(after stating the facts). It is first sought to uphold the decree on the theorv that the account of sales sent by the plaintiff to the defendant had become an account stated.
On this point the record shows that an account of sale for each bale of cotton was sent by the plaintiff to the *552defendant, and the statement showed the price received for the cotton, the storage, insurance, and commission of .the plaintiff, and the net proceeds of sale. These facts did not constitute a cause of action on an account stated. An account stated is an account balanced and rendered, with an assent to the balance, express or implied. Ten hales of cotton were shipped by Brown to the Southern Grocery Company to he sold by it for him, and an advance of $1,125 was made to him on the cotton. The account does not appear to have been intended as a final adjustment and settlement between the parties, and the facts do not show an agreement, express or implied, that it should be so regarded. Glasscock v. Rosengrant, 55 Ark. 376.
• When Brown shipped the nine bales of cotton to the Southern Grocery Company on the 11th day of December, 1919, he told it that he wanted to draw $125 a bale on it. The letter also advised the plaintiff to let him know what it could get for the cotton, and he would advise it whether to hold or sell it. On the 23rd day of January, 1920, Brown wrote the plaintiff that he had called it over the telephone on December -16, 1919, and asked it what he could get for his nine bales of cotton, and that the plaintiff promised to let Mm know not later than January 19, 1920. He reminded the plaintiff that he had not heard from it, and wanted to know, because he had fifteen bales more that he wanted to sell. The plaintiff sold one bale of cotton for $228.36, and, on June ’21, 1920, it sent the defendant an account of sales showing the net proceeds, $225.06. No objection was made to this sale. During the fall of 1920 there was a great decline in the price of cotton, and the plaintiff wrote several letters to the defendant demanding that he put up an additional margin of $300 to cover the advance made by the plaintiff to him. On December 29, 1920, Brown wrote the plaintiff that he would send the $300 as soon as he could sell some of his new cotton. In the letter he asked plaintiff what it could get for his cotton, and referred to the fact that, in its *553last letter, the plaintiff liad talked of selling Ms cotton and applying the proceeds to Ms account because he had failed, to put up the additional margin requested by it. The plaintiff, in several letters, notified the defendant that it would sell the cotton unless an additional margin was put up to cover the fall in the price of cotton.
Under these circumstances the plaintiff had a right to sell the cotton in the usual course 'of trade to reimburse it for the advance already made by it, and was only bound to exercise good faith towards the defendant in selling the cotton.
‘ The general rule is that, under circumstances of this kind, the factor has a right, acting in good faith, and with reasonable discretion, with regard both to the reimbursement of himself and the interest of his principal, to sell the property after reasonable notice to the owner. Davis v. Kobe, 36 Minn. 214; 1 Am. St. Rep. 663; Phillips v. Scott, 43 Mo. 86; 97 Am. Dec. 369; M. M. Walker Co. v. Dubuque Fruit & Produce Co., 113 Iowa 428; 53 L. R. A. 775; Blot v. Boiceau, 3 N. Y. 78; Am. Dec., 345, and case-note in 58 Am. Dec., p. 160; 11 R. C. L. § 19, p. 767, and 25 C. J., p. 360. See also Burke v. Napoleon Hill Cotton Co., 134 Ark. 580, and Wynne, Love & Co. v. Bunch, 157 Ark. 395.
If the defendant wished to prevent the plaintiff from selling the cotton to discharge the amounts advanced by it, he should have put up the margin demanded by the plaintiff, and, having failed, it would only be required to exercise good faith in the sale of the cotton. According to the testimony of the defendant, the plaintiff sold the cotton on the dates on which the price was the lowest. According to the evidence for the plaintiff, there was no market at all in the latter part of 1920 for the class of cotton in controversy. The plaintiff lost a considerable amount of money on this class of cotton because it was unable to sell it. While the account of sales^does not constitute an account stated, for the reason given above, still it is a fact which tends to prove the good faith of the plaintiff in selling the cotton. The cotton was sold on *554various dates in the years 1920 and 1921, and the last three hales were sold in the first part of 1922. On each date on which the cotton was sold the plaintiff sent a statement to the defendant showing the price for which it was sold, and the commission, storage and insurance charges. The defendant was thus advised of the price for which the cotton was sold and the net proceeds which he was to receive.- He made no objection to any sale reported to him, and good faith on his part would seem to require that he should have objected to the sale of the cotton.
In any event, the sending of the statement by the plaintiff tended to show its good faith in the matter. The extreme decline in the price of the cotton seems to have resulted disastrously to every one, and certainly was not anticipated by the plaintiff. The record shows that it had three or four thousand bales of cotton of this same class or grade which it was unable to sell, and on which it suffered considerable loss. While the low price for which the cotton was sold is evidence of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff in selling the cotton, still it cannot be said that, when all the surrounding circumstances are considered along with the evidence for the plaintiff, the finding of the chancellor in favor of the plaintiff is against the weight of the evidence.
Under the settled rules of this court the finding of facts made by a chancellor will not be disturbed on appeal, unless it is against the preponderance of the evidence.
It follows that the decree will be affirmed.