(after stating* the facts). It appears fro!m the record that the sheriff of Pulaski County obtained two commitments based on judgments rendered in the Pulaski Circuit Court in two cases against the defendant. In one of the cases the defendant was fined $100, and in the other case he was fined $100 and sentenced to serve ninety days’ imprisonment in the county jail. After the defendant was arrested and placed in jail, the sheriff made an agreement with hiip that he would release him from jail during good behavior, if he would pay a note of $500, which his mother had given a former sheriff of Pulaski County for the 'balance of a fine of $1,000 adjudged against the defendant in the Pulaski Circuit 'Court. Pursuant to this agreement, the defendant paid the $500, and was by the sheriff released from jail. After more than three months had elapsed, the sheriff re-arrested the defendant and imprisoned him for the reason that he had violated the conditions of his release by again-being guilty of criminal conduct. The defendant, Massey, sued out a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he could not be compelled to serve the ninety days’ imprisonment imposed upon him by the circuit court, because more than ninety days had elapsed after he had been discharged from custody by the sheriff.
There is a conflict between the authorities as to the power of a court to suspend sentence for an indefinite period of time, or to suspend the execution of a sentence indefinitely. The Supreme Court of the United States *413in a well-considered opinion by Chief Justice White has held that, in the absence of a statute, a federal district court exceeds its power by ordering that the execution of a sentence to imprisonment imposed by it upon a plea of guilty, 'be suspended indefinitely during good behavior " upon considerations wholly extraneous to the legality of the conviction. Ex parte United States, 242 U. S. 27, Ann. Cas. 1917B, p. 355, L. R. A. 1917E. p. 1178.
The contrary decisions on this question may be found in notes to the case just cited and in a case note to 26 A. L. R. at p. 399. Our court has not decided this mooted question, but it has held that a sentence may be pronounced on a plea of guilty at a term subsequent to that at which the plea was entered. Thurman v. State, 54 Ark. 120, and Cox v. State, 114 Ark. 234, and cases cited.
The reason for holding that a sentence may be suspended to a subsequent term is quite apparent. It may be that the punishment has been left to the court, and the presiding judge wishes to consider the matter further. It may be that a like case is pending in the appellate court, and that it is deemed best to await its decision. Again the court may think it just to suspend sentence for a while, to the end that the offender may apply for executive clemency. Other reasons might be given; but no useful purpose could be served thereby. Some courts make a difference between! the power to suspend the imposing of a sentence and the power to suspend the execution of a sentence.
It has been uniformly held that where a prisoner has escaped and is rearrested after the term for which he was committed had expired by lapse of time, he may be compelled to serve out his term of imprisonment under the -original sentence. In re Edwards, 43 N. J. L. 555; Hollon v. Hopkins, 21 Kan. 459; Dolan’s case, 101 Mass. 219: Ex parte Bell, 56 Miss. 282; Cleek v. Commonwealth, 21 Grat., Va., 777; State v. Cockerham, 24 N. C. 204; and 2 Bishop’s New Criminal Procedure, § 1385.
The reason i>s that the time at which a sentence shall be darned into execution forms no part of the judgment *414of tlie court. The judgment is the penalty of the law as declared by the court, while the direction with respect to the time of carrying- it into effect is in the nature of an awiard of execution. So it is said that the essential portion of a sentence is the punishment, including the kind of punishment and the amount thereof, without reference to the time when it is to be inflicted. Of course, the sentence should as a rule be strictly executed; but it can not be changed or modified, except by legal action of some sort.
It has been generally said that, where the penalty is imprisonment, the sentence of the law is to be satisfied only by the actual suffering of the imprisonment imposed unless remitted by death or by some legal authority. The expiration of /time without imprisonment is in no sense an execution of the sentence.
In the application of the rule it has been held that, in cases of a void stay of execution issued by a court where the convicted defendant is at liberty and has notservedhis sentence, he mlay be rtea/rrested as an escape, 'and ordered into custody upon the unexecuted sentence. Ex parte Vance, 90 Cal. 208, 27 Pac. 209, 13 L. R. A. 574; People v. Patrich, 118 Cal. 332, 50 Pac. 425; Ex parte Collins (Cal. Ct. of Ap.) 97 Pac. 188; Neal v. State, 104 Ga. 509, 30 S. E.858, 42 L. R. A. 190, 60 Am. St. Repts. 175; Mann v. People (Colo. Ct. of Ap .) 66 Pac. 452; and Spencer v. State (Tenn.), 140 S. W. 597, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 680.
The reasoning of these cases applies with greater force to the case at bar. The sheriff was not vested with judicial authority or the power to grant paroles or reprieves. It is not necessary to discuss, the question of whether the Legislature could confer upon him any such authority. It is sufficient to say that it has not done so. In the present case it is apparent from the record that the sheriff released Massey mainly as a reformatory measure to secure future good behavior on his part. It is also apparent that Massey acted in good faith in mailing the agreement; but his act was none the less voluntary. Tlie sheriff wholly exceeded his pewters in releas*415ing Massey from imprisonment, and Ms act was void. TMs being true, he had the right to rearrest Massey to the end that (he might serve his sentence. It is immaterial that more than ninety days have elapsed since the sheriff released Massey. The latter was not in prison during that time, and the judgment 'could (be satisfied only by Ms actual imprisonment for the adjudged period. The time of Massey’s absence from confinement, under a void release, can not be considered as having been spent in jail in satisfaction, of the judgment which required his actual imprisonment.
It follows that the judgment of the circuit court in dismissing Massey’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was correct, and it will be affirmed.