(after stating the facts). The sole ground upon which the judgment is sought to be reversed is that the evidence is not legally sufficient to warrant the verdict.
The evidence for the defendant, as well as for the plaintiff, shows that it is very dangerous to work in oil and gas fields. Indeed, it is a scientific fact of which the court will take judicial notice, that natural gas is so inflammable that, the moment a flame is applied to it, it will immediately ignite with an instant explosion. Holmberg v. Jacobs (Ore.), Ann. Cas. 1917D, p. 496; Jamieson v. Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co. (Ind.), 12 L. R. A. 652, and Whittemore v. Baxter Laundry Co. (Mich.), Ann. Cas. 1916C, p. 818.
*5The general rule is that, where a master is engaged in a dangerous business, he must adopt and promulgate such rules for the conduct of his business and the government of his servants, in the discharge of their duties, as will afford reasonable protection to them. He must also adopt such measures as may be reasonably necessary to secure the observance of such rules. Railway Company v. Tripplett, 54 Ark. 289, and Railway Company v. Hammond, 58 Ark. 324.
In the case before us the master adopted a rule prohibiting the servants from smoking while they were working near the pipe lines where gas was likely to escape, and they were especially instructed by their foreman not to strike a light while working in such places. The men were working under the direct supervision of their foreman. He had a g’ang of seven men who were working together under his directions. They were engaged in fitting some pipes together which conducted gas from the main pipe line. Some of the men were doing one thing and some another; but all were engaged in the same work.
According to the testimony of the foreman, who was a witness for the defendant, Sealy was in the discharge of his duty at the time he was 'burned, and the work was being done in the usual and customary way. All of the gang knew that the gas was escaping. He stated further that if a match had been struck by some one standing ten feet away the flame would ignite the gas and the fire would travel like lightning.
Other witnesses testified that Knight smoked cigarettes daily, and that he started the fire which burned Sealy by striking .a match with which to light a cigarette.
The foreman further stated that he did not see what ignited the gas, but it must have.been a match, and that, if any one struck a match, it was negligently done.
Knight denied striking a match at the time Sealy was injured, but admitted that he carried matches and smoked cigarettes. He knew it was against the rules to strike matches while they were doing the work that they were *6doing when .Sealy was burned. He was gathering up the tools and was carrying a pair of tongs to the wagon at the time Sealy was burned.
Another witness said that Knight had ¡been working just before he struck the match, and knew that the gas was escaping when he struck it. Knight had been helping to put on the pipe, and then stepped back about ten feet when he struck the match.
It is legally and fairly inferable from this evidence that the lighted match caused the gas to explode and to burn Sealy. The evidence also shows that Knight struck the match, and that he was guilty of negligence in doing so. He was engaged in the same work with Sealy, and his negligence in striking the match caused the explosion which resulted in setting fire to the gas, and burned Sealy before he was aware that the match had been struck or could take any precautions to avoid the injury.
It is claimed by counsel for the defendant that the case comes within the exceptions to the rule as laid down in Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Lee, 115 Ark. 288, and American Ry. Express Co. v. Davis, 152 Ark. 258. We cannot agree with counsel in this contention. In each of those cases the servant had stepped aside from Ms employment, and was acting solely on his own account in a matter in which the master had no connection. So it was said that the servant was not acting for the master and was not his representative in the act which caused the injury.
In the case first cited the plaintiff was assaulted by another servant pursuant to a plan to drive him out of the defendant’s employment.
In the case last cited the plaintiff was killed by a fellow servant in playing with a pistol intrusted to him by the master. He was not engaged in doing any work for the master at the time, but had stepped aside to play with the pistol, a matter which was in no way connected with his employment.
In the case before us all of the men were working in the same gang. They knew that the gas was escaping *7and that it was against the rules to strike a match while engaged in such work. Knight, who 'struck the match, had just finished his work on the pipe, according to one witness, and was carrying some tools to the wagon, according to his own testimony. It is true that he denied striking the match, hut the fact that he did so is established by the testimony of other witnesses. The foreman of the defendant admitted that the striking of the match caused the injury, and that it was negligence to strike it at the time and place in question.
All of the servants were working together at the time Sealy was injured, and it constituted actionable negligence for one of them to violate a rule made for their common protection, the doing of which would likely result in injury to some of them. To illustrate: If several men, engaged in working around a place where gas was escaping or likely to- escape, should agree not to strike a light so that they might avoid exploding the gas and injuring each other, all would agree that it was actionable negligence for one of the persons to strike a match and cause an explosion which would burn one of his fellow workers. Now, under our statute, the master is responsible for the negligent act of one servant causing injury to his fellow workers. Therefore, the negligent act of Knight in striking the match which caused the g-as to explode and burn Sealy was also attributable to the master.
No other assignment of error is presented for a reversal of the judgment, and it will therefore be affirmed.