(after stating the facts). In Willis v. City of Fort Smith, 121 Ark. 606, 182 S. W. 275, it was held-that, under our statutes, municipal corporations have expressly been given control and supervisión of the streets and highways within their limits. It was further. held that the State has a right to regulate and control- the use of motor vehicles except as it has granted such right to other governmental agencies, and that, under the -provisions of our motor vehicle law, the State has recognized the exclusive right of municipal corporations to make and enforce rules and regulations for motor vehicles tó be used for public hire.
It is a rule of universal application in this country that, when private property is devoted to a public use, it is subject to regulation under the police power. It is well settled that, in the absence of constitutional limitations, the Legislature has the right to regulate and prescribe the rules according to which the business of common-carriers may be conducted, and this power may be delegated to municipal corporations to be exercised for the promotion of the public convenience. Hence it is well settled that the right of a citizen to travel upon the streets and transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of things is wholly different from that of a common earr rier who makes the streets his place of business and uses them for private gain in the running of motor busses. The former is the common right of every one, and the latter
is a special or exceptional use of the streets not common to all the citizens of the State. See Dickey v. Davis (W. Va.), 85 S. E. 781, L. R. A. 1915F, 840; Hadfield v. Lundin (Wash.), 168 Pac. 516, L. R. A 1918B, 909; Commonwealth v. Kingsbury (Mass.), 85 N. E. 848, L. R. A. 1915E, 264; Cummins v. Jones (Ore.), 155 Pac. 171; Peters v. San Antonio, 195 S. W. 989; Memphis v. State, (Tenn.), 179 S. W. 631, L. R. A. 1916B, 1151; Allen v. Bellingham (Wash.), 163 Pac. 18; and State v. Spokane (Wash), 186 Pac. 864.
The Arkansas Railroad Commission was established, among other things, for the purpose of regulating motor *730busses, but there is no inconsistency between its powers arid the power given cities to control their streets. Indeed, one of the rules of the Arkansas Railroad Commission provides for the loading and unloading of passengers of public busses operating as common carriers at only privately owned depots in the cities and towns requiring it by valid ordinances.
The result of our views is that the circuit court erred in holding the ordinance in question to be invalid, and for that error the judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.