(after stating the facts). There is no dispute about the several purchases of furniture and furnishings, that they were made at different times, and a separate written contract, descriptive of the articles purchased and retaining the title thereto in the vendor until the purchase price was fully paid, was executed at the time of the purchase.
Appellant insists, first, for reversal, that the court erred in not holding the account for all the different purchases of furniture made a single account, as charged on appellant’s ledger, and an entire contract of purchase, not severable or divisible, under which he had the right to repossess the property at any time so long as any part of the purchase price remained unpaid.
This contention cannot be sustained, however. There were, in fact, several purchases made at different times, and separate written contracts executed with each of such purchases, retaining the title in the vendor of the items described therein until payment in full of the purchase price. There is no expression in these different contracts tending to show any intention of the parties to make of the several purchases but one account or contract of purchase, notwithstanding the same reservation of title was made in each of them. Nor does any one separate purchase of such furniture furnish any consideration for another, so far as any definite expression of an intention of the parties to that effect is concerned. The different purchases of furniture and the written separate contracts therefor, neither furnishing any consideration for the other, cannot be regarded as an entire contract, as contended by appellant, but must be held, as they appear to be, separate contracts.
The court erred, however, in giving appellee’s said instruction No. 3. In each of said contracts of conditional sale the title to all the property purchased and described therein was expressly retained until the full *982payment of the entire amount of the purchase money, and notwithstanding the different articles purchased were included with the prices designated to be paid for each, the title to all the property described remained in the vendor so long as any part of the purchase money for the whole amount thereof remained unpaid.
The court also erred in giving appellee’s requested instruction No. 4, allowing the jury to assess as damages, in addition to the value of the property converted at the time of the conversion, with interest, the rental value of the property converted from the date of the conversion. 8 R. C. L. 486, par. 47; American Soda Fountain Co. v. Futrall, 73 Ark. 464, 84 S. W. 505, 10 Am. St. Rep. 64; Sonsee v. Jones & Green, 157 Ark. 131, 248 S. W. 289; Hudson v. Burton, 158 Ark. 619, 250 S. W. 898.
For the errors designated the cause must be reversed, and remanded for la new trial. It is so ordered.