(after stating the facts). The circuit court was right in holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to maintain the action. The action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer lies only in the cases pointed out by the statute, and the main purpose of the statute is to give a speedy remedy to a landlord against his tenant, who holds possession without right.
In this case the facts do not show that the plaintiffs were ever in the possession of the land, or that the defendant held under them by virtue of any contract, or that the relation of landlord and tenant in any manner, express or implied, existed between them.
We have held that the action of unlawful detainer will not lie on the right of possession merely, but the relation of landlord and tenant, express or implied, must exist in order to maintain the action. Dortch v. Robinson, 31 Ark. 296; Necklace v. West, 33 Ark. 682; and White River Land & Timber Co. v. Hawkins, 128 Ark. 277.
The plaintiffs, under the evidence, were entitled to the possession of the premises, but should have brought ejectment instead of unlawful detainer, or should have demanded that their landlord put them in possession of *644the premises, and, if he failed to do so, they might have maintained an action against him for a breach of their rent contract.
The case of Cherry v. Kirkland, 138 Ark. 33, has no bearing on this case, and is not in conflict with the 'views we have expressed. In that case the plaintiff in the action acqnired title from the lawful owner, and stood in his shoes as owner of the land for all purposes. The court expressly recognized that the relationship of landlord and tenant must exist, but said that the statute was broad enough to include the grantee of the owner. In other words, by acquiring the legal title to the property, the grantee took the place of the original owner, who was the landlord, and succeeded to his rights under the statute. Not so with the lessee of the original landlord, who, as we have already seen, only acquired the right of possession during the term of his lease, and did not become owner of the legal title to the land.
Therefore we are of the opinion that the court was right in dismissing the action of the plaintiffs.
The court was wrong, however, in submitting the question of damages to the jury. In the case of White River Land & Timber Co. v. Hawkins, 128 Ark. 277, it was held that, under our statute, the defendant in an action for unlawful detainer, where his occupancy is without right, cannot recover’ damages from the true owner. The reason is that the statute does not authorize such recovery, and the court said that it is only where the defendant disputes the right of possession that he can introduce before the .jury evidence showing damages he has sustained by reason of being dispossessed.
According to the uncontradicted evidence, the defendant was not entitled to the possession of the land in controversy, and the failure of the plaintiffs to recover possession was due entirely to the form of the action in which they sought relief.
*645It follows that the judgment in the defendant’s favor should only have been for the restitution of possession of the land and for the recovery of the costs of the action. To that extent only will the judgment be affirmed, and the judgment for recovery-of damages will be reversed and dismissed. It is so ordered.