(after stating the facts). The first ground •relied upon for a reversal of the decree is that appellees could not join-in one suit to recover the amount alleged to be due them by appellant, for contribution. Assuming counsel for appellant are right in this contention, it does not call for a reversal of the decree, since, under our Civil Code, the trial court might have consolidated the actions if they had been brought separately. Earl v. Ellison, 138 Ark. 166, 210 S. W. 346.
It is next contended by counsel for appellant that the court .erred in refusing to sustain their plea.of. the statute of limitations. The reciprocal obligations of surer ties to contribute proportionately to the principal debt does not depend upon the express contract between them, but is founded upon the principles of equity, as a liability growing out of their mutual relationship. Weaver-Dowdy v. Brewer, 127 Ark. 462, 192 S. W. 902; Reed v. Rogers, 134 Ark. 528, 204 S. W. 903; and Bank of Searcy v. Baldock, 153 Ark. 308, 240 S. W. 399.
It is contended that the three-year statute of limitations, applicable to implied contracts not in writing, rules the present case, and such is. our holding in Cooper v. Rush, 138 Ark. 602. It was also expressly held in that case that the right of action for contribution accrues when one surety pays more than his share of the common liability. This is in accordance with the general rule, that a party acquires the right of contribution as soon as *831he pays more than his share, hut not until then,'and consequently the statute of limitations does not begin to run until then. Richter v. Blassingame, 110 Cal. 530, 42 Pac. 1077; Durbin v. Kuney, 19 Ore. 71, 23 Pac. 661, and 13 C. J. 833.
When the appellees executed the note for $10,600, on the. 12th day of September, 1921, which appellant refused' to sign, and the Southern Trust Company accepted the note of appellees, this constituted a payment by appellees, and is equivalent in law to a payment in cash. Green v. Anderson, 102 Ky. 216, 43 S. W. 195; and 13 C. J. 823, and cases cited.
The present suit was commenced on the -26th day of March, 1924, which was less than three years from September 12,1921, when the .note by appellees was executed and accepted by the bank in full satisfaction of the demand due by the obligors. It is obvious that the statute did not begin to run.until September 12,1921, because the payments made by the appellees prior to that time did not amount to as much as their proportionate part of the indebtedness. The record shows that, each time a payment was made,-each appellee paid his own proportion ate part .thereof, and these sums did not amount to-as much as his proportionate share of the liability.
Hence the chancellor properly held that the action of appellees against the appellant for -contribution was not barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore the decree is affirmed.