This is ,a second appeal.1 In March, 1940, the judgment procured by Phillips (who alleged total and permanent disability and' obligations arising by reason of appellant’s contract of insurance) was reversed and the cause remanded for refusal of the trial court to require the plaintiff to submit to X-ray examinations in Pine Bluff or Little Rock.
Cumulative monthly payments which would be due appellee if he is entitled to recover were added to the judgment in the instant case. The insurance company contends it was entitled to an instructed verdict. Instead, the court gave the plaintiff’s Instruction No. 1, shown in the margin.2
The contractual provision as to disability requires payment by the company if the insured is suffering from an impairment of body which continuously renders it impossible for him to follow a gainful occupation.
The policy was issued in 1927. The following year Phillips moved from McCrory to Sheridan. His business in McCrory was “ice moving.” In 1935 he and Vance Thompson built an ice plant at Benton, each owning a half. It was operated less than a year, then leased, and still later sold. For three years appellee has owned the Sheridan ice plant. Shortly before trial its capacity was enlarged. When Phillips was asked on cross-examination if he did not testify in the first trial to having paid Thompson $3,000, earned through operation of the plant, he replied: “I said I probably had liquidated some indebtedness, but I don’t think I designated the way I got the money.” Asked where the money came from, he replied: “ Well, I just don’t know. ’ ’
Appellee had owned an ice plant at Rison. It was destroyed by fire in 1936, after having been operated about two years. He also owned a liquor store on the outskirts of Sheridan. Its operation extended over a period *32of eighteen months. He also owned a filling station, and leased it.3 Until three months before the trial from which this appeal comes appellee and his wife had deposited money in a Sheridan hank, bnt the practice had been changed. Although conceding that his business was profitable, appellee professed not to know where surplus money was kept other than that his wife took it to Little Rock. He was equally indefinite regarding a former illness. He had served in the navy and drew $30 monthly disability compensation, but did not know what the nature of his disability was. Other essential facts had been “forgotten” by appellee, or he did not know the answers to material questions. He had applied for additional insurance while partially disabled, but insisted the applications were made the year before. Throughout the cross-examination there is an obvious lack of candor.
Appellee is afflicted with duodenal ulcers and is partially incapacitated. Claim for benefits was recognized by appellant and certain payments made. These were discontinued in December, 1938, the company’s eonten*33tion being that appellee had recovered to such an extent that his disability did not fall within the terms of the policy. He had formerly weighed over 200 pounds. At trial his weight was slightly in excess of 160 pounds.
In spite of the inconveniences occasioned by the ulcers, appellee continued his business activities, increasing his holdings and expanding their capacities. He drove an automobile when necessary, made frequent trips to Little Pock and other places, and in many respects gave to his commercial enterprise executive supervision. The attention was sufficient to make them profitable and to improve appellee’s financial status.4
Evidence that appellee’s disability did not prevent him, from following a gainful occupation is abundant; nor is it shown that such activities were at the price of extraordinary physical suffering, or that appellee worked only because of necessity. We have said that total disability exists if the insured is unable to perform any substantial part of the work connected with his or her business. While the word “impossible” — -impossible to follow a gainful occupation — is used in appellee’s policy, the term is to be construed by courts in the light of facts incident to each case, and it may sometimes be synonymous with “impracticable.”
If the disease it is claimed causes disability (although not compelling inactivity) is such that slight effort might reasonably be expected to result disas*34trously, the insured would not he required to take the risk, although admittedly to do so would not be impossible.
The case at bar is controlled by the decisions in Missouri State Life Insurance Co. v. Snow, 185 Ark. 335, 47 S. W. 2d 600; Lyle v. Reliance Life Ins. Co., 197 Ark. 737, 124 S. W. 2d 958; Ætna Life Ins. Co. v. Person, 188 Ark. 864, 67 S. W. 2d 1007; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Guinn, 199 Ark. 994, 136 S. W. 2d 681; New York Life Insurance Co. v. Ashby, 199 Ark. 881, 138 S. W. 2d 65; General American Life Ins. Co. v. Chatwell, 201 Ark. 1155, 148 S. W. 2d 333.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is dismissed.