(after stating the facts). Curtner relies for ia reversal of the judgment upon the rule in Hampton Stave Co. v. Gardner (C. C. A.), 154 Fed. 805, where it was. held that, upon a breach by a vendor of a covenant to furnish an abstract of title in a contract which grants a time option to purchase land, the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the value of the land, and the issue whether or not the vendee would have bought the land if the vendor had furnished the abstract is speculative and immaterial. Without approving that decision as to option contracts for the sale of land, we are of the opinion that it has no application to the facts of the present casé and is wholly opposed to the rule governing executed contracts of sale, as decided by our own and other courts of last resort.
It was clearly the duty of the plaintiff to use reasonable effort» to lessen any damage that might result from defendant’s breach of its contract in.a case like the-present one, where this could have been done at a trifling *541expense compared to the whole value -of the land. In Warren v. Stoddard, 105 U. S. 224, 26 L. ed. 1117, the rule was laid down as follows:
“That, where a party is entitled to the benefit'of a contract, and can save himself from a loss arising from the breach of it, at a trifling expense or with reasonable exertions, 'it is- his duty to do it, and he can charge the delinquent with isiuch damages -only as, with reasonable endeavors and expense, he could not prevent.”
The rule as -settled -by the decisions in this State is ■that, where a party is entitled to the benefit of a contract, 'and can save himself from loss arising from a breach thereof at a small expense or with reasonable exertions, it is his duty to do so, and he cam only recover -such damages as he could not thereby prevent. Young v. Berman, 96 Ark. 78, 131 S. W. 62, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 977; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ivy, 102 Ark. 246, 143 S. W. 1078; St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Reagan, 79 Ark. 484, 96 S. W. 168, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 977; and Lisko v. Uhren, 134 Ark. 430, 204 S. W. 101.
The undisputed evidence shows that Curtner could have procured -a-m abstract -of title to the land in question for the sum -of $65, and we are of the opinion that this was a trifling expense when compared with the whole value of the land, which, at the time of the exchange, was valued by the bank at $8,000, and which Curtner now says the bank told him waisi worth at the time twice that amount.
It follows that the judgment of the circuit court, was correct, and it will therefore be affirmed.