(after stating the facts). The circuit court was right in directing a verdict for the plaintiff. The *996amount and value of the logs taken were shown by the undisputed evidence. The ruling of the court was based upon the stipulation which we have copied in our statement of facts. The stipulation in express terms provides that the case at bar shall abide by the decision of the Supreme Court in the chancery case referred to in our statement of facts.
It is well settled that, in cases of suits actually pending, the parties may agree that one suit shall abide the event of another suit involving the same question. Webster v. Goolsby, 130 Ark. 141; Stone v. Bank of Commerce, 174 U. S. 412; and Knott v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 230 U. S. 509.
No contention is made by counsel for the defendant that this is not the law. His sole reliance for a reversal of the judgment is that the issues were not the same in the two cases. We can not agree with counsel in this contention. As we have just seen, a judgment entered upon the stipulation of the parties to a pending suit is in fact a judgment by consent. The record shows that the parties to both suits are the same, and in each suit their rights are to be determined by the same contract. The plaintiff in the present suit claimed the log's in each case under the same written contract, and the defendant claimed in each case that under this contract Burr & Poole had a lien on the logs, which was superior to the title of the plaintiff. The defendant bought whatever title Burr & Poole had, relying upon its being established in the courts as superior to that of the plaintiff. Hence the stipulation was entered into between the parties that the present suit should abide the result of the chancery suit.
The decree in the chancery case was affirmed in this court, and this settled the rights of the parties in the present suit. The issues of law in the two suits were precisely the same. Indeed it would seem that there was no use whatever in entering into the stipulation involved *997in this suit if the title to the logs was not to be determined by the result of the chancery suit.
The question of the value of the logs converted by the defendant was submitted to the jury under proper instructions, and the finding of the jury on this point is supported by the evidence.
It follows that the judgment will be affirmed.