(after stating the facts). It is conceded that no notice was given of the filing of the account and claim for a lien, as required by § 6917, Crawford & Moses’ Digest, and also that Charles Ziegler, the original contractor, was not made a party to the suit, but insisted that there was no necessity for complying with any of the provisions of the mechanics’ and laborers’ lien law, since the building against which the lien was sought to be enforced was a church, except §§ 6915 and 6916, giving a lien for laborers and materialmen against churches and charitable institutions when no bond is required filed by the contractor for payment of labor ' done and materials furnished.
This contention is without merit. The said sections of the statute (act of June 2, 1911) were evidently made to provide protection for laborers and materialmen for work done and materials' furnished upon buildings and improvements of religions and charitable organizations and institutions, which the court had held were not subject^to the provisions of said mechanics’ and laborers’ lien law.
In Pfeiffer Stone Co. v. Brogdon, 125 Ark. 426, 188 S. W. 1187, the case in which it was sought to enforce a lien against a church where no notice of the filing of the account with the circuit clerk had been given, the court held that the filing of the suit to enforce the lien within the ninety days’ time given for fixing it dispensed with the giving of any such notice as had been held in the enforcement of such liens under the general law. This suit not having been commenced within ninety days after the work was done for which a lien is claimed, would not operate to relieve a lien claimant against the necessity for filing his account with the circuit clerk within the ninety days after the work was performed, and after giving the ten days’ notice required by law.
*1156It was not the intention of the statute to give a lien for work done for contractors on such buildings and improvements in ease no bond was required filed for the payment of such claims that could be enforced at any time thereafter, but, obviously and necessarily, the new act was intended to become-a part of such general law, and, certainly, to the extent of perfecting and enforcing the lien in accordance with the provisions thereof. The contractor was a necessary and indispensable party, as held in Simpson v. J. W. Black Limber Co., 114 Ark. 464, 172 S. W. 883.
Even if it could be considered that there was doubt about the bringing of the suit within ninety days of the date the last labor was performed, which dispensed with necessity for giving the notice and filing the account with the circuit clerk, the law requires that an action to enforce such lien shall be commenced within fifteen months, and the contractor is a necessary and indispensable party to such suit. His not having been made a party within said time, and the fact that the suit was sooner brought against the owner,' could not relieve against the limitation.
The judgment is accordingly reversed, and the cause dismissed.