is from a decree dismissing appellant’s complaint of September 24, 1946. The Chancellor found there was no merit in the contentions advanced — a conclusion with which we agree.
The marital history, and matters relating to continuing discord, interrupted now and then by periods of amity, are set out in this Court’s opinion of January 7, 1946. See Harris v. Harris, 209 Ark. 528, 191 S. W. 2d 465. In that case Mrs. Harris took the initiative and procured the decree we reversed.
*989All of the substantial grounds relied upon in the case now before us were urged in the appeal considered in the January 7th opinion. It was there said: “Any cause of action which might have existed when the suit was filed was condoned, and none has occurred since, although the right to divorce may be maturing on the ground of desertion”.
After Mrs. Harris’ first complaint was filed August 22, 1944, it was not the husband’s duty to urge his presence upon her when the circumstances were such that he knew of her desire for severance of the matrimonial bonds; but, if desertion had begun and the full period had not run when the complaint was filed, good faith on the part of the defendant required that he make known to the plaintiff a willingness to resume the relationship of husband and wife. The opinion of January 7th was to the effect that no valid reason was shown why the parties should not adjust their differences, which were referred to as petty.
February 5,1946 — slightly less than a month followr ing reversal, and eight days after this Court’s mandate was issued — Appellee wrote his wife the letter set out in the footnote, to which she .replied February 9th. Her letter is also copied.1 Answering the wife’s refusal of *990conciliation, Harris wrote her again on February 14th, urging that she return. He closed with the expression, “I hope you will use your mind and reconsider this matter for the sake of our boy. Our consideration of him should be paramount”.
We do not find anything to justify Mrs. Harris in thinking that her husband’s letter “carried insult in its very content”. It is true the'communication of February 5th suggested inferentially that Mrs. Harris was acting upon the advice of others instead of consulting her own desires; hut this could hardly be called insulting, even if untrue.
With no evidence' other than appellant’s hypersensitive conclusions that appellee was not acting in good faith, it cannot be said that the Chancellor’s action in dismissing the complaint was erroneous.
Affirmed.