We determine whether there was substantial evidence to sustain appellee Chas. Tiffin’s claim, asserted through cross-complaint, that he was damaged $500 by action of appellant.
Tiffin, in January, 1937, renewed liis contract with appellant for distribution of its products. It was contemplated that Tiffin should purchase at wholesale prices, “on time.” Either party had the right to terminate the contract by written notice. Accounts due appellant matured upon termination of the contract, but in anv event were payable not later than December 31, 1937.
Upon termination of the contract appellant’s obligation was to purchase from Tiffin at current wholesale prices all products undisposed of. There was the condi*428tion that such goods should be returned promptly by prepaid freight to point designated by appellant. Appellant was permitted to charge five per cent, to cover cost of receiving, overhauling, and inspecting. By its terms the contract created the relationship of buyer and seller as distinguished from principal and agent, and “the buyer is in business for himself and has the exclusive right to determine where, at what price, and upon what terms and conditions he shall sell the products.” It was further agreed that any sales promotion or service letters or bulletins, advertising matter, or other literature appellant might send Tiffin should not change the relationship.1
Additional provisions related to suretyship. Bobert Meadors and S. W. Warfield were sued as sureties, the complaint alleging that Tiffin owed $512.33.
The answer was a general denial of the indebtedness. By way of cross-complaint it was charged that appellant had violated the terms of § 3 of the contract by refusing to accept products held in stock by cross-complainant when the contract was terminated; also', that the contract had been violated by appellant in ‘ ‘ continually suggesting, ordering and demanding that appellee sell his products in certain territory, at certain prices, and on certain terms. ’ ’ The damage alleged was $500.
Other1 Facts — and Opinion
Tiffin began selling W. T. Bawleigh products in 1928. ‘Contracts were renewed annually! He testified that at first he sold in the northern part of Franklin county; that in 1937 he was denied permission to sell elsewhere ; that he fixed prices on most of the products, but some came with the price stamped on the container; and that the company constantly sent bulletins and instructions on “how to sell and at what price.” One such bul*429letin was entitled: “Why it is best to follow company recommendations; ”2
Tiffin testified he had a conversation with J. A. Laws3 relative to enlargement of his territory; that he wanted to sell in Madison county, and that Laws told him he would not be allowed- to work there. A further statement was that Laws directed medicines to be left with prospective customers “on time and trial — he said that was the only way a dealer could succeed. ’ ’ When asked on cross-examination if he disobeyed the so-called instructions, Tiffin replied: “ I disobeyed these instructions every time I thought I could get by with it. ”
Although Tiffin testified he was not indebted to appellant, there was no denial of any item in the account. The assertion, therefore, was a mere conclusion apparently predicated upon a theory that damages would offset appellant’s claim.
The record fails to disclose that appellant breached its contract. Tiffin was not limited to any territory. If it be conceded that Laws refused to sanction sales in Madison county, the answer is that Tiffin owned the products and had a right to sell where he pleased. The only penalty appellant could inflict would be a refusal to renew the contract in 1938. It is not alleged there was any such threat. But, even conceding an implication, appellant was under no obligation beyond the 1937 agreement. Nor does Tiffin testify that when merchandise was received from time to time he complained because *430prices were printed on certain containers. It is possible • — reven probable — that Laws, in bis zeal to create a demand for Rawleigh products, exerted bigli-pressure salesmanship and convinced Tiffin the latter’s interests would be best served by following suggestions. This he had a legal right to do. Tiffin was not required to accede to any of Laws’ methods. Tiffin owned the merchandise, and this is true whether he paid for it or bought it on credit. The contract of suretyship was designed by appellant to afford financial protection, and prompt payment was not a matter of immediate concern.
It is unfortunate that well-meaning and obliging sureties miscalculated and must have judgments returned against them. The contract contained this paragraph: “The sureties are entitled upon request at any time to a statement of buyer’s account.” Their recourse, however, is against Tiffin.
There was no evidence upon which a judgment for damages could be predicated: The merchandise account stands unimpeached.
The judgment for $500 is reversed and the cause dismissed. Judgment is given here for $512.33, with interest as asked in the complaint.